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Explaining Africa’s Long-Run Economic 





One of the most pressing issues in development economics is (the lack of) progress 
in the development region: Sub-Saharan Africa (Africa hereafter). Africa clearly 
occupies a distinct place in development studies, as Africa is the poorest region in 
terms of income levels per head of the population and also, on average, the slowest 
growing continent of the world (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1997; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik, 1998; Block, 2001).  
However, these averages hide an enormous within-Africa diversity both in economic 
performance and in economic fundamentals. This thesis focuses on this African 
diversity as we analyse institutional and economic developments for the majority of 
the African countries from a long term perspective. Many studies have offered 
explanations for Africa’s growth performance compared to other regions, ranging 
from bad institutions brought by colonisers, to ethnic diversity and bad geography 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001; Easterly and Levine 1997; Collier and Gunning 1999; Gallup 
et al. 1998; Sachs 2001). But these studies rarely take the situation before 
colonisation into account nor do they actually measure colonial presence beyond a 
colonial dummy. We focus only on Africa, and start by measuring pre-colonial 
institutional ‘initial conditions’ and link this to institutional and economic 
Explaining Long-Run African Development 8
  
development in later times to the present day. Subsequently we quantify colonial 
presence in education just before decolonisation, and link this to educational and 
economic development during independence. Finally, we study the influence of a 
colonial past on present day investment patterns. 
When we compare the income per capita developments since 1950 of three 
geographical regions home to a majority of relatively poor countries in graph 1, 
Africa is the region obviously lagging behind as it is not much better off than it was 
25 years ago (Vaughan, 2005). Africa’s distinctiveness is also reflected by the Africa 
dummy which is often included in studies analysing economic growth in a world 
sample (Barro, 1998; Gallup et al., 1998).  
 
 





























       Source: Maddison (2003) 
 
 
But averages have only limited value for the African continent, given the enormous 
diversity this region contains. There are 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, together 
covering an area of 23,8 million square kilometres. This equals the size of Europe, 
the United States (including Alaska) and China put together. The continent has a 
wide variety of climate zones, ranging from deserts and semi-deserts to savannas, 
tropical rainforest and woodlands (Neff, 2007).  
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 In 2000, there were over 665 million people living in Sub-Saharan African 
countries (U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division), which is on average 28 persons 
per square kilometre. The most populous countries are Mauritius (584 persons per 
sqd km. in 2000) Rwanda and Burundi (337 persons and 266 persons per sqd km. in 
2000 respectively). The lowest population densities can be found in Namibia, 
Mauritania and Botswana (2,3 persons, 2,4 persons and 2,9 persons per sqd km in 
2000 respectively). Furthermore, Africa is both linguistically and ethnically the most 
diverse continent in the world. In the words of Frederick Cooper (2002): ‘Africans 
are as different from each other as they are from anybody else (Cooper, 2002:12; see 
also Manning, 1990:25).   
 This vast variety in circumstances between African countries is reflected in 
various development paths (Rodrik, 1998; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Garner, 2005; 
Englebert, 2000a; 2000b). There are countries that experienced over 2.5% growth on 
average for 50 years,  and there are countries that are actually worse off than they 
were 25 years ago. In half of the countries, income per capita is over 1,000 
international dollars per annum at the end of the previous century.  
 
The distinct place in terms of development Africa occupies in the world, and the 
variability of growth experiences on the continent merits an analysis of economic 
and institutional development in an African sample. This thesis will do so by taking a 
historical approach. We try to asses the impact of initial conditions on development 
paths in later times. Initial conditions, i.e. the situation present before or at the 
beginning of the period under analysis, can be thought of as a spectrum, from factors 
that are plausibly exogenous to factors that are the results of previous policies 
(Temple 1998). Many studies include initial conditions in growth analyses, such as 
the geographical situation, the availability of resource endowments, ethnic diversity, 
capital stocks, technological environment and social capability (Sachs and Warner 
1997; Easterly and Levine 1997; Abramovitz 1986). In the convergence literature for 
example, initial conditions are argued to determine the potential of countries to catch 
up to the technology leader (Abramovitz 1986, 1989).  
 Given Africa’s colonial history, which has been influential if only for the 
creation of the countries  we know today, two periods for initial conditions are 
Explaining Long-Run African Development 10
  
defined in this study, namely the pre-colonial period and the colonial period1. First, 
the institutional environment in pre-colonial times is measured using new data taken 
from anthropological datasets and this is utilized to analyse the influence of these 
early institutions on institutional development and economic development in present 
times. Second, using colonial archives the actual presence of colonial rulers in 
various African countries is captured and used to asses to what extent that influenced 
development paths after independence. Finally, we study the effect of a colonial past 
on investment patterns abroad.  
 
Together with this introductory chapter, this thesis contains five chapters. Four 
chapters are based on articles published or submitted to various journals. This might 
cause some overlap in the discussion of both variable measurement and literature.   
 This first chapter serves both as a general introduction to the topic of 
African development and as a prelude to the other chapters. It will start with a brief 
overview of the current economic situation in African countries and the main 
developments since 1950. This will make clear that there is substantial between-
country variation to be explained. Subsequently we review studies explaining broad 
economic development, with special relevance to Africa, while making the 
distinction between ultimate and proximate causes of growth. Literature discerns the 
following root causes of African development: Institutions, of which the roots are 
traced back to colonial times (Acemoglu et. al, 2001; Grier, 1999; Englebert, 2000b; 
Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; Lange, 2004; Fielding and Torres, 2008). Slave trades, 
which pre-dates and coexisted with colonial rule, in which millions of Africans were 
exported from the continent, arguably severely hampering African development 
(Nunn, 2008; Manning, 1983, 1990; Lovejoy, 1983). Geography, where the tropical 
location of the African continent leads to bad disease environments and limits to 
agricultural and labour productivity (Sachs and Warner, 1999; Sachs, 2001; Gallup et 
al., 1998). And finally, ethnical diversity, often in combination with little political 
development, is maintained to lead to the formation of less social capital, to the 
undersupply of productive public goods, and more generally to less growth 
enhancing policies, hence causing lower economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 
1997; Collier and Gunning, 1999a, 1999b). Figure 1.2 below summarises variables 
                                                 
1 In appendix 1.A we include a table with the start and the end of the colonial period for 
every African country. 
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discussed and the links to development and includes in bold the relationships studied 
in this thesis.  
 





















Our main findings are that indeed initial institutional conditions matter. Africa was 
no tabula rasa with respect to institutions when Europeans conquered the continent, 
and these indigenous institutional histories matter when explaining institutional 
development in Africa. Furthermore, we find that variables useful in explaining the 
difference between rich and poor countries in a world sample are not always helpful 
in explaining growth differences within a sub-sample of only developing countries. 
More specifically, we find the extractive institutional hypothesis not able to explain 
within-Africa variation in development. In contrast, our results show that colonial 
education correlates well with Africa’s development after independence. And finally, 
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we find evidence that a shared colonial past fosters familiarity between countries and 
that this familiarity influences investment patterns between those countries.  
After the discussion of the existing literature on economic development, we 
introduce each  chapter included in this thesis. As the chapters can be divided into 
roughly two time periods, namely the pre-colonial period (chapter two and three) 
and the colonial period (chapter four and five), each set of chapters is preceded by a 
brief outline of economic and social circumstances prevalent in each period. Each of 
these outlines is followed by a discussion of the main conclusions of the chapters 
focussing on that period. 
 
1.2. Africa’s economies 
 
A feature of Africa which is often overlooked is that, even though its average 
development performance may be disappointing, some African countries have 
actually achieved significant and sustained growth between 1950 and 2000 (see figure 
1.3). In contrast, there are also countries whose economy contracted in the second 
half of the 20th century. On the surface, it is not immediately obvious what 
distinguishes the good performers from the countries that experienced only low or 
even negative growth. Some of these good performing countries are landlocked, and 
others are not; some are islands, and some are not, some have natural resources, and 
some have not. But before we try to explain why some countries did better than 
others it is useful to first describe the current economic situation, and the broad 
trends since 1950. 
 GDP levels more than doubled in all African countries since 1950, but GDP 
per capita figures show a very different picture (see figure 1.3). Ten countries2 more 
than doubled their per capita income, eleven other countries3 saw their average 
income decline since 1950, and the remaining 26 experienced some increase in 
income (see also figure 1.3).  
 
 
                                                 
2 Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Lesotho, Seychelles, Swaziland, 
Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Malawi. 
3 Zambia, Chad, Somalia, Central African Republic, Liberia, Angola, Madagascar, Djibouti, 
Niger, Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo.  
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Figure 1.3: GDP per capita growth 1950-2000 
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Sources: Total Economy database, GGDC Groningen 
Explaining Long-Run African Development 14
  
In terms of GDP per capita levels, Mauritius, Seychelles and Gabon were the richest 
countries on the continent4 during the 1990s, the poorest were Tanzania, Ethiopia 
and Chad5. In around half the African countries, the average income per capita was 
above 1,000 international dollars at the turn of the century (GK PPP adjusted, see 
Maddison, 2003).  
 In many African countries during the 1990s, only ten percent of the working 
age population was engaged in wage-employment because of the lack of available 
wage-jobs (Fluitman 2001). The rest of the people were forced to be self-employed, 
or were engaged as unpaid family helpers in mini farms or in micro-enterprises in the 
informal sector. On average 69 percent of the people work in the agricultural sector 
in the 1990s, which makes this sector by far the largest employer of most African 
countries (ILO)6. Although the employment shares of agriculture have been 
declining in all countries, the growth of the labour force has led to an increase in the 
rural labour force in absolute numbers in most countries. The majority of agricultural 
workers were unpaid family helpers on household farms or were self-employed, and 
many produce for domestic consumption only. Although the majority of these 
workers were primary engaged in the agricultural sector, they are also increasingly 
active in other sectors on a part time basis. These part time exits from agriculture to 
other activities remain unnoticed in these statistics, as only primary occupations are 
included. At the national level though, these exits add up to a substantial shift in 
economic activity (Headey et al. 2009).   
 Even though the majority of the population was working in agriculture, only 
around 30 percent of the official GDP was produced in the agricultural sector in 
Africa. As only market activities are included in GDP estimates, the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP is highly underestimated. 
 The service sector and the industrial sector provide much less employment 
compared to the agricultural sector, although it should be noted again that only 
primary activities are reported. The service sector employs on average 20 percent of 
                                                 
4 Average GDP pc 1990-1999 
5 Actually the poorest country based on average income levels in the 1990s is Democratic 
Republic of Congo; see footnote 3. 
6 Data on employment per sector are very scarce. Data used here are taken from the ILO 
(Economically Active Population 1950-2010) for 1990 and from Fluitman (2001) for 1997, but the 
latter are only available for selected countries. For those countries, change between 1990 and 
1997 is minimal. 
Introduction  15 
the population and the majority of these people were typically engaged in small 
household-based ventures providing all kinds of services like mobile restaurants, 
barber shops, street traders and so forth (Fluitman, 2001). In only 14 countries, more 
than ten percent of the population was active in the industrial sector. Countries with 
the largest industrial sector in terms of GDP were almost all well known resource 
rich countries, such as Angola, Botswana, Nigeria, Gabon and more recently 
Equatorial Guinea. Especially the mining sector provides little employment.  
 
Social Indicators7 
Social indicators are, similar to GDP measures, important indicators for 
development. And just like GDP estimates, these indicators show a varied picture of 
African development, both between countries, but also in terms of progress 
achieved. On average the African population is very young, with between 42 and 45 
percent of the population being 14 years or younger between 1960 and 2000 (WDI 
2007) and only 3 percent of the population being over 65 years of age. This is due to 
high fertility and still relative low life expectancy although both indicators show 
improvements. 
In other social areas, available data shows, sometimes considerable, progress. 
Access to clean water increased, as did the availability of sanitation facilities and 
primary school completion rates. Furthermore, especially in terms of school 
enrolment rates and child mortality, most African countries experienced substantial 











                                                 
7 Data taken from WDI 2007, except for numbers enrolled in primary school in 1960 which 
are obtained from the World Development Report 1978. 
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Table 1.1: Social indicators for selected countries 
 
 
Numbers enrolled in primary 
school as percentage of age 
group 
Mortality rate, under-5           
(per 1,000)  
 1960 2000 % change 1960 2000 
% 
change 
Angola  21 80 74% 345 260 -25% 
Benin  26 77 66% 296 160 -46% 
Burkina Faso  8 44 82% 320 196 -39% 
Burundi  18 61 70% 250 190 -24% 
Cameroon  65 92 29% 255 151 -41% 
Central African Republic  32 64 50% 343 193 -44% 
Chad  16 67 76%    
Congo, Dem. Rep. 60 70 14% 302 205 -32% 
Congo, Rep. 78 73 -7% 220 108 -51% 
Cote d'Ivoire  46 70 35% 290 188 -35% 
Ethiopia  5 63 92% 273 150 -45% 
Ghana  59 80 27% 215 112 -48% 
Guinea  30 60 50%    
Kenya  47 98 52% 205 117 -43% 
Lesotho  83 120 31% 202 108 -47% 
Liberia  31 99 69% 288 235 -18% 
Madagascar  52 100 48% 186 137 -26% 
Malawi  63 139 55% 362 155 -57% 
Mali  7 53 87% 500 224 -55% 
Mauritania  8 87 91% 310 125 -60% 
Mozambique  48 74 35% 313 178 -43% 
Niger  5 30 84% 354 270 -24% 
Nigeria  36 96 62% 290 207 -29% 
Rwanda  49 102 52% 206 203 -1% 
Senegal  27 64 58% 311 132 -57% 
Sierra Leone  23 65 65% 390 286 -27% 
South Africa  89 107 17%    
Sudan  25 51 51% 208 97 -53% 
Tanzania  24 66 64% 241 141 -41% 
Togo  44 104 58% 267 142 -47% 
Uganda  49 127 62% 224 145 -35% 
Zambia  48 75 36% 213 182 -15% 
Zimbabwe  98 98 0% 159 117 -26% 
       Sources: WDI 2007; World Development Report 1978  
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A much smaller proportion of African children has been dying in infancy in 2000 
compared to 50 years earlier, as child mortality fell by on average nearly 40 percent 
to 152 per 1000 in 2000, although in 12 countries, mortality is still over 200 in 2000 
see table 1.1. Also enrolment rates improved vastly, on average doubling between 
1960 and 2000. Various countries actually reached the point where nearly all children 
go to school, at least for some period of time.  
In other areas, the advancement has been less promising. For example 
health indicators like hospital beds per 1000 people, and economic indicators like 
road and railway densities per square kilometre are the lowest in the world, and 
hardly increased between 1990 and 2000. Moreover, for goods transported internally, 
no sufficient data is available, but numbers suggest actually a decline in transported 
volume since the beginning of the 1980s. 
The fact that for various indicators not enough data is available brings us to an 
important issue in quantitative studies on African development: data availability and 
data quality. This will be discussed in section on data issues below. 
 
Period of analysis  
In this thesis, the period of analysis ends around the year 20008. This is a somewhat 
arbitrary choice, based on the fact that the year 2000 nicely rounds off the preceding 
century, and because this project started in the year 2004 which made most data 
readily available up to the year 2000. But this choice ignores the period of rapid 
growth Africa embarked upon since the end of the 1990s. Average GDP growth 
between 1995 and 2005 has been over 5 percent, and GDP per capita growth over 3 
percent on average (Arbache et al. 2008). But again, variances are large as Zimbabwe 
saw its economy contract by on average 5.5 percent per year, and Equatorial Guinea 
experienced over the same period a staggering 23.1 percent growth9. And not only 
resource rich countries experienced growth accelerations, but also oil importing, 
landlocked and to some extent fragile state countries have saw growth take off10 
(Arbache et al. 2008). The question is of course how sustainable this growth is, given 
Africa’s history of frequent growth accelerations and - collapses. Despite the 
                                                 
8 In chapter 2 the dependent variable is measured between 1996 and 2002. 
9 Figures based on the WDI 2007. 
10 Countries such as Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, 
Rwanda and Uganda. 
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impressive growth records, it seems clear that the increase in commodity prices since 
the turn of the century is a great driver of this increased growth. Moreover, much 
also seems to depend on aid flows and debt relief, although also economic 
fundamentals of growth seem to improve, like macro economic policy and 
institutions (Arbache et al. 2008).  
 
Data issues 
Africa is in the eyes of many economists notorious for the lack of reliable data. 
Especially GDP (per capita) estimates have been subject to much critique (Chander 
1990; World Bank 1989). There are two kinds of problems with GDP measures, 
both technical issues and a more fundamental problem. To start with the latter, GDP 
growth is often used to measure development, but development is actually much 
more than economic growth alone. Social aspects as literacy and healthcare and for 
example the environmental costs of growth are also important. Still, at least for the 
poorest countries, economic growth is seen as a pre-requisite for development and 
therefore GDP growth is a good indication of development (Szirmai 2005).  
The most pressing technical problems related to GDP estimates are first of 
all that these measures exclude subsistence production and the informal sector. Both 
sectors are generally large in developing countries especially in Africa. Furthermore, 
GDP estimates do not adequately include environmental pollution and depletion of 
natural resources. Finally, these measures do not allow for difference in conditions in 
life that demand different types of food, housing and clothing (Szirmai 2005; Headey 
et al. 2009).  
Another problem with GDP estimates is that various sources of GDP give different 
estimates for the same country, with the difference generally larger for developing 
countries, especially Africa (Jerven, 2007). Sutcliff (2003) for example compared 
GDP measures provided by Maddison (2000) and the Penn World Tables (PWT) 6.1 
for 98 countries, and finds that the values of Maddison (2000) vary between 62 and 
291 percent of those presented by PWT values. This implies that it matters for the 
analysis, which source of income estimates you use.  
Despite these limitations, there are also indications that GDP measures for 
Africa are not of such low quality that they cannot be used for certain analytical 
purposes. Cinyabuguma and Putterman (2007) for example estimate growth in an all 
African data panel, and find the typical negative relationship between initial income 
and growth and the common positive relationship between investment and growth. 
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This suggests ‘that Africa is not all that different from other continents and that data 
for the continent’s countries is not all that poor’ (Cinyabuguma and Putterman, 
2007:2). Furthermore, studies using alternative measures of welfare such as mean 
population heights and nutritional statuses, find that the correlation with GDP is 
generally high and positive (Moradi, 2006; Austin et al., 2007).  
As GDP measures are the most readily available measure of the size of the 
economy, and are an important indicator for development, in various chapters we 
use these estimates as an indicator of welfare, although it is obvious that, especially in 
developing countries, GDP estimates should be interpreted with care. 
Acknowledging the variation in income levels between different sources, we always 
use two different sources of income estimates when assessing the income effect of 
certain variables. 
 
1.3. The ultimate sources of economic growth 
 
Trying to answer the question why some countries are rich and others poor has 
produced an enormous number of studies (Hall and Jones, 1999; Landes, 1997; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003 among many others). Especially 
since the independence of most former colonies, ‘the problem of economic growth 
came to the fore’ (Easterlin, 2001:1). Determinants of economic growth are often 
divided in ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’ causes of growth (Maddison, 1987; 1991). 
Proximate causes include inputs of labour and capital, technological change and 
population growth  (Maddison, 1991; Acemoglu, 2008). Ultimate causes comprise 
‘institutions, ideologies, pressure of social-economic interest groups, historical 
accidents and economic policy at the national level’  (Maddison, 1991:10). Rodrik et 
al. (2004) and Rodrik (2003) define the ‘deep’ determinants of growth to be 
‘institutions, integration and geography’. Acemoglu et al. (2004) and Acemoglu 
(2008) divide the fundamental causes of growth into the ‘geography hypotheses’ and 
the ‘institutional hypotheses’.  
The general root causes of development, namely institutions and geography, 
and factors deemed more specifically relevant for long run ‘African development’, 
namely slave trades and ethnic diversity will be discussed extensively below. 
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Institutions 
The institutional approach to economic development has received much attention 
during the last few years as among others Acemoglu et al (2001), Djankov et al 
(2002), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Knack and Keefer (1997) drew attention to the 
relation between weak political-economic institutions and low growth in cross-
country studies. Furthermore, the book ‘In Search of Prosperity’ edited by Rodrik 
(2003) shows the importance of good institutions in explaining the performance of 
individual countries such as China, Botswana, Mauritius and Australia. In contrast, 
the chapters about Indonesia and Bolivia describe the difficulties countries encounter 
when growth promoting institutions are absent.  
Institutions or institutional quality is a very broad concept which means 
different things to different people. Many studies do not explicitly define institutions, 
but implicitly often the definition of North (1990) is used. According to North 
(1990), institutions are ‘the rules of the game in a society’ (North 1990:3). These rules 
govern interaction and exchange in society and so reduce the uncertainty of daily 
live. These rules include both formal rules and informal codes of behaviour. 
The institutional approach is not new. Ever since the famous article on 
transaction costs by Coase (1937), scientists have analyzed the importance of 
institutions for economic growth. North and Thomas state in their book ‘The Rise 
of the Western World’ (1973) that the key reason the West soared was because it 
developed efficient institutional arrangements.  
 
Colonial Institutions 
Directly linking the institutional framework to economic development is difficult, 
since the causal relationship could very well run from economic development  to 
institutions (richer countries might need and can afford better institutions). To solve 
this, Acemoglu et al (2001) argue that the exogenous variation in different 
institutional frameworks is rooted in history. The authors take a sub sample of 
former European colonies, and propose that where the (disease) environment of 
possible colonies was favourable to the European settlement, the colonisers went to 
stay, which led to the creation of institutions similar to those in Europe. In contrast, 
where the (disease) environment was not favourable, i.e. (potential) settler mortality 
was high, the Europeans created ‘extractive institutions’ to get valuable resources out 
of those regions. These implemented institutional frameworks are presumed to be 
persistent, i.e. they still influence the institutional environment today in former 
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colonies. Fielding and Torres (2008) argue in line with the previous study, that the 
style of colonisation still influences institutional quality in former colonies although 
they suggest that colonisation depended not on the disease environment but on the 
natural comparative advantages of prospective colonies. Climate, physical geography 
and to some extent settler mortality determined factor endowments and the 
production structure of the colony which in turn determined whether colonisation 
was extractive or not. In countries with a comparative advantage in (slave) labour or 
physical capital intensive  goods, i.e. countries suitable for cash crops and mineral 
rich countries, there was no need for large settlement to reap the benefits of 
colonisation. Consequently, colonisers implemented a institutional framework in 
these countries, designed only to control the population and extract resources. In 
contrast, in countries with a comparative advantage in pastoral agriculture, European 
settlement densities were much higher. These colonies developed much stronger 
political and economic institutions. According to both studies, this explains why 
settler economies like the US, Australia and New Zealand are well developed, and 
many countries in Africa and Asia are much worse off. 
Distinctive from the studies discussed above, which use circumstances in the distant 
past to explain settlement patterns and subsequent (colonial) institutional 
development, there is also an expanding literature that recognises the influence of 
colonial era circumstances on long term development in ex-colonies, by taking the 
colonial time as the starting point (Grier, 1999; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; Lange, 
2004; Djankov et al , 2002; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002).  
The ‘legal origin’ view argues that the fundamentals of the institutional 
framework that evolve in different countries crucially depend on legal origin 
(Djankov et al, 2002, Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002, La Porta et al., 1998). Djankov et al. 
(2002) and La Porta et al. (1998), identify five legal traditions or origins: British 
common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian civil law, and Socialist 
civil law. Most developing countries have inherited a legal structure from their 
colonisers, which according to this view has remained fundamentally the same ever 
since. So the legal identity of the colonizer determined the quality of institutions in 
terms of regulation and property rights, the quality of governments and, to a certain 
extent, political freedom (Gleaser and Shleifer, 2002). The British common law and 
the French civil law are the most common in the world, and for Africa also the most 
relevant ones. Both systems are different since the French system depends on 
‘professional judges, legal codes, and written records’ (Glaeser and Shleifer, 
Explaining Long-Run African Development 22
  
2002:1193) whereas in contrast, the British system works with ‘lay judges, broader 
legal principle, and oral argument’, (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002:1193). It is interesting  
to note that civil law countries always perform different on all institutional areas 
analysed, (institutions such as regulation and property rights, the ‘quality’ of 
governments and political freedom) and also on financial development, compared to 
common law countries (Djankov et al., 2002; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; La Porta et 
al., 1998) 11.  
Grier (1997) finds that British colonies perform significantly better 
economically between 1960 and 1990 than their French and Spanish counterparts in 
a 63 country sample. Given the British indirect rule, it is argued that ex-colonies were 
allowed to adopt institutions that best suited their situation. Additionally, Grier 
(1999) argues that also the length of colonial period positively influences economic 
performance after independence. Both the length of the colonial period and a British 
legacy are also positively related to growth in a sub-sample of 31 African countries. 
Bertocchi and Canova (1996) focus on Africa when establishing a link 
between colonisation and development. They find that former British and French 
colonies perform better than former Portuguese and Belgian colonies. Possible 
channels mentioned are the high degree of political instability and low human capital 
accumulation caused by colonial rule. Apparently (but not mentioned by the authors) 
political instability has been higher and human capital accumulation lower in former 
Portuguese and Belgian colonies compared to former British and French colonies. 
Additionally, exploitation of natural resources and repatriating profits during colonial 
times12 are negatively associated with growth post-independence. 
The general conclusion of the institutional view is that African countries are 
performing so poorly compared to other regions, because they lack a sound 
institutional framework due to colonisation (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Djankov et al., 
2002; Fielding and Torres, 2008), although some colonial legacies are apparently 
                                                 
11 Scoring higher on these measures appears to indicates more like the Anglo-Saxon system. 
Often higher scores are immediately associated with better institutions, but the question is 
whether that is the case. At the least its important specify for what purpose exactly certain 
institutions are better. 
12 measured as the difference between GDP and GNP in 1960, so after most countries gained 
independence. This discrepancy between GDP and GNP reflects ‘repatriated profits on 
foreign investment, royalties as well as direct exploitation activities (Bertocchi and Canova, 
2002: 12). 
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worse than others (Djankov et al., 2002; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Grier, 1997; 
Bertocchi and Canova, 1996). In some sense, colonisation, and to some extent also 
coloniser identity can also be interpreted as a ‘historical accident’, one of the ultimate 
causes of development according to (Maddison, 1991).  
 
Slavery 
A phenomenon closely related to colonisation, and also often associated with 
Africa’s underdevelopment is the slave trade, which took place prior to and alongside 
colonisation. Many papers have studied slavery - introduced by Arab settlers and 
European colonizers, and greatly extended by the latter - and its impact on long-term 
development (Manning, 1983; 1990; Lovejoy, 1983; Nunn, 2007)13. 
 A major immediate effect of the export of slaves out of Africa was 
demographic: more than 18 million people, generally young adults, were exported 
from the continent since 1500, of whom up to twenty percent died during transport 
(Manning, 1990). The export of people reduced production of food which 
aggravated famines (DeLancey, 2007). A more long term effect of the slave trades 
was that it severely changed sex-ratios, as along the Western Coast mainly male 
slaves were exported which left a dominantly female population; in the Savana and 
the Horn, most slaves exported were female, leaving a dominantly male population 
behind. This greatly reduced fertility in sub-Saharan Africa during this time. But 
there is some debate about whether the slave trades actually led to a decline in 
population, since in some areas compensatory population growth occurred and in 
some areas population growth was too low to compensate the number of people 
taken away (Manning, 1990; Lovejoy, 1983; Evans and Richardson, 1995; Miller, 
1981:66). What seems clear is that at the least slave trade and the resulting sex-ratio 
changes tempered population growth. It is estimated that without slavery, the 
population of Africa could have been double that of the roughly 50 million present 
at around 1850 (Manning, 1990; Lovejoy, 1983). It left Africa with a smaller 
proportion of world population in 1900 than it had in 1700. Labour became even 
scarcer and slaves were traded for products which undercut existing African industry, 
such as textiles (Manning, 1990:22). Slave trades in some areas increased political 
centralisation because kings and chiefs raided slaves (Fage, 1969), but in the long run 
                                                 
13 Some authors have also assessed the impact of New World slavery in econometric analysis 
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000, 2002; Mitchener et al., 2003). 
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the continuing raids and the loss of large parts of the population led to political 
instability in many societies (Manning, 1990). The reduced population size also had a 
long term influence on the agricultural system. The extremely sparse populations 
kept extensive long-fallow land use feasible, as there was no necessity to change 
under the pressure of increasing population densities (Boserup 1965, 1981). This 
reduced the shift of employment to other activities. Finally, the diminished 
population size, to some extent, limited the ability of the African people to fight the 
Europeans who came to take possession of the continent after 1880 (Manning 1990). 
Next to the population effect of the slave trades, various studies also claim that 
export slavery greatly influenced the indigenous institution of slavery. Although this 
indigenous slavery can be traced back as far as historical records go (Lovejoy, 1983; 
Manning, 1990), in many areas during the 19th century (and sometimes even the late 
18th century) the scope and the intensity of  indigenous African slavery expanded 
significantly.  
 The legacy of slavery manifests itself today in Africa in the distribution and 
size of the population and in continuing class distinctions. Although there are quite 
precise data on exported slaves, especially since the start of the Atlantic slave trade, 
most studies on the impact of slavery on long term development have been 
qualitative (Lovejoy, 1983; Vasina, 1989; Hilton, 1985; Inikori, 2003). Manning 
calculates the population loss and the demographic consequences for regions, but 
this was an exception until a recent path breaking study by Nunn (2008). Nunn 
(2008) is the first to quantify the number of slaves taken out of each country and 
combines this with population and area data to gauge the long-term effect of export 
slavery on economic development. He finds this relation to be robustly negative, also 
when controlling for geographical conditions, natural endowments and nationality of 
colonizers. Nunn (2008) explores two channels through which slavery had a negative 
effect on economic development: early political instability and increased ethnic 
fractionalisation. Since slaves were often obtained in raids and wars, these events 
both hampered the formation of pre-colonial states hence increasing political 
instability, and also increased fractionalisation. Both are in turn linked to lower 
economic development in later times.  
 Slavery also had an indirect effect on institutional development through its 
effects on colonial activity. The colonial strategy to rule Africa differed from region 
to region, depending on circumstances such as the availability of cheap labour, the 
availability of natural resources, and the suitability of the area for large scale white 
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agricultural settlement. Three broad colonial strategies can be determined (Amin, 
1972; Oliver and Atmore, 1967). 
 The first strategy was executed in those areas were the population was least 
depleted by slave exports and where there were natural resources and or settler 
agriculture was possible. The availability of cheap labour enabled the colonial 
authorities to extract natural resources and run farms at minimal costs. These areas 
were characterised by the most intense settlements and the relatively high 
investments in colonial institutions to oversee the colonial economy.   
 In contrast, in areas where there was not enough cheap labour available 
(mainly because of the slave trades), where no natural resources were discovered and 
where large scale white settlement and farming was not viable, colonial activity 
focused on extracting surpluses from peasant production through the introduction 
of merchantalist houses controlling marketing and export. Surplus was extracted by 
paying producers extremely low commodity prices. In these areas, the ‘colonial trade 
economies’, only limited colonial institutions were implemented to oversee activities 
of the merchantalist houses and therefore no large scale colonial investments were 
deemed necessary. 
 Finally in those areas were even less labour was available (again due to slave 
trades) and where the ecological system made it difficult for the colonial authorities 
to penetrate the area, the colonial authorities gave the area to charter companies who 
were on their own to get as much resources out as possible. This resulted in hardly 




Another group of scholars relate patterns of economic development to geographical 
circumstances (Gallup et al., 1998); Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2001; Diamond, 
1999). They find that almost all countries in the tropics are poor, and nearly all land 
locked countries have on average a lower level of income than coastal countries. As 
the position on the globe determines the distance to large markets, natural 
endowments, average rainfall, and various other climatic factors, geography directly 
affects income levels via agricultural productivity, human health, natural endowments 
and transport costs (Sachs, 2001; Gallup et al. 1998). Agricultural productivity 
appears to be considerably lower in the tropics compared to countries with a more 
temperate climate (Gallup et al., 1998; Sachs, 2001). Tropical soils are generally very 
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fragile and usable water is often scarce. Rainfall is limited and infrequent, and 
irrigation is generally underdeveloped as only 4 percent of the crop land was irrigated 
in the 1990s (Bloom and Sachs, 1998). Furthermore, pests and parasites are more 
common in tropical ecosystems affecting both plants, animals, and humans. This has 
long hindered animal husbandry and mixed crop-cattle agricultural systems (Sachs, 
2001:14) and lowered agricultural productivity. Moreover, (agricultural) technologies 
developed in temperate zones proved largely inapplicable in tropical areas so that 
‘key technologies could not cross the ecological divide’ (Sachs, 2001:22; see also 
Diamond, 1999). This severely limited the diffusion of technology which is crucial 
for the catching up of technologically backward areas.  
Health outcomes are generally worse in tropical regions compared to 
temperate zones, lowering labour productivity. Infectious diseases like malaria, and 
the incidence of bacterial contamination are much more prevalent in the tropics, and 
have a year round transmission period. This continuous exposure to life threatening 
diseases makes people in the tropics more vulnerable to illness and  less productive. 
Thirdly, natural endowments of point (mainly oil, gas, diamonds, gold, silver 
and minerals) are a potential source of substantial and sustainable income growth 
when exploited effectively. At the same time, these endowments often give rise to 
tensions over ‘resource rents’, creating political and economic instability hampering 
development (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Sachs and Warner, 1999. 1997; 
Torvik, 2002) Natural resources are also related to Dutch disease effects (Sachs and 
Warner, 1999; Torvik, 2001), making resource rich economies more fragile. 
Finally, when countries are situated far away from world markets, transport 
costs will be higher, and exporting will be more costly. Also, when countries are 
landlocked, transport has to go over land, increasingly hindering transportation 
(Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2001). 
Over time, these geographical constraints to economic development may be 
reinforced as low agricultural productivity hinders an agricultural revolution, a 
necessary precondition for a country to start the development process (Timmer, 
2002; Diamond, 1999). Also, lower income might reduce technological innovation, 
amplifying the initial adverse effect through the dynamics of endogenous growth 
(McArthur and Sachs, 2001). 
All these geographical factors seem relevant to Africa. All African countries are 
located in the (sub) tropics, and infectious diseases like malaria and to a lesser extent 
the human sleeping sickness (caused by the tsetse fly) are prevalent. Various studies 
Introduction  27 
indeed find a robust and negative relationship between malaria prevalence and per 
capita income (Sachs and Malaney, 2002; Gallup and Sachs, 2001). Moreover, the 
continent has the highest percentage of land-locked countries and the highest 
percentage of people living in landlocked countries of any continent in the world. 
Additionally, many rivers are not easily navigable because of the many steep 
waterfalls. This is often found to be negatively related to economic development 
(Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup et al., 1998; Sachs and Warner, 1997).  
 
Ethnic Diversity 
A prominent argument in the African context is, of course, that its long-term 
development is seriously hampered by the high ethnic fractionalisation of many 
countries. But empirical evidence is mixed, making clear that the relationship 
between ethnicity and development is a complex one.  
One strand of literature links ethnic diversity to more civil conflict (Horowitz, 
1985; Gurr, 1993; Sambanis, 2001) and worse economic performance (Easterly and 
Levine, 1997; Collier and Gunning, 1999). ‘Conflict of preferences, racism and 
prejudice often lead to policies that are at the same time odious and counter 
productive for society as a whole’ (Allesina and Ferrara, 2005:762). In contrast, 
diversity can also contribute to variety in ability, culture and experience, which might 
enhance innovation, productivity and creativity (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005). 
Moreover, fractionalisation may even make societies safer compared to more 
homogenous societies, since fragmentation makes large scale organised violence 
more difficult to execute (Collier and  Hoeffler, 2000; Collier, 2001; Bates, 1999) 14.  
Literature linking ethnic diversity to worse economic performance often finds 
the effect to run via worse institutions and policies (Easterly and Levine, 1997; La 
Porta et al., 1998). Based on game theoretical principles, the main argument in this 
literature is that it is more difficult to reach an optimal solution with many different 
players. This theory is supported by ample empirical evidence. For example, Alesina 
and Drazen (1991), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Alesina et al. (1999) find that 
more heterogeneous societies find it more difficult to create a socially optimal 
solution, both in the supply of public goods (in terms of composition and amount of 
                                                 
14 There are also studies which find no effect of ethnic heterogeneity on instability and 
conflict (Elabwadi and Sambanis 2000 and 2002). 
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supply) and in the distribution of costs. Moreover, as it is easier for small groups to 
organise themselves as they suffer less from the collective action problem, often 
small groups are very successful in influencing policies for their own benefits, at the 
cost of society at large (Olson 1965). Finally, when governments are busy satisfying 
their political supporters, they are likely to provide goods that are valued by their 
own followers, but are not necessarily good for development (Alesina et al., 1999).  
There are also studies that argue that heterogeneity comes in different forms 
and can have various effects on institutional development and economic growth 
(Collier, 2001; Bates, 1999; Bates and Yakovlev, 2002). These authors make a clear 
distinction between dominance and fractionalisation15. Dominance is found to be 
detrimental to growth (irrespectively whether in a democracy or dictatorship - when 
the same group is in power), simply because there is an incentive to redistribute to 
the own group at the expense of growth. Fragmentation comes in many different 
forms (many small groups vs. three or four groups none of which has a majority). 
Collier (2001) finds that different compositions of groups have different influences 
on stability and government predation, but that fragmentation in the context of 
democracy does not lower growth. Aghion et al. (2004) argue that political 
institutions are endogenous to the nature of inter-group conflict. Societies 
characterised by domination may be more inclined to restrictive institutions, whereas 
fractionalised societies may put more weight on defending the rights of minorities 
within the constitution.   
Finally, according to Rodrik (1999), heterogeneity on its own is not sufficient 
to explain low institutional quality. More specifically, it is the combination of 
heterogeneous population and conflict management capabilities that explain the 
outcome of the political market and ultimately development. This implies that when 
for some reason tension arises between different groups within society, agreement 
on how to distribute the costs or profits is much more difficult in a deeply divided 
society which lacks proper conflict management institutions (Rodrik, 1999; Alesina 
and Drazen, 1991).  
 Summarising, the root causes of African development can be divided into 
the broad areas of institutions, of which the origins are generally placed in the 
colonial times; slave trades, geographical features and ethnic diversity. The 
                                                 
15 They speak of ‘dominance’ when one group comprises 45-60 % of the total population 
(Collier 2001; Bates and Yakovlev (2002) mention 50%). 
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transmission channel via which the slave trades and ethnic diversity affect income 
development is largely institutional (Nunn, 2008; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Rodrik, 
1999). Also certain geographical features have been linked to the development of 
specific institutions (Easterly and Levine, 2003; Sachs and McArthur, 1995). This 
suggests that the development and quality of institutions is one of the central issues 
in African development. Generally, the institutional approach is applied in a world 
sample of countries to explain why Africa is growing less compared to other regions. 
The first interesting question is of course whether such an approach also helps us to 
understand within-Africa growth patterns? Secondly, a crucial aspect missing in the 
explanations offered so far is the situation present on the African continent at the 
time colonisation. The only thing that seems to matter for institutional development 
is colonial presence. There are a few exceptions, for example Genaiolli and Rainer 
(2007) who in their study link pre-colonial centralisation of societies to public good 
provision post colonial, and find a significant positive relationship. Also, Nunn 
(2008) touches briefly upon pre-colonial state development in his export slavery 
account, but only to show the influence of exported slaves on this pre-colonial state 
development (Nunn, 2008). Englebert (2000a) takes into account pre-colonial 
institutions by determining whether postcolonial states are legitimate. He does so by 
(amongst others) analysing whether postcolonial states embed their authority into the 
historical legitimacy of pre-colonial kingdoms or states (Englebert, 2000a:129). 
However, no account is given of the actual institutions present during pre-colonial 
times.  
This leaves open the opportunity to study the influence of pre-colonial 
institutional settings on postcolonial institutional development. The importance of 
early institutions is brought forward by, among others, Greif (2006) who emphasises 
the importance of initial institutional conditions in the development of modern 
institutions. North (1990) argues that ‘the present and the future are connected to 
the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions’ (North 1990: vii). Furthermore, 
it has been thoroughly analysed that that colonial rulers based their institutions on 
what was already there (Boone, 2003; O’Toole, 2007:23; Spear, 2003; Greenstein, 
1995; Herbst, 2000). And finally, the abundant evidence on the presence of hugely 
diverse societies spread all over the continent (Curtin et al., 1988:129, 286; Ayittey, 
2006; Schapera, 1970),  makes the inclusion of pre-colonial characteristics feasible. 
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In this thesis we attend to both the applicability of the institutional approach to 
within-Africa development, and to the influence of the pre-colonial institutional 
framework on post-colonial development. 
Institutions or institutional quality is a very broad concept which means 
different things to different people. In this thesis, I follow North (1990) who defines 
institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society’ (North 1990:3). These rules govern 
interaction and exchange in society and so reduce the uncertainty of daily live. Not 
only through formal rules, but also through informal codes of behaviour. This 
definition distinguishes between institutions (the rules) and organisations (the 
players). The rules define the way the game should be played and the players decide 
within these rules how to actually play. The institutional framework develops as the 
players are directed by the rules, and the players in turn influence the evolution of 
the rules. The distinction between rules and organisations is of course often difficult 
to make in practice. Is the state for example an institution as it sets the rules of the 
game, or organisation as it consists agencies that play according to the rules. And is 
the market an institution consisting of rules for how people can buy and sell, or is it 
an organisation as it consists of different firms and consumers. In this thesis, the 
focus is on rules like whether people are excluded from participating in society, 
whether there is room for people to organise themselves, and whether people are 
protected from expropriation by other parties. By avoiding measures that represent 
organisations and attempt is made to not further obscure the distinction between 
rules and organisations. 
A second issue with the institutional framework is the measurement aspect. 
How to measure constraints or incentives prevalent in society? There are many proxy 
variables available all reflecting different parts of institutional quality. The question is, 
which one should be used, and does it measure what you want it to measure? Given 
that the available measures are proxies, representing the actual institutions, no 
measure is perfect. In this thesis straightforward measures are used, like democracy 
and rule of law to represent whether people are able to participate in society and 
whether they are protected from expropriation, but we are aware that these measures 
are not ideal. The discussion therefore needs to be modest and careful. 
A final problem with institutional quality is what is a good institution and 
what is a bad institution? What is good in one situation, might not be optimal for 
another situation. The discussion in this thesis tries to avoid claims like a small 
government is better than a larger one, or a market economy is better than one 
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where the government plays a significant role. Instead, as stated before the focus is 
on the opportunity the population has to participate in society, and how well they are 
protected, and to what extend rules by the state are directed towards development. 
  
We start with the argument that to understand within-Africa diversity in 
development, it is important to also take into account pre-colonial institutional 
characteristics when explaining long term institutional development. In other words, 
the analysis of institutional development in Africa needs to be based on the right 
initial conditions. To this end the institutional situation at the onset of colonisation is 
quantified, based on anthropological data and this is linked to the institutional and 
economic development in the independent period. Subsequently we focus more 
specifically on one particular pre-colonial feature so far underrepresented in 
quantitative studies, namely indigenous slavery, and analyse its effect on long term 
income development.  
Thirdly, we analyse to what extent the institutional explanations offered in 
the literature apply to a within-Africa context. The extractive institutional thesis as 
proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) is tested, now only including African countries. 
Additionally, a newly compiled dataset based on colonial archives is used, to be able 
to estimate the actual influence of colonial presence on long term development in 
Africa. And finally, we study whether colonial ties still affect global direct investment 
patterns, and analyse whether this is due to increased familiarity between countries 
linked by a colonial tie, or due to increased similarity between these countries.  
Below we will start with short overview of pre-colonial Africa, to understand 
the importance of pre-colonial institutions for subsequent development paths. 
Subsequently the first two chapters included in this thesis are introduced. 
 
1.4. Pre-colonial Africa 
 
The actual size of the populations of pre-colonial African societies is unknown. 
Broad population estimates for around 1700, using the most positive scenario, 
suggest that in west Africa, an estimated 25 million people lived (Manning, 1990:82). 
At the same time, the Savanna and the Horn were home to around 20 million 
people, and the Eastern coast to an estimated 4.5 million, both also using the 
positive scenario (Manning, 1990:196). Even from these most optimistic population 
estimates it is obvious that population densities were very low. From the 19th century 
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onwards some regions embarked upon rapid population growth for the first time in 
history, while others experienced demographic stagnation or decline. Regional 
diversity at the time was so large that a clear continental trend could not be discerned 
(Iliffe, 1995:159). 
 Contrary to what is often assumed, pre-colonial Africa was not only 
comprised of isolated economic units – ‘subsistence economies’ where the village 
group actually produced all it consumed (Curtin, 1975:197). In all regions, there were 
various local, and sometimes very long distance trading networks. This suggests that 
in many places more was produced than consumed, and certain specialisation 
patterns can be distinguished. In eastern and southern Africa, trade in commodities 
for consumptions, such as dried fish, grain, timber, salt and barkcloth took place in 
various local trading networks. Additionally, especially ivory was traded over long 
distances. In Western and Equatorial Africa, consumption commodities like millet, 
meat, fish, shea butter and salt, as well as iron products, copper, and in Equatorial 
Africa ivory, were traded in both local and long distance trading networks. In the 
latter region, trade connected regions now known as Zambia with eastern Shaba 
(region in what is now Democratic Republic of Congo), with the coast of the Indian 
Ocean, the capital of Zimbabwe and the region west of the River Kasai. In southern 
Africa, trade was mainly barter from village to village, without a merchant class. In 
contrast, in western Africa, many different merchant societies developed over time. 
In most regions, trade was controlled and taxed, as trade was seen as a convenient 
source of wealth and power, both in West and in East Africa. Especially long 
distance trade is in many instances linked to state formation in pre-colonial Africa 
(Curtin et al., 1988:131; Iliffe, 1995). 
 In pre-colonial West Africa a manufacturing sector evolved. Much of West 
Africa had a significant iron industry, and production withstood European 
competition relatively well until the coming of railroads and motor roads. Until then, 
high inland transportation costs kept interior markets relative isolated and the 
African iron industry remained competitive (Curtin, 1975: 207, 211, 312). Especially 
in Senegambia, a cloth manufacturing industry was present, which also produced for 
the export market.  
 During the 19th century, overseas trade increased rapidly, although for most 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, it was only a small fraction of total trade (Curtin et al., 1988: 
325). Especially for West and Equatorial Africa, evidence suggests that total long 
distance trade within Africa increased more rapidly than overseas trade (Curtin et al., 
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1988: 331). Between 1500 and roughly 1850, a major export product for many 
African regions were slaves, although already during the 17th century, gold from the 
Gold Coast and hides from Senegambia were more important as export products 
than slaves. Also, there was a substantial export of timber, gum, palm oil, beeswax, 
gold, hides and manufacturing goods like beads or cotton textiles from western 
Africa, (Curtin et al., 1988: 332; O’Toole, 2007: 44) and ivory from eastern Africa 
(Curtin et al., 1988). After the slave trades, the export of ‘legitimate’ products such as 
palm oil, gum, peanuts, gold and ivory increased. 
 
Internal trade in Africa took place between societies characterised by vastly different 
political institutions. Yet despite this diversity, the boundaries of political systems did 
not at all restrict the exchange of goods. (Curtin en al., 1988: 129). In some areas, 
large kingdoms developed, such as the Ashanti in present day Ghana, Dahomey in 
present day Benin, Great Zimbabwe, and Mali in western Africa, among others. In 
other areas, such as the Rift Valley of Kenya and in Southern Africa, age set 
systems16 performed major political functions. Independent self governing kin 
groups (in large parts of Somalia, and in south and south eastern Nigeria among 
others), and minor chiefdoms (South Western Tanzania, Angola among others) also 
appeared frequently (Curtin en al., 1988).  
 The second chapter in this thesis focuses on these various political 
structures and we analyse the effects of political institutions on present day 
institutions. Our main hypothesis is that in those areas where both state and 
community hierarchy (political structure at both state and community level) was well 
developed, more participatory political institutions developed, governed by stronger 
rule of law.  
 The importance of early state structures in the development of stronger 
institutions is well documented in the literature (Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda and 
Putterman, 2005; Evans, 2005; Lange, 2005). Bockstette et al. (2002) link early state 
development to greater political stability, to higher institutional quality and ultimately 
to higher growth. They propose that early state development fosters learning by 
doing in public administrative system, that the long term operation of a state 
structure may increase state effectiveness and that an effective state might foster 
                                                 
16 An age set is a social group or a social category, consisting of people of similar age 
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trust and ease social interaction between various agents (Bockstette et al., 2002: 4-5). 
Focussing on the effect of pre-colonial state formation in Africa, Gennaioli and 
Rainer (2007) find that more centralised societies in pre-colonial times are positively 
linked to higher supply of certain public goods post independence. 
Additionally to these previous studies, we argue that state structures alone are not 
sufficient in explaining institutional and economic development in later times in 
Africa. We propose that complementary community structures are equally important. 
Community structures refer to the number of jurisdictional levels up to and 
including the local community, ranging from the nuclear family to clan barrios. 
Organising capabilities at the local, communal level, were important for various 
reasons. First of all the community was a vital feature of many pre-colonial societies 
organisational principles (Ayittey, 2006:42). Community structures were central to 
the survival of societies with scarce resources, because it provided insurance in times 
of illness or when harvest was bad. Within these communities, group solidarity was 
considered very important although limits on individual freedom set by the 
community varied between various societies. Nevertheless, the pre-eminence of 
social interest prevailed in all groups (Ayittey, 2006). Furthermore, since the local 
chief was in closer contact with the local community and was better informed about 
specific local issues, the king or chief generally preferred to decentralise many 
decisions.  
 Secondly, well developed community structures facilitated the checks and 
balances of the state, functioning as a civil society. Community structures were 
important to limit the power of the state, to organize collective action, and to enable 
people to participate in society (Ayittey, 2006, Schapera, 1970, Maundeni, 2004). At 
the same time, state structures enabled especially long distance trade and increased 
security, also from slave trades (Inikori, 2003). Furthermore, it fostered 
organisational capacities in times of external threat (Ayittey, 2006) and provide 
checks and balances against local tyranny.   
 It has been widely documented that many pre-colonial African culture traits 
endure, possibly in modified forms, to the present day. Curtin et al. (1988) argue for 
example that the sense of social hierarchy and accountability of (local) rulers 
originates from pre-colonial times (Curtin et al., 1988:250; see also Page, 1980; 
Ayittey, 2006). Even though more recent events, such as colonial rule and wars 
greatly influenced Africa’s development paths, it would be incorrect to assume that 
the history of pre-colonial Africa has been rendered irrelevant (Manning, 1990).  
Introduction  35 
Why would this set of institutions be related to the development of stronger 
institutions post-colonial? One reason may be that societies characterised by both 
well developed state and community hierarchy survived colonial times with their 
institutions more intact than for example stateless societies. Colonial rulers found it 
often easier to deal with clearly structured societies (Ayittey, 2006:116). For example 
Tosh (1978) notes, in his study of the stateless Lango in Uganda, that  that the 
colonial powers had difficulty in dealing with the Lango because there was no central 
contact point. Therefore, they assigned chiefs (first form the Baganda, later from the 
Lango themselves) to certain territories, and invested them with  “unprecedented 
public authority and personal privilege, and [it] gave them sway over communities to 
which they had no prior claim” (Tosh, 1978:245). In other words, to be able to 
control stateless societies, colonial officers often assigned a chief as a contact 
between the people and the colonial rulers, as is also documented for the Igbo of 
Nigeria, the Gikuyu of Kenya among others (Betts, 1985; Boone, 2003). This way, 
they altered the organising structure of the indigenous stateless societies. 
 
Next to political institutions, we include three other pre-colonial institutional 
characteristics arguably also important for institutional development. The first is 
slavery, often analysed as a reaction to prevailing factor endowments in pre-colonial 
Africa (Hopkins, 1973; Austin, 2008; Fenske, 2009). Given the long history of 
slavery and its prevalence and centrality in pre-colonial African societies (Lovejoy, 
1983; Manning, 1990), we first analyse the effects of slavery in connection to other 
pre-colonial institutions on institutional development in chapter two. In a separate 
analysis we focus on its influence on long term income development in chapter 
three. 
 Although the institution of slavery goes far back in history, various sources 
argue that the indigenous institution of slavery changed drastically under influence of 
the export slavery (Manning, 1990; Lovejoy, 1983). The fundamental function of 
slavery was to ‘deny outsiders the rights and privileges of a particular society so that 
they could be exploited for economic, political and or social purposes. Usually, 
outsiders were perceived as ethnically different, the absence of kinship was 
particularly common distinction of slaves’ (Lovejoy, 1983:2). Many societies in Africa 
relied extensively on slavery. Production depended in varying degrees on slave 
labour, political power relied on slave armies, and external trade involved the sale of 
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slaves. Class relationships developed, where slaves were at the bottom of the social 
order (Lovejoy, 1983). The institution of controlling and excluding people is likely to 
lead to the development of restrictive (political) institutions, where people are limited 
to take part in the political process (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000, 2002).  
The final two initial institutional characteristics deemed important for 
institutional development are cultural heterogeneity and conflict management 
institutions. Literature on post-colonial ethnic diversity argues that often, 
heterogeneity of people hinders efficient institutional development, especially when 
conflict management capabilities are not well developed (Rodrik, 1999). We follow 
this route, but focus on cultural heterogeneity instead of ethnic heterogeneity, in 
combination with a proxy for the development of rudimentary conflict management 
institutions. When local communities were the basic unit of social organisation, 
differently organised societies living next to each other posed no threat to 
institutional and economic development. However, Curtin et al. (1988) point out that 
already in the early colonial period, institutional problems manifested themselves in 
the rapidly growing urban areas. As people from different ethnic backgrounds started 
to live together, with different cultural origins and a huge variety of law systems, 
there was no simple, overriding African law system which could be used to rule the 
cities (Van Oppen, 2006). Inter-group conflict resolving institutions were generally 
absent, because in times of conflict, societies could easily move away given the 
abundance of land (Ayitttey, 2006; Kopytoff, 1987). Still, very basic forms of local 
conflict management institutions were present  in certain societies, in the form 
clearly structured groups, explicitly trying to marry outside their society. According 
to the anthropological ‘Alliance theory’, the fact that communities marry outside 
their own group indicates that such communities look for allies by marrying with 
people in other groups. This way these groups co-operate on a regular basis which 





                                                 
17 Two other anthropological theories consistently pair exogamy with reduced likelihood of 
(internal) conflict and either increased survival rate of the group (Survival Value theory, see 
for example White, 1949) or promoted social cohesiveness (Conflicting Loyalties theory, see 
for example Colson, 1953; and Scheffler, 1973). 
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Main Results Pre-Colonial Initial Conditions 
In chapter two, we analyse the impact of pre-colonial institutions, based on 
anthropological data, on present day governance quality in Africa in an OLS-
framework. Estimations show that differences in governance quality between African 
countries in the late twentieth century correlate well with pre-colonial institutional 
variables. More specifically, we find that a well developed (local) state hierarchy in 
pre-colonial societies has a positive influence on present day governance quality at 
country level, when complemented by a well developed community hierarchy in the 
pre colonial era. In addition, the extent to which pre-colonial communities were 
outward looking and clearly structured, also positively relates to present day 
governance quality. Furthermore, both a high prevalence of social exclusion in pre-
colonial times (measured as the extent to which pre-colonial slavery was present) and 
a large variance of organisational characteristics of pre-colonial societies in one 
country negatively correlate with governance quality. These findings suggest that pre-
colonial institutional arrangements are quite persistent and are important when 
analysing Africa’s long-run institutional development. 
The negative impact of indigenous slavery on institutional development, the 
large literature on the influence of export slavery on development in Africa, and the 
alleged close connection between indigenous slavery and export slavery, leads us to 
scrutinize the impact of slavery on economic development in chapter three. In line 
with findings in the qualitative literature, we find that indigenous slavery was 
geographically concentrated and more common in societies with more developed 
states, and in those were Islam was more widespread. Indigenous slavery is also 
found to be robustly and negatively associated with long-term income development. 
We find evidence that indigenous slavery, by socially excluding large parts of the 
populations, led to the development of restrictive political institutions hampering the 
development of states conductive to growth, i.e. states with broad based legitimacy 
and capable bureaucracies.  
 
1.5. Colonial Africa 
 
The second part of this thesis focuses on the colonial period, and its influence on 
both economic development and investment patterns around the globe. We start 
with a short overview of the colonial period followed by an introduction of the two 
final chapters. 
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Although Europe had some commercial interest in Africa prior to colonisation, 
formal control by European countries did not start until the end of the 19th century. 
Various European powers were present in certain coastal trading posts, but 
possessed very little knowledge of and were generally not interested in the interior of 
the continent (Herbst, 2000; Christopher, 1984). The limited interest in Africa until 
the end of the 19th century can be explained both by the limited commercial 
opportunities and the disease environment which was very unfavourable to 
European settlement in many parts of Africa. Especially West Africa was seen as ‘the 
white man’s grave’ (Herbst, 2000: 64).  
What exactly motivated the scramble for Africa after 1880 is rather complex. 
Necessary developments were the discovery of first of all quinine prophylaxis, which 
greatly reduced deaths from malaria. And secondly and maybe more importantly, the 
development of the Maxim-gun, a semiautomatic weapon, which created great 
military superiority (Uzoigwe, 1985; Iliffe, 1995; Herbst, 2000). Given this context, a 
mixture of factors influenced the increased interests of European countries in Africa, 
the relative importance varying from region to region. First of all, European rivalries 
increased European activity on the continent, such as Britain’s worries that France 
controlled more area than they did; secondly, the desire by men ‘on the spot’  to 
extend control, independent of the desires of the metropole; and thirdly, a sudden 
hysteria across Europe to be left out of the division of Africa, even though the gain 
of colonisation was highly uncertain (Herbst, 2000; Uzoigwe, 1985; Wesseling, 1991). 
Pure commercial interests were in the beginning limited to certain areas on the west 
coast mainly. In other areas merchants were opposed to conquest for fear of 
disturbing existing trade relations (Iliffe, 1995).  
What sets the colonisation of Africa apart from other regions, is that it 
happened relatively late, quick – in 25 years the whole continent was divided - and 
without fighting between the colonial rulers (Herbst, 2000: 66). Seven countries 
divided Africa on a conference in Berlin in 1884-85, but the countries gaining the 
largest areas were France and Great Britain. The conference allowed any European 
power to prohibit others from challenging a piece of territory once they had brought 
it under their ‘sphere of influence (Herbst, 2000:73). Control was established by 
signing treaties with African chiefs, and subsequently unilaterally declaring those 
areas to be under their control (Uzoigwe, 1985; Herbst, 2000). If these treaties were 
not contested by other European countries, these areas came under actual control of 
the country with the treaties. The boundaries of these territories were determined as 
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closely as possible by natural boundaries, but if that was not clear or not available, 
arbitrary longitude and latitude lines were used. In the end, around 44 percent of the 
borders of African countries consisted of straight lines (Uzoigwe, 1985; Herbst, 
2000).  
It was important for Europeans to avoid war over territory, mainly because 
of high costs and uncertain benefits. Generally colonial powers were reluctant to 
incur more than minimum financial commitment, in particular Great Britain. In this 
context, Lord Salisbury is noted to complain about the ‘inconvenience of 
protectorates’ (Herbst, 2000:69). One of the means of reducing the costs was to 
allow private charter companies to control large parts of the areas by letting them 
sign treaties with local African chiefs. Moreover, colonial powers were initially 
unwilling to develop extensive administration networks, again because of the high 
costs and the low expected reward (Wesseling, 1991). But especially in contested 
areas, the colonial administration increased its influence, a trend which can also be 
noticed clearly in colonial education figures (see chapter 4; White, 1996; Herbst, 
2000).  
The number of Europeans that went to Africa to settle was very low. On 
average, around 1 percent of the population was European in British colonies, 
compared to less than a half percent in French colonies right after WW218. Hence, 
the majority of construction, agriculture, and industrial works of the colonial era 
relied heavily on employment of Africans, recruited by force or enticement 
(Christopher, 1984: 5). So in the end, Africans built up the colonial economy, and 
paid taxes to maintain it. A strong distinction was made in every day life between 
Africans and Europeans. Africans became the underprivileged part of the 
population, and were only allowed to fulfil low positions in the official 
administration, if employed at all. This is also reflected in the separate administration 
of African and European affairs in colonial yearbooks and colonial bluebooks. 
Especially social indicators, such as health indicators like hospitalisation, diseases, 
causes and numbers of deaths, enrolment rates, crime figures and so on are 
separately recorded.   
We make use of these colonial yearbooks in chapter four, to be able to 
quantify actual circumstances during colonial times. The main forces of social change 
during the colonial period came through the introduction of political settlement, 
                                                 
18 Author’s calculations. See chapter 4.  
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western economic forces, Christianity, and western education (Afigbo, 1985: 489) 
and we focus on two of these areas: the settlement patterns and the influence of 
western education. Settlement patterns allow us to asses the extractive institutional 
hypothesis brought forward by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and education levels are an 
essential part of Abramovitz’s (1986; 1989) social capability, important in explaining 
the potential of a country to catch up. We first calculate the number of Europeans 
present right after World War 2, both per area and per population. And second we 
determine how many children went to school as a percentage of the population 
Western education was brought to Africa by Europeans, though not spread 
through official agencies alone or even primarily in some areas. Especially Christian 
missionaries played a prominent role in the spreading of formal education during 
colonial times (Bergman, 1975; Crowder, 1964). For both the Catholics in French 
Africa and the predominantly Protestant (Anglican, but also other) missionaries in 
British Africa, education was a key institution for spreading religion, and especially in 
British Africa for creating self-perpetuating congregations as the missionaries 
considered their presence temporarily (Berman, 1975).   Between various churches, 
rivalry existed to reach as many people as possible. Helped by improved means of 
communication, this stimulated the rapid spread of missionary educational work in 
the first half of the twentieth century, with enduring results (Cameron, 1970). The 
colonial administrations were only to a limited extent involved in providing 
education, mainly out of cost considerations, although in French areas official 
involvement was generally more important than in British areas. Via the increased 
educational efforts, colonial governments hoped to train the low-grade personnel  
they needed for staffing the lower ranks of the colonial bureaucracy (Collins, 1970).  
The initial African reaction to Western education was generally one of 
animosity. In Muslim areas, this was usually respected, since it was assumed to be 
based on religious grounds, but the refusal of ‘pagans’ to bring their children to 
missionary education could not count on such respect (Crowder, 1964). But 
gradually, the resistance of Africans towards Western education changed. Africans 
saw the power and the status educated Europeans had, and also the better jobs were 
in European hands. This made education attractive, since it provided opportunities 
(Berman, 1975). 
Given this context, the number of children enrolled in primary and 
secondary schools are a good indication to what extent western education was 
actually present in the various countries. The general level of education at the onset 
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of independence is also an important indicator of social capacity, the capacity of a 
country to absorb new ideas and technology and thus the capacity to catch up to 
developed countries (Abramovitz, 1986, 1989). In chapter four we use these 
enrolment figures to determine the effect of colonial education on development 
patterns first in an OLS framework. But as education during colonial times might be 
endogenous, we also apply an 2sls framework where we instrument education with 
settler mortality taken from Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
The colonial period as such can be seen as a ‘historical accident’, one of the 
ultimate causes of development according to (Maddison, 1991). Especially for the 
colonised countries, the colonial period forms an initial condition of its own, as 
especially in Africa, colonisers created countries, but more generally, the colonisers 
influenced many areas of society. The colonial period is often found to have an 
effect long after the independence of countries (Grier, 1997; Bertocchi and Canova, 
1996; Djankov et al., 2002).  
A very visible result of the colonial period is that it created a tie, a bond 
between the countries of the ruled and the rulers. It created a sense of familiarity 
between the populations of both countries, as some people from the colonial 
countries followed their education in the mother country during the colonial period, 
and trade was intense between the colony and the metropole. Furthermore, colonial 
ties are often reflected in the national education systems and literary histories of the 
colonisers (Said 1978). In chapter 5, we hypothesise that this ‘familiarity’ between 
countries that share a past together influences how foreign countries are perceived 
today. People feel closer to a foreign country with which their country shares a past, 
and hence when thinking about investing abroad, these countries are more likely to 
be entered than countries with which they share no past. We test in an OLS 
framework whether more direct investment goes to countries with which four major 
colonial powers19 share a past with than to countries without such a shared past. 
 
Main Results Colonial Initial Conditions 
In chapter four, we firstly consider whether the ‘extractive institutions’ hypothesis 
brought forward by Acemoglu et al. (2001) is applicable to an African sample, by 
explicitly checking the intervening steps from high settler mortality to low 
settlements to extractive institutions. Secondly, we test the ‘colonial human capital’ 
                                                 
19 The UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany. 
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explanation for sub-Saharan Africa, controlling for legal origin and geography. Our 
main hypothesis is that colonial education may have fostered long-term growth 
through two channels: both by affecting present education levels, and through its 
effect on political institutions, fostering stability, ‘voice’, and good governance. 
Utilising our data on colonial era education, we find that instrumented human capital 
explains long-term growth better, and shows greater stability over time, than 
instrumented measures for extractive institutions. We suggest that the impact of the 
disease environment on African long-term growth runs through a human capital 
channel rather than an extractive-institutions channel. The effect of education is 
robust to including variables capturing legal origin and geography, which have some 
additional explanatory power. 
 
In chapter five, we analyse whether colonial ties, being part of broader historical ties, 
linger on after independence. Colonial legacies are often analysed from colonised 
country perspective (Acemoglu et., al 2001; Grier, 1999; Englebert, 2000a; Bertocchi 
and Canova, 2002; Lange, 2004; Fielding and Torres, 2008). In this chapter we 
analyse the influence of a shared history between countries from the coloniser 
perspective, and test whether more direct investment is going to former colonies 
compared to other countries. We hypothesise that when countries share a past 
together, this increases familiarity between these countries. Familiarity in turn is 
negatively related to ‘psychic distance’ – the perceived distance to a foreign market -, 
a factor strongly influencing internationalisation decisions (Dow, 2000; Ellis, 2007; 
Stöttinger and Schlegelmilch, 1998). This contrasts with existing literature, which 
assumes country similarities (also sometimes proxied for by colonial ties) to drive the 
perceived distance to a foreign market. But we feel that the case for historical ties as 
an originator of similarities is often rather far fetched. For example in the case of the 
UK, which both shares a past with the United States and Zambia the similarity 
school argues that this makes the UK similar to both the US and Zambia. 
Conversely, we argue that in this example, the UK is more familiar with the US and 
Zambia compared to countries with whom they do not share a past, but that they are 
not more alike these very different countries.  
Empirical results show that indeed countries invest more in countries with 
which they share a common history. Furthermore, our results caution against the 
indiscriminate use of country differences as a surrogate for the perceived distance to 
a foreign market. Although the effect of historical ties, common language, and 
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industrial development is highly significant when explaining direct investment 
patterns, no support emerges for the idea that firms favour investments in culturally, 
institutionally, politically, religiously, or educationally similar countries. 
 
1.6. Limitations and future research 
 
Much literature has over the years been devoted to explaining Africa’s long-term 
economic development. Factors found relevant range from institutions brought by 
colonisers to geographical location, to ethnic diversity and slave trades (Acemoglu et 
al. 2001; Gallup et al. 1998; Easterly and Levine 1997; Nunn 2008).  
But these explanations of Africa’s long-term growth performance have 
generally paid very little attention to the actual institutional circumstances on the 
continent before colonisation. Coloniser activities are taken into account, the 
geographical situation is represented, but little account is given of the people living 
on the continent before colonisation, or their activities and organising principles.  
Furthermore, most of these explanations contrast Africa to the rest of the 
world without analysing whether these explanations are also applicable to explaining 
within-Africa variation. Moreover, when the colonial influence is discussed, little is 
done to actually measure presence and influence of colonisers, beyond a colonial 
dummy. On both subjects, this thesis has tried to proceed. 
When trying to explain institutional and economic development within 
Africa, initial conditions matter. We find that modern institutions reflect the 
influence of early institutions, and that institutional histories between countries differ 
partly because they have a different institutional heritage, as proposed by Greif 
(2006) and North (1990). In addition, we find that pre-colonial institutions robustly 
correlate with economic development. 
Moreover, we found that growth explanations in a world sample are not 
always useful for explaining growth variances within a specific geographical region. 
Factors that correlate well with the difference between the developed and developing 
world are often less helpful when analysing growth differences within the developing 
world. We test the famous ‘extractive institutions hypothesis’, and found this 
proposition unsuccessful in explaining within-Africa differences in development. 
Instead, we found colonial education to be a more robust explanation of 
development in Africa.  
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Nevertheless, the studies included in this thesis do suffer from various limitations. 
The first is the relative unknown validity of the data used to construct the pre-
colonial institutions. Both the basic data underlying our main source - the 
ethnographic atlas - , and the coding scheme used by the author of this source to 
rework the underlying data to comparable classifications are subject to uncertainty. 
Our main source of pre-colonial data is the Ethnographic Atlas (1967) 
created by Peter Murdock. This study pinpoints each society to a particular time and 
community, usually when some reliable observer (traveller, missionary, trader, or 
anthropologist) first visited the society and wrote about it in sufficient detail to 
impart important ethnographic information. It is known as one of the most 
extensive sources of anthropological data available and it has been used in economic 
studies before (Pryor 2005; Gennaioli and Rainer 2007). Besides, studies focusing on 
coding biases in anthropological data find no evidence of coding biases in the 
Ethnographic Atlas (March 1970: 270). 
A related problem is that it is possible that data from the most developed 
indigenous societies is over represented in the Atlas as it was more readily available 
to Europeans collecting the data, because these societies were (arguably) in closer 
contact to Europeans. It is very difficult to assess this issue, but as there are large 
state organised societies and very small dispersed hunting and gathering groups20 
included in the Ethnographic Atlas, there seems to be at least some variance in the 
level of development of included societies.  
A second limitation of this thesis, and at the same time an opportunity for 
future research, is that all chapters include cross section analyses, linking an early 
(pre-colonial or colonial) snapshot to a snapshot of the situation at the turn of the 
century. This approach ignores in between fluctuations of the dependent variable. 
This might be especially relevant for Africa, which has a history of infrequent growth 
accelerations and - collapses, and most countries on the continent experienced a 
substantial plunge in development starting right after the first oil crisis in the mid 
1970s and continuing until the end of the 1980s. It would be an interesting addition 
to this thesis  to link pre-colonial initial conditions to institutional and economic 
development in a time perspective.   
A third limitation of this research is that we treat colonial education as the 
start of educational developments in Africa. Hence we ignore all possible forms of 
                                                 
20 The Kung and the Naron in Southern Africa. 
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indigenous education present before colonisation such as education by village elders, 
by the extended family or in an indigenous religious setting (Adeyemi and Adeyinka, 
2003). These efforts to create or pass on skills and knowledge possibly contributed 
to long-term growth of the African economies – either directly or by providing a 
basis for colonial education systems. One might conjecture, for instance, that people 
used to education of some sort were more willing to have their children attend 
colonial schools; or conversely, that indigenous and colonial education were rivals 
and so the presence of pre-colonial education hampered the spread of colonial 
education. Moreover, pre-colonial education schemes have most likely not been 
homogenous (see chapter 4). So an important avenue for further research would be 
to study the effects of pre-colonial educational forms on the development of colonial 
education. 
This brings us to a more general limitation of this study, which again is a valuable 
opportunity for further research: the effects of pre-colonial institutional 
arrangements on the formation of colonial institutions are not examined. It has been 
widely documented that, among other things, due to the fact that only a limited 
number of Europeans actually settled in Africa, colonial rule had to be based on 
Africa’s indigenous institutions (Spear 2003, Boone 2003, Tosh 1978; Herbst 2000). 
It was in the interest of colonial rulers to leave these local institutions intact as they 
enabled the agricultural sector to grow and thus increased tax income (Pim 1946). 
Moreover, “[…] colonial authorities depended on local authorities to effect and 
legitimate their rule […]” (Spear 2003: 9). We also know that colonisers implemented 
different tax policies in their colonies (Frankema 2009). It would be valuable to 
examine to what extent these variations can be explained by the different indigenous 
institutions the colonisers faced.  
 A final limitation of this thesis applies to the final chapter. Part of the data 
we use for the analysis is only available for a limited number of developed countries. 
Although we can test our main hypothesis for developing countries including nearly 
all Sub-Saharan African countries, the second part of the analysis is only possible for 
a limited set of countries. Even though we believe and argue that the results are 
applicable to the extended set of countries, we can not substantiate this with 
empirical evidence. 
Despite these limitations and opportunities for future research, the 
contribution of this research was to suggest and substantiate that initial conditions 
matter when explaining institutional and economic development in Africa. We will 
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start with the pre-colonial initial conditions in chapters 2 and 3, followed by colonial 









Can the Nature of Pre-Colonial Institutions Explain 





Studies focusing on Africa tend to identify the lack of proper institutions as one of 
the main sources of its dismal growth performance over the last decades (World 
Bank 1992, 1994; Collier and Gunning 1999; Lewis 1996, Rodrik 1999, Rodrik et al. 
2004). After independence, in a large number of countries predatory states emerged 
that benefited the ruling elites and which often resulted in slow growth and social 
conflict. However, within Africa quite striking variations in institutions can be 
discerned (Englebert 2000b). Some of Africa’s ‘growth miracles’, such as Botswana 
and Mauritius, seem to be based on high-quality- and growth-promoting institutions, 
whereas in many other cases slow growth seems to be connected to a lack of 
institutional quality. 
This chapter aims to explain the differences in present-day governance 
quality within Africa from a historical perspective. Contrary to among others 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Grier (1999), and Bertocchi and Canova (2002)  who argue 
that present-day differences in institutional quality and economic performance are 
                                                 
21 Chapter based on the paper “Can the nature of pre-colonial institutions explain governance 
quality in Africa?” written with  J.P. Smits. His contribution is gratefully acknowledged. The 
paper is submitted at World Development. 
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rooted in the colonial period, we stress the pre-colonial origins of development. Over 
the years various Africa scholars have emphasized the importance of the pre-colonial 
institutions (Ayittey 2006, Hopkins 1973, Schapera 1970). Recently also the 
economic literature has started to pay attention to the pre-colonial period (Gennaioli 
and Rainer 2006, Gennaioli and Rainer 2007). But where these studies focus solely 
on the influence of pre-colonial centralization, we emphasize the crucial role of local 
communities in the development of good institutions, based on the extensive 
literature on state failure in Africa over the last decades (Bates 2008, Wunsch and 
Olowu 1995, Olowu and Wunsch 2004). Additionally we find that focusing only on 
pre-colonial political organization is too limited, as ample evidence shows the 
importance of other initial conditions on institutional development, such as factor 
endowments, and the heterogeneity of population (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, 
Domar 1970, Easterly and Levine 1997). 
We use anthropological data collected by Murdock (1967) to capture 
important pre-colonial institutional characteristics and link these data to present-day 
governance quality measured in terms of rule of law and the degree of 
democratization. We find that variations in governance quality in the late twentieth 
century can be (partly) explained by the nature of pre-colonial institutional 
arrangements. The results point at the importance of well-organized local 
communities and their ability to shape an institutional context characterized by high 
governance quality.  
The remainder of the chapter will start with a literature review. In section 
three we discuss the data and methods we used to build the model which links 
present-day governance quality to pre-colonial institutional measures. In section four 
the main results of the model are examined, followed by some robustness checks to 
see the strength of our results Section five summarizes our main findings. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
It is widely believed that institutions are an important determinant of economic 
development (Rodrik 1999, 2000, North 1990, Collier and Gunning 1999, Easterly 
and Levine 1997). However, there is still much debate on why growth promoting 
institutions did develop in some countries, and not in others.  
 Recently, attempts have been made to tackle this issue by trying to identify 
the historical roots of present-day institutions. An expanding literature has sought to 
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identify the impact of colonial-era conditions on long-term development in former 
colonies (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Grier 1999; Bertocchi and Canova 2002; Lange 2004; 
Fielding and Torres 2008; Bolt en Bezemer 2009). But these studies do not account 
for the indigenous institutional context at the time of colonization. Initial conditions 
are relevant in explaining institutional development, as Greif (2006) for example 
argues (Greif 2006: 394). In Africa, especially due to the fact that only a limited 
number of Europeans actually settled here, colonial rule had to be based on Africa’s 
indigenous institutions (Spear 2003, Boone 2003, Tosh 1978). More specifically, 
“[…] colonial authorities depended on local authorities to effect and legitimate their 
rule […]” (Spear 2003: 9). So it was in the interest of colonial rulers to leave these 
local institutions intact as they enabled the agricultural sector to grow and thus 
increased tax income (Pim 1946).  
 One of the few attempts to do quantitative research along these lines has 
been made by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007, 2006) who argue that pre-colonial 
centralization of local communities, increased the ability of post-colonial 
governments to supply important public goods and rule of law. One of the crucial 
elements in the Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) paper is that strong local state structures 
were needed to limit the rent-seeing behavior of local chiefs at community level.  
 Contrary to Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), most historians and social 
scientists describe the nature of Africa’s indigenous local institutions in rather 
favorable terms. Hopkins (1973) argues that Africa’s (economic) institutions might 
have been different from those in other parts of the world –partly due to differences 
in endowment structures which induced different paths of institutional development- 
but that these institutional arrangements were conducive to growth. Individuals 
enjoyed substantial freedom to engage in economic transactions (Wickins 1981: 349, 
Falola 1984, Ayittey 2006:360) and at least in West Africa capital markets were well-
functioning (Sundstroem 1965). These findings are not that surprising as colonial 
officials already stressed how hard it was for white farmers to compete with the 
indigenous modes of production. In large parts of Eastern and Southern Africa levels 
of labor productivity in agriculture where higher in African than in European 
farming (Pim 1946). It is quite interesting that many scholars who have studied 
Africa’s institutional problems in the post-independence period, point at the 
devolved system of social and political organizations in the colonial and even pre-
colonial era [see: Colson 1957, Gluckman 1965, Nhlapo 1995 and Dore 1997]. Ndulo 
(2006) even states that “if colonial powers were shrewd enough to use traditional 
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institutions in administering the colonial state (Lugard 1905-p. 149-50), why should 
African political systems not make use of them in an effort to reach out to small 
communities and help to build national consensus and cohesion?” (see also Olowu 
and Wunsch 2004) 
 The pre-colonial institutional arrangements were often characterized by 
democratic structures in which the political power of chiefs was limited by councils 
of elderly people (Ayittey 2006, Schapera 1970). For example, in the Ashante and 
Zulu kingdoms and in Tswana chiefdoms the king or chief could not make any laws 
without consulting the chiefs and elderly. Custom and tradition in these societies set 
limits to the authority of the king, his cabinet and advisors (Boamah-Wiafe 1993, 
Curtin et al. 1988, Ayittey 2006). 
Furthermore, the king or chief generally needed local chiefs or village 
headmen for support and had to rely on them in order to carry out its policy, as the 
local chief was in closer contact with the local community and was better informed 
about specific local issues. In case a village chief made a poor judgment, he could be 
held responsible by the council of elders and the council of commoners and he could 
be removed from power, as happened in among others the Ashante, the Tswana, the 
Oyo-Yoruba (Ayittey 2005, 2006, Schapera 1967, 1970, Falola 1984, Vaughan 1986). 
At the same time, local chiefs could be replaced by the king in cases of bad 
performance (Ayittey 2006). In other words, both bottom up and top down checks 
and balances were  well developed in many societies. This sophisticated system was 
well suited to govern life at the local level and guaranteed an adequate allocation of 
labor and capital. 
 A good example of the importance of such checks and balances can be 
found in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, where the Shona (the largest) and the Ndebele 
were the most important groups. Both groups have a history of state formation, but 
only the Ndebele also had a well developed community structure. In literature on 
pre-colonial societies, the Shona chiefdoms are described as being fragmented and 
undisciplined (Maundeni 2004). Chiefs were often engaged in mutual feuds, and 
since succession was collateral, also within chiefdoms there were fights over power 
and wealth between different families at all levels of the state. The Shona state 
institutions were ‘structured’  in ways that worked to promote the temporary 
enrichment of a few warlords who easily lost to others “[…] the fragmentation of 
chiefly power that led to the failure to exercise leadership in economic matters […]” 
(Maundeni 2004: 196-197). In contrast, the Ndebele state, which was much smaller 
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than the Shona area, had a well-developed community structure (Murdock 1967). 
The Ndebele state was coherent and disciplined and ‘had coercive, destructive and 
transformative ability’ (Maundeni 2004: 197). Present day Zimbabwe still sees the 
results of this history since the Zimbabwean state elite is based on the pre-colonial 
state culture of the dominant Shona. The Ndebele groups were and still are too small 
in terms of its population size to gain enough influence on national politics 
(Maundeni 2004). 
 Also for other pre-colonial societies, there is ample evidence that an 
important balance was created between  state and community levels. For example 
Smith (1988) notes about the Oyo-Yoruba (in present day Nigeria) that ‘in general a 
delicate balance of power was achieved and all parties in the state were usually at 
pains to maintain this’ (Smith 1988: 92). Mair (1974) observes about the Edo (also in 
present day Nigeria) that ‘every village was allotted a chief […]. Rather they were 
intermediaries, in both directions between the Oba [king] and the general 
population’. Mair (1974: 155). In Eastern Africa, the Chewa of Malawi among others 
represent the strong pre-colonial structures based on state and community 
development. According to Page (1980), ‘one of the reasons for [their] cultural 
survival can be found in the importance of local, village authority in Chewa life’ 
(Page 1980: 172). So although in different forms, various societies were characterized 
by a comprehensive balance between different political levels in pre-colonial times. 
As colonial entities had to base their authority on pre-colonial settings given their 
relatively limited presence in Africa (Boone 2003, Spear 2003, Tosh 1978), and post-
colonial governments often failed to implement effective rule (Bates 2008), much of 
the contemporary institutional framework had to be based on pre-colonial 
fundaments.   
 
Next to early (political) organization, there are other initial conditions that may have 
influenced institutional development in the long run, such as factor endowments and 
heterogeneity of the population (Greif 2006, Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, Domar 
1970, Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, and Alesina et al. 1999).  
 During pre-colonial times, Africa was characterized by extremely low 
population density. According to economic theory this implies labor scarcity which 
in combination with simple agricultural technology, leads to the absence of a non 
cultivating labor class and provides incentives for dominant groups to search for 
cheap labor in the form of slavery (Binswanger and McIntire 1987: 97 note 8). 
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Domar (1970) argues that land abundancy in Eastern Europe around the sixteenth 
century led to serfdom, because the only way for non working land owners to 
survive in a situation of land abundancy, was by restricting the free movement of 
labor. In contrast, North and Thomas (1971) claim that the high land labor ratios in 
Europe after widespread famines and pestilence of the 14th century actually 
ultimately led to a free labor market since lords had to compete for what had then 
become very scarce labor, since there was no effective central coercive authority to 
prevent this competition. Conning (2004) formalized Domar’s hypothesis using a 
general equilibrium model and finds that indeed slavery is more likely to emerge in 
when land is abundant in combination with intermediate land inequality. When land 
inequality is high, landowners can obtain cheap labor by  withholding land from the 
market, which raises the price of land and lowers the land labor ratio In contrast, 
when land inequality is at intermediate levels, slavery is  much more prevalent since 
land owners is this case do not have other means of obtaining cheap labor. This 
situation seems relevant to pre – colonial Africa, where land inequality was not 
extreme compared to Latin America and slavery was widespread (Fenske 2009, 
Austin 2008). This might have triggered an institutional development path 
characterized by relatively restrictive institutions, needed to tie the scarce labor to 
estates which led to high inequality both in wealth and in political power, since elites 
preferred more restrictive institutions to limit economic political opportunities for 
the masses (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). 
 In many African countries, restricted political institutions are present as large 
segments of society are not able to take part in the political process (Barkan 2006). 
This enables ruling elites to formulate policies which benefit themselves, but which 
are often harmful for the society at large. Ndulo argues that only ‘devolution’, i.e. 
giving more power to rulers at regional or local levels, may increase the participation 
of larger segments of society (Ndulo 2006a).  
A second strand of literature on Africa’s institutional development focuses 
on the influence of the ethnic heterogeneity of its population. Many studies link 
heterogeneity of population to the development of inefficient institutions, as 
empirical evidence shows that it is often more difficult to find socially optimal 
solutions in heterogeneous societies, both in the supply of public goods (in terms of 
composition and amount of supply) and in the distribution of costs (Easterly and 
Levine 1997, Alesina and Rodrik 1994, and Alesina et al. 1999). Also, when 
governments attempt to satisfy their political support, they are likely to provide 
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goods that are valued by their followers, but which are not necessarily good for the 
development of society at large (Alesina et al. 1999). Moreover, when natural 
resources are present, this could increase tensions in a country over how this gains 
should be distributed (Hodler 2006, Sachs and Warner 2001). Agreement on how to 
distribute the costs or profits is much more difficult in a deeply divided society 
which lacks proper conflict management institutions (Rodrik 1999, Alesina and 
Drazen 1991).  
There are also scholars who argue that heterogeneity comes in different 
forms and can have various effects on institutional development and economic 
growth (Collier 2001, Bates 1999, Bates and Yakovlev 2002). These authors make a 
clear distinction between dominance and fractionalization. Dominance is found to be 
detrimental for growth (irrespectively whether in a democracy or dictatorship - when 
the same group is in power), simply because there is an incentive to redistribute to 
the own group at the expense of growth although the empirical effect is weak. In 
contrast, fragmentation (many small groups, or three or four groups none of which 
has a majority) are found to have different effects on stability and on the predatory 
behavior of governments. In democracies it fractionalization is generally not 
problematic for development, but it can be detrimental in dictatorships (Collier 
2001). 
 During pre-colonial times, communities in Africa were dispersed over the 
vast continent and they were characterized by a high degree of cultural and 
institutional diversity (Murdock 1967). As long as local communities were the basic 
unit of social organization, these differently organized societies living next to each 
other posed no threat to institutional and economic development as in time of 
conflict, people could  move away easily given the abundance of land. Within this 
context, the local level institutions were sufficient to govern everyday life and there 
was no need, and often no capacity, to develop special institutions for conflict 
management between groups (Kopytoff 1987, Ayittey 2006). 
 However, there are indications that this cultural and institutional diversity 
became problematic at the time that population density increased and groups of 
people could no longer easily leave their communities due to the growing problem of 
land scarcity. Curtin et al. (1988) point out that already in the colonial period 
institutional problems manifested themselves in the rapidly growing urban areas. 
People from different ethnic backgrounds and with different cultural origins started 
to live side by side in the new cities, but there was no simple, overriding African law 
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system which could be used to rule the cities (Von Oppen 2006). While within group 
conflict management institutions were often well developed, inter-group conflict 
resolving institutions were generally absent (Ayitttey 2006: 101).This lack of inter-
group conflict management institutions had serious implications for the functioning 
of Africa’s political markets after independence. The different ethnic groups faced 
tremendous difficulties in co-operating and organizing effective collective action. 
The post-colonial central state gained power to the extent that it could pursue 
policies which were mainly directed at benefiting the ruling elite. Due to the 
fragmented nature of Africa’s civil society, the communities could not successfully 
influence the central state.  
The above literature suggests a strong impact of pre-colonial factors on 
institutional development in Africa.  First of all, strong and well developed local state 
and community structures of pre-colonial societies are associated with a positive 
effect on institutional development paths. More specifically, where state structures 
are linked to effective rule of law (Gennaioli and Rainer 2006), community structures 
are crucial to limit the power of the state, to organize collective action, and to enable 
people to participate in society (Ayittey 2006, Schapera 1970, Maundeni 2004). In 
other words, we argue that it is the interrelationship between the two that is essential 
for a balanced institutional development. Secondly, the early day resource 
endowments (i.e. labor scarcity) in Africa are linked to pre-colonial social exclusion 
(slavery) which in turn caused more restrictive institutions to develop to limit politic 
and economic options for the masses. In countries with widespread social exclusion, 
we expect lower governance quality. Third, empirical evidence suggests that the 
combination of the (cultural) heterogeneity of Africa’s pre-colonial societies 
(combined with the increasing population pressure already starting during colonial 
times), and the absence of good conflict management institutions, made it more 
difficult to develop efficient institutions. Therefore, in countries with many culturally 
different groups and with little conflict management institutions, we expect lower 
governance quality. In the next section we will quantify these pre-colonial 
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2.3. Data and Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we will present the model in which contemporary governance quality 
is explained by a number of pre colonial institutional characteristics. Governance 
quality is measured at the country level. The data on pre colonial institutions are 
measured at the level of individual ethnic groups/ local communities and 
subsequently processed to get to a country level measure. It should be stressed that 
when we discuss state and community structures in the pre colonial period, these 




Institutional quality in African countries is measured in terms of governance quality. 
Governance quality  is of course a broad concept and there are many different 
indicators to chose from (Goodloe Wescott 2003, Centre for Democracy and  
Governance, 1998). Most indicators can be placed into one of three broad aggregates 
- competitive and participatory political processes, rule of law, and government 
capacity (as defined by Kaufmann and Kraay 2004). We selected Rule of law - 
whether a country has a legal framework that protects property rights and human 
rights of citizens, and Democracy – which reflects to what extent a country has 
competitive and participatory political processes (Kaufmann et al. 2000, Goodloe 
Wescott 2003, and Court et al. 2002), as these variables that are both at the core of 
institutional quality and are relevant in the light of the literature discussion above. 
First of all, Rule of law is linked to state structures (Gennaioli and Rainer 2006), and 
community structures are important in enabling people to participate in society and 
to limit the power of the state (through competitive and participatory political 
processes (Ayittey 2006, Maundeni 2004), with many different groups in society, 
conflict management institutions are important. Through participatory political 
process, people can protect their interest, and an effective judiciary system is vital to 
peacefully settle conflicts. Finally, social exclusion and restricted political and 
economic opportunities for the masses will be reflected in less democratic processes 
and less or worse enforcement of the protection of property rights. 
 Factor analysis was used to combine the average over time of the index on 
rule of law between 1996 and 2002, taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2007) and the average over time of the democratic score of a society between 1997 
Explaining Long-Run African Development 56
  
and 2002 taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). This 
combined variable enabled us to include different aspects of governance or 
institutional quality in one variable22. Another option would of course be to link 
institutional or governance variables separately to pre-colonial institutions23. 
However, this would lead to analyzing only limited parts of governance and prevents 
the explicit analysis of our argument that it is the coherence between state and 




Data on pre-colonial community characteristics in sub Saharan Africa were taken 
from the Ethnographic Atlas, created by Murdock (1967). The Ethnographic Atlas 
(Murdock 1967) is based on data previously published in various issues of the 
Journal Ethnology and contains a global sample of 862 societies for which 48 different 
variables are collected. For sub Saharan Africa, 292 societies are included. The actual 
time periods for which societies are included is dependent on the earliest period for 
which the author could find satisfactory data, mostly the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. Murdock focused on the earliest date possible  between 1850 and 
1950 to avoid cultural effects of contact with Europeans as much as possible. 
 We selected variables that represent the extent to which both local state and 
community structures are well developed, the extent to which communities were 
characterized by social exclusion,  and cultural characteristics to capture both cultural 
heterogeneity and the extent to which communities were outward looking, i.e. were 
looking for ties to other groups, as a measure for inter-group conflict management 
arrangements. 
 As the data in the Ethnographic Atlas are presented at the level of groups, 
we combined these data with population data from the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) to 
assign the different groups  to present-day countries. This atlas represents the global 
                                                 
22 For factor scores see Appendix 3.A. 
23 We have estimated our model using democracy and rule of law separately as our dependent 
variable, and results do not change much (see Appendix 3.C). We have also separately linked 
state development and community development to respectively rule of law and democracy. 
Indeed, the results suggests that State structures correlate with rule of law, and that 
Community structures correlate with democracy (see Appendix 3.C). 
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distribution of ethnic groups and gives an explicit subdivision of groups over 
countries24. This enables us to calculate the proportion of each pre-colonial group 
that belongs to a specific country. Important to note in this context is that the 
subdivision of groups over countries was collected at the end of the colonial period. 
The sometimes large scale migration of groups, for example in the context of 
indigenous slavery discussed in chapter three of this thesis, took place before this 
period. During colonisation and after large scale migration was no longer an option, 
making these group division data extremely suitable to locate pre-colonial groups in 
present-day countries.  
 
The following variables were taken from the Ethnographic Atlas: 
- Jurisdictional hierarchy at the community level, i.e., “the number of 
jurisdictional levels up to and including the local community, ranging 
from the nuclear family to clan barrios. 
- Jurisdictional hierarchy at the state level, i.e., the number of 
jurisdictional levels of those transcending the local community, ranging 
from autonomous villages to large states.  
- The incidence of indigenous slavery, measuring “the forms and 
prevalence of slave status”.   
- Community Organization, i.e., the prevalence of certain organizational 
features of communities such as the practice of endogamy or exogamy –
the extent to which people marry within or outside their own ethnic 
group- combined with the presence or absence of clear segmented 
structures.  
 
These variables have been scaled by Murdock (1967) from simple/flat structures to 
more complex and layered social structures, with the exception of slavery for which 
information was collected on whether indigenous slavery (ever) existed, and if so, 
which form was prevalent. In order to capture relevant information on pre-colonial 
institutional arrangements, we operationalize the four above mentioned community 
variables as follows: 
 
                                                 
24 P. Roeder (2001) and Easterly and Levine (1997) use the Atlas to construct their ethnic 
fractionalisation measure.  
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1. Jurisdictional hierarchy at local community and state level (the State-
Community variable). To capture the extent to which both local state and 
community structures are well developed, we calculate the percentage of the 
population that belonged to a group that has at the same time both a well-developed 
state-level hierarchy and a local-level hierarchy. Data in the ethnographic atlas on 
(local) state hierarchy range from 0 to 4, where 0 stands for stateless societies and 3 
and 4 for large states. Following Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), we define (local) state 
hierarchy to be developed for a score from 2 and higher, e.g. from larger paramount 
chiefdoms to large states. According to Murdock (1967), the state level digits can 
also be interpreted as a measure of political complexity. The data on community 
hierarchy ranges from 0 to 2, i.e. from independent nuclear or polygynous families to 
clan-barrios. Local level hierarchy is defined as the levels above the nuclear family, 
e.g. scores of 1 and 2. Local hierarchy can be seen as the extent to which higher 
authority is founded on local structures (Schapera 1967, Ayittey 2005). A good 
example of a society with such a political structure is the Mossi state. In the Mossi 
state (which covers parts of present day Burkina Faso), the smallest political unit is 
the family, the next level is the extended family, followed by the village council. 
Districts are the subsequent divisions, and the King the final political level 
(Williamson 1987). Burkina Faso scores intermediate on the state-community level 
(0.59), where the Mossi represent 91% of this score.   
 
2. Pre colonial social exclusion (the Slavery variable). To capture the extent 
of  social exclusion in the pre colonial period, we calculate the percentage of the 
population that belonged to a group where indigenous slavery existed. The existence 
of slavery represents pre-colonial social exclusion. According to Vaughan (1986: 
1974) ‘[..] African [slavery] was a form of institutionalized marginality in which 
individuals were restricted in their participation in  the society […]’. The expected 
impact on institutional quality is negative. Social exclusion leads to inequality both in 
wealth and in political power which in turn results in more restrictive institutions 
since elites often prefer to restrict economic and political opportunities for the 
masses (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). 
 
3. Cultural heterogeneity between groups (the Heterogeneous Community 
variable). To measure cultural heterogeneity we calculated the standard deviation of 
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the population-weighted mean of the country level community organization score25 
(see Englebert 2000b), which can be seen as an indicator of the dispersion in 
organizational structure at the community level. The Ethnographic Atlas classifies 
communities from inward looking communities, without localized clans and where 
inhabitants marry within their community, to clearly segmented communities which 
are outward looking, i.e., where people marry outside their own group. There are six 
different categories, ranging from 0 to 5. According to Easterly and Levine (1997) 
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), the more diversely the communities are organized 
in a country the more difficult it will generally be to organize people. This will have a 
negative effect on institutional quality hence governance. 
 
4. Characteristics of local communities (the Community Organization 
variable). We calculated the percentage of the population that belongs to a 
community that is clearly defined and practices exogamy to represent the 
development of (local) inter-group conflict management institutions. According to 
the anthropological “Alliance theory”, the fact that communities marry outside their 
own group indicates that such communities co-operate on a regular basis with other 
communities and are looking for allies and see the benefits of cooperation which 
promotes social solidarity and lessen (internal) conflict (Levi-Strauss 1969, Chagnon 
1977)26. For this we use the same data as for the calculation of the heterogeneity of 
communities. 
Summary statistics of the variables described are presented in table 2.1 and pairwise 




                                                 












, where P = population and C.O.S. is the 
community organisation structure 
26 Two other anthropological theories consistently pair exogamy with reduced likelihood of 
(internal) conflict and either increased survival rate of the group (Survival Value theory, see 
for example White 1949) or promoted social cohesiveness (Conflicting Loyalties theory, see 
for example Colson, 1953 and Scheffler 1973). 
27 The actual data of the pre-colonial variables are available from the author on request. 
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of data 
  
Variable Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. N 
       
Governance 0.00 -0.20 2.73 -1.30 1.00 41 
State-Community 0.46 0.43 0.99 0.00 0.33 42 
Slavery 0.63 0.76 0.99 0.00 0.35 42 
Community Heterogeneity 0.61 0.50 2.29 0.08 0.51 42 




The summary statistics reveal that only the State-Community variable is truly 
normally distributed. Slavery and Governance are normally distributed at the 5 % 
level, and our community level variables are not normally distributed. However the 
residuals from the regression models are in all cases normally distributed. 
 
Table 2.2: Pairwise correlations 









     
Governance 0.36 -0.21 -0.22 0.05 
State-Community  0.26 0.36 0.12 
Slavery   0.05 0.35 
Community heterogeneity    0.26 
     
 
 
The correlations between the independent variables do not point at multicollinearity. 
Besides, we checked for multicollinearity by estimating auxiliary regressions relating 
each independent variable to the other independent variable. Also this robustness 
check confirms the suggestion of low multicollinearity. 
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Empirical analysis 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining the relationship between governance 
quality  and each of the pre-colonial measures introduced above. Figure 1 to 4 below 
show the individual relationships between governance quality and the several 
indicators of pre-colonial institutions, i.e. State-Community, Slavery, Community 
Heterogeneity and Community Organization, respectively. 
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Governance vs. Community Heterogeneity
 
                                                 
28 If the country-point on the right (Burundi) is left out, partial correlation between 
governance and heterogeneity of community organisation is -0.15. The outcome of the model 
is hardly influenced. 
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Figure 2.4: Scatter plot of Governance and Community Organisation 
 
 








                              
 
                                             
 
 
The first three figures show the expected relationship between governance and pre-
colonial institutional measures. The more prevalent a well developed pre-colonial 
hierarchy structure both at the local and state level, the better contemporary 
governance quality is at the country level (figure 1). In contrast, in areas were slavery 
was common, present-day governance quality is on average lower (figure 2). The 
third figure shows that a larger variation of community organization structures 
before colonization are associated with lower contemporary governance quality. 
Finally, in the last figure we can see that the relationship between the part of the 
population that is organized with a clear community structure and outward looking 
characteristics and governance is not straightforward.   
 
2.4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
Having examined the correlations between the different variables, we now look at 















Governance vs. Community Organisation
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estimating an OLS equation, where we include additional variables that potentially 
influence institutional quality29. The baseline equation is:  
 
Governance = c + ß1*State-Community + ß2*Slavery + ß3*Heterogeneity 
Community +   ß4* Community Organization + ß5*X 
 
where ß1 to ß4 estimate the effects of our pre-colonial variables, and X is a vector of 
control variables, meant to capture other influences on institutional quality in our 
sample. See table 2.3 for the estimation results. 
 
We first analyze the influence of each pre-colonial institutional variable on 
governance quality by adding the variables one at a time and start with the measure 
of the extent to which well developed local and state level hierarchy is prevalent in a 
country (State-Community, model (1)). This variable is strongly and positively 
correlated with governance quality. Following Ayittey (2006), this reflects the 
importance of pre-colonial structures where “the principle of central government [at 
the local level] was combined with greater degree of local autonomy (Ayittey, 2006: 
267). 
This effect remains robust in all the estimations when we control for other 
influences on governance quality (model (2)-(14)). Indigenous slavery (Slavery, model 
(2)), representing pre-colonial social exclusion, exerts a significant negative influence 
on governance quality. Societies in which substantial parts of the population were 
excluded from important political processes, might suffer from lock-in effects. These 
are societies that in the long-run are characterized by social polarization and low 
levels of governance quality. This relationship also remains robust (significant 
minimally at the 10%) level to including control variables. Various authors note the 
long lasting effect of pre-colonial exclusion, see for example Grace (1977) on the 
Mende in Sierra Leone, Macgaffey (1977) on the Kongo in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Klein (1977) on the Wolof and Serer in Senegambia, and MacCormack 
(1977) on the Sherbro in Sierra Leone. Moreover, Benin and Botswana, for example, 
are very comparable on every pre-colonial measure but Slavery. The most important 
society of Botswana (the Tswana) have no tradition in slavery, as did most other 
                                                 
29 See appendix 3.B for sources and explanations why specific controls were included and for 
pairwise correlations. 
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(smaller) groups (Schapera 1970). In contrast, in Benin, the major groups Ewe, Fon 
and the Oyo Yoruba customs that involved some form of slavery (Smith 1988; 
Argyle 1966). This is reflected in a lower score on governance quality for Benin 
compared to Botswana. 
 The variance of community organization in a country (Community 
Heterogeneity, model (3)) is strongly negatively correlated with governance quality 
and also robust after including control variables. Finally, the addition of the 
percentage of the population belonging to a clearly segmented community 
characterized by exogamy (Community Organization, model (4)) generates an 
additional positive effect on governance, although this represents the weakest link 
between pre-colonial institutions and contemporary institutional quality (generally 
significant at 10%).  
In the models (5) to (14) we introduce control variables which are also often 
linked to institutional quality, such as income per capita in 1990, ethnic 
fractionalization, a colonial dummy, measures for internal conflict or tensions, 
resource endowments and early population density (for literature on these variables 
see appendix 3.B). As can already be seen in the pairwise correlation matrix (also in 
appendix 3.B), some of the control variables are highly correlated either with each 
other (see for example ln GDP pc 1990 and population density in 1900 (r = 0.51), or 
ethnic tension 1984-2000 and internal conflict 1984-2000 (r = 0.74). Also, some of 
the control variables seem to be highly correlated with our pre-colonial institutional 
variables (see for example Community Heterogeneity and Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 1985 (r = - 0.75)30. This might influence the interpretation of the 
coefficients of the variables involved. 
                                                 
30 This is actually the only case in which one of our pre-colonial variables is highly correlated 
with one of the other independent variables. 
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Income is generally significantly associated with better governance quality (models 
(5) through to (14)) and conflict variables on average significantly negatively 
influence governance quality (models (8) through to (14) show different 
combinations of conflict variables to see the robustness of these variables). Ethnic 
fractionalization exerts hardly any influence on governance (model (7))31. Likewise, 
the dummy for British legal origin does not exercise a strong influence on 
governance (models (6) to (14), where its only significant in model (9)) and neither 
does population density in 1900 (model (14)). Finally resource endowments is 
negatively correlated with governance quality but is only significant in half the cases 
it is included (models (11) through to (14)). 
Generally speaking, the pre-colonial variables are not influenced much by 
the inclusion of the control variables. Only when we include “internal conflict” as a 
conflict measure, Community Heterogeneity and Community Organization just lose 
their significance (p-values of 14% and 12% respectively). Besides, when we include 
population density in 1900 our measure of Community Heterogeneity is no longer 
significant (p-value of 15%)  (which might be due to multicollinairity - see the 
correlation table in appendix 3.B - or to fewer observations).  
 
Robustness checks 
There could of course be other explanations as to why well developed state and 
community structures would positively influence governance quality32. One such 
alternative hypothesis is that societies which had better developed state and 
community structures before colonization were at the time also economically and 
socially more developed and therefore needed or could afford institutions 
constructive to growth. Since early institutional arrangements are often assumed to 
be persistent (Acemoglu et.al 2001, La Porta et al. 1999), these growth and 
development promoting early institutions led to better institutions today. In this case 
we would have captured an early economic development effect with our State-
Community variable.  
                                                 
31 The correlation between governance quality and ethnic fractionalisation is low, i.e. -0.11. 
Since it correlates highly with some of our other independent variables, it is excluded from 
our other equations. 
32 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion 
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A second alternative explanation could be that pre-colonial societies with 
less developed state and community structures possibly lived in geographical areas 
that hindered the development of growth promoting institutions. For example, one 
could imagine that in woodland or forest areas, it is harder to travel, communicate 
and trade. This would make it harder and maybe not as compelling to develop 
effective bureaucratic structures compared to for example savannas or other more 
open areas, where long distance trade routes were well established Curtin et al. 1988). 
Hence, in this case we might have captured a geographical effect with our State-
Community variable. To distinguish between these alternative explanations we 
calculated both variables that capture pre-colonial economic and social development 
of societies and a variable that captures unfavorable geographical circumstances for 
institutional development. These variables are then used to re-estimate our baseline 
model.  
Pre-colonial economic and social development is calculated following 
Gennaioli and Rainer (2007)33: we first determined whether societies had an 
indigenous system of writing, since that can be seen as a measure of advancement 
(Gennaioli and Rainer 2007: 202, Murdock and Provost 1973: 379). Secondly, we 
calculated to what extend societies depended on agriculture (as opposed to hunting 
and gathering), and thirdly we determined whether societies lived in permanent 
settlements or not. Finally, to capture geographical circumstances, we calculated the 
percentage of a country covered by of forest and woodlands in 196134.  We included 
these four variables one at the time in our baseline model, to separate the effect of 
our State-Community variable from economic and social advancement and 








                                                 
33 See Appendix 3.B for exact definitions and sources. 
34 Data are taken from the FAO, 1961 is the earliest date we could find consistent data for. 
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Table 2.4: Alternative hypotheses 
 Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
State-Community 1.68*** 1.52*** 1.49*** 1.65*** 
  (0.35) (0.33) (0.32) (0.50) 
Slavery -1.02** -1.13** -1.15** -1.06** 
  (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.51) 
Community Heterogeneity -0.96*** -0.90*** -0.93*** -0.92*** 
  (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) 
Community Organization 0.83 0.84 0.73 0.86* 
  (0.55) (0.58) (0.56) (0.51) 
Written Records -0.57    
  (0.45)    
Dependence on Agriculture  0.03   
   (0.07)   
Permanent Settlement   0.61  
    (0.36)  
Forest-Woodland    0.50 
     0.84 
          
Adj. R2 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.27 
N 40 40 40 39 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
    Sources: see appendix 3.B 
 
 
In the first three models we include variables capturing pre-colonial economic and 
social development. Only the variable for the settlement pattern, i.e. to what extend 
parts of the population lived in permanent settlements has a positive and rather high 
correlation with institutional quality which is only just insignificant (p=0.103). 
Whether an indigenous system of writing existed is negatively (and insignificantly) 
associated with governance quality. The dependence on agriculture variable shows 
hardly any relation with governance quality at all. The final model includes the 
percentage of land covered by forest and woodlands. Again there is no significant 
relation with  governance quality. All four models have an adjusted R-squared that is 
lower or the same as our baseline model  (see table 2.3, model (4)). In other words, 
these variables do not add much to the explanation of contemporary governance 
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quality in our model. Moreover, these results do not suggest that with our State-
Community variable we captured a development or geographical effect.  
 
The notion that both local state and community hierarchy are important in explaining 
contemporary governance quality differs from the idea put forward by Gennaioli and 
Rainer (2007, 2006). Their studies focus on the relationship between pre-colonial 
centralisation and the supply of certain public goods and rule of law after 
independence. They argue that strong local state development is a necessary 
prerequisite of economic development because these state structures were needed to 
limit the rent-seeking behaviour of local elites and stress the low quality of Africa’s 
local leadership in the pre-colonial era (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007). 
 We disagree with the rather negative view Gennaioli and Rainer (2007, 2006) 
present on the quality of Africa’s pre-colonial communal institutions. Their claim 
seems to be based on a rather limited and sometimes even biased35 reading of the 
                                                 
35 Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) argue that decentralisation as a means to improve local leaders 
accountability, i.e. by improving voters’ information, increased ability to replace misbehaving 
politicians, and fostering peoples mobility’ (see footnote 4, p. 191) is not relevant for Africa. 
Especially migration (leaving corrupt local leaders) was not a feasible option in pre-colonial 
times. In contrast, for example Ayittey (2006: 109), Schapera (1967, 1970) and Falola (1984) 
stress that actually the most powerful weapon to restrain rulers was indeed the threat of 
people leaving. Although leaving was often difficult and entailed high costs, it was used as a 
measure of last resort (Schapera 1967:154). Furthermore, in many cases replacing (or killing) 
the chief was also an option in case rulers abused their power (Ayittey 2006: 170, Schapera 
1970, Vaughan 1986: 178). In essence, these authors argue that final power lay with the 
people. Many groups were characterised by a rather complex and balanced system of checks 
and balances to avoid abuse of power by chiefs. Furthermore in making their case for the 
abusive and corrupt local leaders Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) selectively quote Tosh (1978) 
on p. 190. Where they quote the sentence on abusive behaviour of local chiefs, they miss the 
preceding sentences in which Tosh (1978) states that “The way political offices were filled 
rapidly departed still further from pre-colonial practice” (Tosh 1978: 1982). Moreover, in his 
book, Tosh (1978) makes the claim that the colonial powers had difficulty in dealing with the 
stateless Lango. Therefore, they assigned chiefs (first form the Baganda, later from the Lango 
themselves) to certain territories, and invested them with powers “unprecedented public 
authority and personal privilege, and it gave them sway over communities to which they had 
no prior claim” (Tosh 1978: 245). In other words, only after the colonial powers interfered in the 
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literature. No mention is made of the nature of Africa’s indigenous community 
structures at all (for example the huge anthropological literature on the age-grade 
system and its beneficial impact on the outcome of political processes (see a.o. 
Boamah-Wiafe 1993; Curtin et al. 1988, Ayittey 2006). Besides, also the positive 
colonial view on the vitality of Africa’s communal organisations (see for example 
Pim 1946 and several of the British Colonial Bluebooks) is not taken into account. 
Moreover, Gennaioli and Rainer (2007, 2006) do not attempt to quantify the quality 
of Africa’s indigenous, local institutions and its impact on present-day institutional 
quality. The alleged poor quality of the local institutions is postulated and strangely 
enough they do not use the community data which are part of the Murdock dataset. 
 On the basis of a thorough survey of the literature as well as on our 
regression analysis, we come to the conclusion that high state development 
underpinned by well-developed communities structures which are successful in 
providing checks and balances on the power of the ruling elites, enhance the 




This chapter aims to show how differences in present-day governance quality 
between African countries can be explained. On the basis of an extensive reading of 
the literature we argue that the nature of the indigenous pre-colonial institutions can 
be seen as an important determinant of present day levels of governance quality. A 
regression model was built on the basis of an anthropological dataset. Estimations 
show that differences in governance quality between African countries in the late 
twentieth century can to a considerable extent be explained from pre-colonial 
institutional variables. The incidence of slavery and a great variety in community 
structures in the pre-colonial era seem to have a negative impact on present-day 
governance quality, whereas a strong development of state as well as communal 
structures and the nature of community organizations have a positive impact. These 
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findings are in line with qualitative studies by various Africa scholars on the pre-
colonial period, as well as the literature on the post independence era. These strands 
of literature both emphasize that the quality of local communal institutions, with its 
favourable impact on the emergence of civil society structures, enhances the 
formulation of proper policies at central state level. 
 This chapter points at the pre colonial origins rather than the colonial origins 
of development, as put forward by Acemoglu et al (2001). In this respect we follow 
Gennaioloi and Rainer (2007) who also stress the importance of pre colonial 
institutional arrangements. However, contrary to them we put more emphasis on the 
importance of local community structures and the positive effect they can have on 












Indigenous Slavery in Africa’s History: Conditions 





This chapter contributes to an expanding literature that has recently sought to 
identify the impact of (pre-) colonial-era conditions on long-term development in ex-
colonies (Grier, 1999; Englebert, 2000b; Acemoglu et al, 2001; Bertocchi and Canova 
2002; Lange 2004; Fielding and Torres 2008). Specifically for Africa, Englebert 
(2002) attempted to link pre-colonial institutions to the quality of post-colonial states 
and to long-run economic development in tropical Africa. Gennaioli and Rainer 
(2007) investigated how the structure of pre-colonial African societies affected long-
term public good provision. Bolt and Bezemer (2009) studied how colonial-era 
human capital formation affects long-term growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. A 
prominent argument in the African context is, of course, that its long-term 
development is seriously hampered by the slave trades, which took place alongside 
colonisation. Many papers have studied ‘export slavery’ - introduced by Arab settlers 
and European colonizers, and greatly extended by the latter - and its impact on long-
term development (Manning, 1983,  1990; Bairoch, 1993; Nunn, 2007). Some 
authors have assessed the impact of New World slavery in econometric analysis 
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002, Sokoloff and Engerman 2000; Mitchener et al., 
2003). But until Nunn’s recent path breaking study, Africa’s slavery had yet to be 
                                                 
36 Chapter based on the paper “Indigenous Slavery in Africa’s History: Conditions and 
Consequences”, written with D.J. Bezemer and B.W. Lensink. Their contribution is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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examined in a systematic quantitative fashion. Nunn (2008) estimated the numbers 
of slaves exported from Africa’s main ports during 1400-1800 and combines this 
with other data to gauge the long-term effect of export slavery on economic 
development. He finds this relation to be robustly negative, also when controlling for 
geographical conditions, natural endowments and nationality of colonizers. He also 
offers some evidence that export slavery may have induced ethnic fractionalization, 
which in turn impeded economic growth in later times, to this day. 
The present chapter extends the investigation to sub-Saharan African 
(hereafter African) indigenous slavery, by which we denote customs of slavery that 
were innate in African societies before, during and after colonization. Indigenous 
slavery is contrasted to export slavery (which was introduced and developed in 
Africa by Arab and European invaders and colonizers) although indigenous and 
export slavery also existed in symbiosis (Nunn, 2008; Vansina, 1989; Hilton, 1985). 
We collected data from anthropological records to investigate under what conditions 
indigenous slavery arose and existed, what its relation to export slavery was, what its 
impact on long-run income development is, and what the plausible channels of 
influence were. In doing so, we build on a long-standing qualitative and descriptive 
literature on indigenous slavery, which is currently further being developed by, for 
instance, Ayittey (2006) and Perbi (2004)37.  
In the next section we define and explore African indigenous slavery based 
on a review of the literature. In section 3 we formulate and test hypotheses on the 
historical and geographical conditions of indigenous slavery, and of its consequences 
on long-term income development. Previewing the results, we find that indigenous 
slavery was more common in countries closer to the Equator, and more prevalent in 
                                                 
37 The academic study of indigenous slavery in Africa is a niche research area that rapidly 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s, predominantly in universities in the UK, US and in France 
- francophone West Africa was the hub of Africa’s slave trade, both continental and for 
export - as well as at some African institutes (such as the Institute for African Studies of the 
University of Ghana at Legon). Scholars could draw on colonial archives, eyewitness 
accounts (often of colonial officials), oral traditions, and interviews: there were then still 
living witnesses of indigenous slavery, which continued well into the 20th century. But the 
subject remains relatively under-researched; Ewald noted in 1992 of indigenous slavery (in 
Islamic Africa) that it ‘…has not engaged European and American scholars as intensely as 
slavery in the Atlantic world’. This remains true today of Africa’s indigenous slavery systems 
generally. 
 
Indigenous Slavery 77 
  
societies with more developed states and in those where Islam was more widespread. 
We find a clearly negative impact of indigenous slavery on present-day income levels, 
also if we control for geographical conditions, nationality of colonizers, export 
slavery and for the possible endogeneity of indigenous slavery to income 
development. In section 4 we speculate on the possible channels through which 
indigenous slavery could have influenced long-term income development. We 
suggest that it may have created social structures that impeded the development of 
states conducive to economic growth – specifically, states that are accountable to 
their populations, and which are able to develop and maintain capable bureaucracies. 
This suggestion is supported by an empirical exploration, but also merits further 
research beyond the size and scope of this chapter.  Section 5 concludes with a stock 
taking of the results, a critical discussion of our findings in the context of the 
literature, and some suggestions for future research. 
 
3.2. Defining and Exploring Indigenous Slavery 
Slavery in Africa’s history can be categorized into indigenous slavery and export 
slavery. The distinguishing feature adopted in this chapter here is whether or not 
slaves were traded beyond the continent38. Thus, African indigenous slavery includes 
both slavery and the slave trade in Africa, which often occurred across long distances 
within Africa. The distinction is important because (as we elaborate below) the 
conditions of indigenous slavery, its economic role, and slaves’ status within African 
society were all very different from the conditions characteristic of varieties of export 
slavery – especially so in the case of the last form of export slavery that Africa 
experienced, the trans-Atlantic slave trade. 
                                                 
38 A note on definitions is in order. Nunn (2008:139,159) uses the term ‘Africa’s slave trades’ 
or ‘external slave trades’ to denote exclusively export slavery, using shipping records to gauge 
the extent of ‘slave trade’. Nunn juxtaposes the ‘slave trades’ (both Islamic and Atlantic) to 
‘domestic slavery’ (2008:159).  It should be noted, however, that slave trade was rife also 
within the African continent (i.e. ‘domestically’), and many traded slaves were never shipped 
and never left the continent. Nunn’s (2008) study is thus about ‘export slavery’ as defined 
here. Perbi (2001) writes of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ slavery, where ‘external’ slavery involves 
slave trade within and beyond Africa. Our ‘indigenous slavery’ is the trans-African part of 
Perbi’s (2001) ‘external‘ slavery. Finally, we distinguish our usage from some authors who 
have denoted by ‘indigenous slavery’ African involvement in the export slave trades. 
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Indigenous slavery has been studied by scholars in two broad frameworks: 
functionalism and (economic) rationalism. In the first school, Miers and Kopytoff 
(1977) argued that most forms of indigenous slavery in Africa cannot be understood 
simply as a commodification of people, or even as ‘slavery as the legal 
institutionalisation of persons as property’ as Tuden and Plotnicov (1970:12) defined 
it. This would be a more appropriate interpretation of ancient Roman or modern 
New World slavery. Instead, Miers and Kopytoff (1977) view indigenous slavery in 
Africa as part of a continuum of social relationships within a kinship system, of 
which slavery was the most marginal. Terms like (private) ‘property’ and (individual) 
‘freedom’, they stressed, are unhelpful to understanding traditional African society. 
We elaborate on this below. With this framework comes a relative benign view on 
slaves’ social status and living conditions. 
In contrast Hopkins (1973), building on Nieboer (1900), suggested that 
indigenous slavery was a response to scarcity of labour especially in West Africa, 
where under conditions of simple agricultural technologies, ‘the costs of acquiring 
and maintaining slaves were less than the cost of hiring labour’ (Hopkins, 1973:25). 
This economic rationalism approach assumes the treatment of slaves as a 
commodity, since the slave was chattel. It also takes a dimmer view of slaves’ 
circumstances. Klein (1978:601) suggests (based on fieldwork in Senegal) that this 
approach might be most appropriate in high-density slavery systems. 
Indigenous slavery was an ingrained feature of most African societies in recorded 
history39. Many have speculated that indigenous slavery may have been an important 
precursor for (and facilitator of) export slavery, and that the existence of indigenous 
slave trade ‘opened up ... societies to the temptation of the Atlantic trade’ (Klein, 
1978:605)40. Perbi (2004), describing indigenous slavery in Ghana, takes the view that 
                                                 
39 There is early pre-colonial evidence of slavery among the Berbers of Morocco and Algeria, 
the Tuaregs of the Sahara, the Ethiopeans, Egyptians and Somalis of northeast Africa, the 
Buhganda states and Nyamwezi and Chagga peoples of inland East Africa, the Mrima and 
Omani Arabs of coastal East Africa, the Wolof of Senegal and the Gambia, the Mende and 
Temne of Sierra Leone, the Via of Liberia, the Duala of Cameroon, the Bakongo and Luande 
of Congo, the Lozi of Zambia and, as Perbi (2001:2) notes, ‘virtually all the states and 
societies in Guinea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mali, and Nigeria’ 
40 This is not to suggest that export slavery started with the Atlantic slave trades. African 
slaves were acquired by the ancients Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans and by mediaeval 
Europe, Arabia, the Ottoman Empire, and Asia. From the 1435 capture by the Ottomans of 
Constantinople which halted the flow of white slaves from the Black Sea regions and 
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it predated the Atlantic slave trade, coexisted with it from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries and survived it through the early twentieth century. She locates 
its origins in the neolithic and iron ages, and its institutionalisation with the 
formation and expansion of pre-colonial states (Miescher, 2007:157). Others argue 
that in fact indigenous slavery may not have predated New World export slavery. On 
the contrary, as the Guyanese historian Rodney (1966) suggested, the Atlantic slave 
trade may have stimulated slavery within Africa. Nunn (2008:159) notes that 
“[w]hether the parts of Africa that were untouched by the Islamic trades had chattel 
slavery has been the subject of an old debate (e.g., Fage, 1962; Rodney, 1966). Since 
this debate, evidence has been presented suggesting that domestic slavery may not 
have existed prior to the trans-Atlantic slave trade.” Nunn (2008) proceeds to 
examine linguistic evidence that there were no words for slaves prior to the New 
World export trades (also Vansina, 1989; Hilton, 1985). 
 However that may be, the indigenous slave trade from its earliest 
observations was part of pan-African trade in goods including salt, copper and dates 
from the Sahara and millet, sorghum, wheat, livestock, gum, shea butter, ivory and 
gold from West Africa. There were two major slave routes, one between North and 
West Africa, and one linking East, Central and Southern Africa. Important West 
African slave markets are recorded from as early as the year 1000.  Ghana obtained 
slaves - mainly in returns for its abundant gold resources – from the 1st to the 16th 
century. Bono Manso and Begho in Ghana were important slave markets from AD 
1000 to around 1750 (Perbi, 2001:4); others were Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso and 
Bonduku and Buna in Ivory Coast. 
 
The geographic dimension of indigenous slavery is illustrated in Table 3.1. This is 
based on data taken from an ‘Ethnographic Atlas’ compiled by Murdock (1967), in 
turn based on data previously published in the journal Ethnology. For sub-Saharan 
Africa, Murdock included 292 societies, with a wealth of ethnographic data. One of 
these is whether a society historically had the institution of (indigenous) slavery. The 
actual time periods to which this data refer is dependent on the earliest period for 
which Murdock could find reliable data, which is from 1850 onward but not later 
                                                                                                                          
Balkans, mediaeval Europe turned completely to Africa for its slave labour (Perbi, 2001:3; 
McKay et al, 1992). In modern times, export slavery was towards the Oriental, Islamic and, 
especially, Atlantic worlds during the 15th to 19th centuries (Perbi, 2001:4). 
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than 1950, and varying over societies. Following Bolt and Smits (2008), we combine 
this data with population data from the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) to assign 
indigenous societies to present-day countries. We so calculate the share of the 
population within modern-day national borders that historically had the institution of 
indigenous slavery41. Thus, it is not a measure for actual slaves scaled by population 
(a quantity which is unknown), but for population fractions historically practicing the 
institution of indigenous slavery. An important distinction with measures of export 
slavery (such as Nunn’s) is that our measure is about the country that practised 
indigenous slavery, while Nunn’s measure relates to countries that lost their people to 



















                                                 
41 For instance, let us assume that only the Mende and Temne peoples - who lived in lands 
now part of Sierra Leone - historically had the institution of indigenous slavery, and no other 
ethnicities in present-day Sierra Leone did. If the Mende make up 17 % of the population of 
present-day Sierra Leone and the Temne 8 %, then our measure for indigenous slavery in 
Sierra Leone is 25 %. 
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Table 3.1: Population Fraction In Today’s Borders That Historically Had 
Indigenous  Slavery 
          
Country % of population  Country % of population 
          
Lesotho  0  Djibouti  0.76 
Madagascar  0  Zimbabwe  0.77 
Swaziland  0  Malawi  0.81 
South Africa  0.02  Burkina Faso  0.84 
Eq. Guinea 0.08  Central African Rep. 0.86 
Kenya  0.1  Gambia, The 0.88 
Botswana  0.13  Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.89 
Gabon  0.15  Ethiopia  0.9 
Mozambique  0.22  Uganda  0.9 
Sudan  0.27  Guinea  0.92 
Guinea-Bissau  0.34  Togo  0.92 
Chad  0.36  Senegal  0.93 
Cape Verde  0.38  Nigeria  0.94 
Cameroon  0.4  Sierra Leone  0.94 
Liberia  0.45  Zambia  0.94 
Angola  0.53  Rwanda  0.98 
Congo, Rep. 0.66  Somalia  0.98 
Tanzania  0.67  Burundi  0.99 
Benin  0.7  Ghana  0.99 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.7  Mali  0.99 
Namibia  0.72  Mauritania  0.99 
      Niger  0.99 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and Murdock (1967) 
 
 
Table 3.1 provides information on the fraction of the population in present day 
African countries that historically had indigenous slavery. It shows that indigenous 
slavery was prevalent among the peoples of most of today’s African countries. On 
average, it was an indigenous institution in 63 % of the population; and in 20 of the 
43 countries in our sample, it occurred among over 80 % of the population. It is also 
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noteworthy that nearly all these very high values (and none of the 18 lowest-ranking 
countries) are West or West-Central African countries north of the Equator. This is 
where both the institution of indigenous slavery and the slave markets for the 
Atlantic slave trade were concentrated. 
Indigenous slaves in Africa were obtained by means of raiding and kidnapping, 
warfare, as punishment for criminals, as tribute paid by conquered nations, or by 
pawning (where debtors unable to repay their dues went into slavery, or sent 
dependents into slavery – Ayittey, 2006). For instance, almost all the states 
conquered by the famous Asante empire (in what is now Ghana) from 1700 to the 
end of the 19th century paid annual tributes in slaves and goods to the Asante capital 
of Kumasi– the state of Gonja 1000, Slaga 600, and Akwapim 1000 slaves (Perbi, 
2001:5). Slavery lay at the core of Ghana’s pre-colonial states, whose economy was 
almost totally dependent on slave labour (Perbi, 2004:110). Slaves in pre-colonial 
Africa were used for a variety of purposes - to work in agriculture, trade and 
industry; in the administration and military; for domestic chores and in harems; for 
social prestige; for procreation; and occasionally for ritual sacrifice. This stands in 
stark contrast to the vast numbers of slaves shipped out of Africa in the trans-
Atlantic trades, which were used almost exclusively for hard plantation labour. 
Indeed, African modes of indigenous slavery were very different from 
slavery as known in North America, the West Indies, or Europe (including ancient 
Greece and Rome). Perbi (2001:12) records how 19th century European observers 
expressed surprise at the humane treatment of indigenous African slaves. The typical 
situation was that slaves were integrated, in various ways, into the extended family of 
their owners by adoption or marriage42. They usually had the right to be fed and 
clothed, to marry in legal ceremonies, to earn an independent income, to work a plot 
of land for own consumption, to hold and inherit property, and to have legal 
                                                 
42 For instance, slaves in Tuareg society were often regarded as fictive children and used 
kinship term to address members of the owner’s family (Miers and Kopytoff, 1977: 391-403). 
Perbi (2001:8-9) details the different practices to assimilate slaves into owner families among 
the Makara and Bambara in Niger, the Wolof and Serer in Senegal and the Gambia, the 
Bajongo, Baluba and Lunda in Central Africa and the Sena of Mozambique. Only a few 
peoples are known to have not integrated slaves habitually in existing kinship structures 
(Perbi mentions the Batawana of Botswana; the Ila in Zambia; the Yao in East Africa; the 
Duala of Cameroon; and the Shebro of Sierra Leone). 
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protection. Slave owners had no absolute power over their slaves and were not 
allowed to kill them at their discretion - only the king or chief could impose a death 
penalty on both free and enslaved persons. In cases of maltreatment, owners could 
be punished in accordance with local legal custom (e.g. fined, as in the Asante state). 
There are only five records of revolts of indigenous slaves in Africa (Perbi, 2004). 
Among most of the African states and societies there were also avenues for upward 
social and political mobility for slaves (Miers and Koptykoff, 1977:134-170). For 
instance, in the Hausa-Fulani Emirates, slaves could be appointed village heads. 
Slaves among the Mende of Sierra Leone could obtain the political positions of 
chiefs. Asante slaves were granted occupation of stools, the traditional symbols of 
authority (Perbi, 2001:11). And indigenous slaves, unlike export slaves, did not 
reproduce as slaves but often married free persons and had children who were free 
people: ‘… children born into slavery could expect to grow up as members of their 
master’s lineage’ (Lovejoy, 1983:127). 
All this is not to say that slaves and free persons were equals in Africa’s 
indigenous societies. People entered into slavery by an act of violence which stripped 
them of their social identity in their own kinship system, to be only marginally 
integrated into an alien kinship system. Precisely the danger that a slave might escape 
in the area where (s)he had social linkages was an important reason why slaves were 
transported and traded across societies (Klein, 1978:601; Manning, 1983:2). Slaves, 
while often not chattel, were exploited one way or another, more intensively so in 
the ‘high-density’ slave systems. The archives of Senegal contain the account of the 
Governor-General in Bamako (now capital of Mali) who during a 1904 survey of 
slavery in Africa was the only administrator who actually went out and talked to 
slaves. He encountered consistent complaints about malnourishment among the 
Soninke slaves (recounted in Klein, 1978:607). There was ‘economic rationalization’ 
resulting in harsh slave systems among the Soninke, Juula, Hausa and Swahili slaves 
comparable, Klein suggests, to New World slavery conditions. These slaves mostly 
did not live with their owner families but in separate compounds, in conditions were 
their membership in the owner’s kinship system was a mere formality. 
Furthermore, slaves had no familial rights, did not control their children and 
could not make bequest decisions (Klein, 1978:602). They could be used as sacrifice 
or to pay off debts; were expected to work harder and dress simply; could not freely 
mix with free men and women; needed the owner’s permission to embark on any 
enterprise; and received only the simplest burials (Perbi, 2001: 1). Klein (1978: 602) 
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recounts that after slavery was abolished in French Africa, ‘hundreds of thousands of 
slaves left their masters and went home.’ Those who stayed often did so because 
they had no other place to go or because the costs of building up a new life were too 
large; or they formed separate communities locally. These ex-slaves often remained 
in relations of dependence and exploitation, as in the western Sudan were released 
slaves farming for themselves generally paid their master the amount of grain 
necessary to feed a person for one year. It is also noteworthy that most observations 
on indigenous slavery were made in the period of colonial rule, which, as Klein 
(1978:601) stresses, ‘deprived ruling [indigenous] elites of their capacity to coerce’. 
Thus historically, observed indigenous slavery may have been the milder form. 
There was an intimate connection between slavery for export and for 
indigenous use. Ewald (1992:466) notes that ‘the same networks taking millions of 
slaves out of Africa also transported others within the continent’. We use our 
indigenous slavery variable introduced in Table 3.1 to explore the relation between 
indigenous and export slavery, which is measured by the total number of slaves taken 
from each country during various slave trades between 1400 and 1900, scaled by 
populations. This is a variable constructed by Nunn (2008), to which we refer for 
further detail on the underlying data. In Figure 3.1 we plot country-level 
observations of the prevalence of indigenous slavery against the logarithm of slave 
exports per population. The correlation between these two measures in our sample is 
substantial (as the positively sloped trend line demonstrates) but far from complete: 
the bivariate correlation coefficient is 30 % (n = 43). While we must bear in mind 
that the two measures are not identical definitions of slavery prevalence and 
therefore will never perfectly correlate, we observe that a low prevalence of 
indigenous slavery occurred in both high-level and low-level export slavery 
environments. But a high prevalence of indigenous slavery seems more clearly 
associated with intense export slavery environments, as the concentration in the 
upper-right corner of Figure 3.2 shows. This is in line with scholarly work suggesting 
that high levels of slave exports was an important driving force for the development 
of indigenous slavery (Nunn, 2008; Vansina, 1989; Hilton, 1985; Lovejoy, 1983; 
Manning, 1990). 
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Figure 3.1: Scatter Plot Of The Prevalence Of Indigenous Slavery and Slave 
Exports 






















    Sources: Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), Murdock (1967), Nunn (2008) 
 
 
Indigenous slavery lasted longer than export slavery. In 1807 Britain passed a law 
abolishing the Atlantic slave trade, but the African colonies had laws against 
indigenous slavery passed by their colonizers much later and at different dates: in 
1874 in the Gold Coast Colony (the southernmost part of Ghana), but not until 1908 
in the Asante and Northern Territories of Ghana (Perbi, 2001:12). And only after 
1914 was further enslavement prohibited in all colonies (Manning, 1990:12). And 
even then, indigenous slavery often continued in practice. The abolition brought 
about a labour shortage that induced an increase in pawning, to which former slaves 
and their descendants - often in the most vulnerable strata of society – were the 
natural victims (Perbi, 2004). ‘Laws against slave trading were more strictly enforced 
than legislation on slavery, which was often a dead letter’… ‘Servile labour remained 
important in many areas well into the interwar period; and in a few economic 
backwaters it persisted even longer, generally with the knowing complicity of 
colonial regimes’ (Klein, 1978:599,608). 
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Against this background we use our new measure to conduct an 
econometric analysis of the conditions under which indigenous slavery arose and 
existed. The review of the literature above suggests that indigenous slavery was 
geographically concentrated (it was more likely to be encountered in Central-West 
Africa, home to the most important slave markets). We therefore include in our 
empirical analysis below the degrees of longitude and the distance to the Equator 
(latitude) into the regression equation. As colonizers adopted different attitudes 
towards indigenous slavery, the nationality of the colonizer is plausibly relevant: we 
also include five binary variables for colonizer nationality (capturing the British, 
French, Portuguese, Belgian, and Spanish colonising powers43,44). Cooper (1981) and 
others describe how religion generally and Islam specifically was a distinctive force in 
the development of indigenous slavery. Thus the prevalence of indigenous slavery 
may well have been higher in those areas where Islam was the dominant religion. We 
include the Islamic population share to capture this. The presence of export slavery 
may have stimulated the extent of indigenous slavery, as Rodney (1966), Ewald 
(1992) and Nunn (2008) suggest, and we include a control variable for the number of 
exported slaves per land area45. More hierarchical societies with stronger states may 
have induced indigenous slavery in their lands in various ways (e.g. by asking tribute 
in slaves as the Asante did) and we include a variable on state development, defined 
as the share of the non-European population that belongs to indigenous 'centralised' 
ethnic group46. These considerations lead to a model specification of the form47 
                                                 
43 For definitions see appendix 3.E. 
44 The reference group is comprised of countries that were never colonies (Ethiopia and 
Liberia) and Namibia (a former German colony). 
45 Using the numbers of exported slaves per population gives qualitatively similar results in all 
regressions below. 
46 We here follow the definition by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), who provide more detail on 
data and sources for this variable. 
47 There are other variables that we considered but did not include in the analysis. Given the 
variation of forms of indigenous slavery over societal modes (Cooper, 1979; 1981), we 
experimented with variables on social heterogeneity, on community organization, on the 
presence of written records, on population density and on state-community relations 
(Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Bolt and Smits, 2008). Exploratory regressions indicated no 
robust correlations with indigenous slavery for all variables except the presence of written 
records. Nor did their inclusion improve the explained variation in indigenous slavery. This is 
actually an understandable finding taking into account that indigenous slavery was pervasive 
across very different societies. It is clear from the literature that the type of indigenous slavery 
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Slaveryi  = C + ßijXij  + eij  with i = 1,2,…,43 and j = 1,2,…,11 
 
Where Slaveryi is the prevalence of indigenous slavery in country i, C is a constant, ßij 
is the coefficient reflecting the impact of condition Xj in country i on Slavery and eij 
is a white-noise error term. We refer to the Appendix for full details on data sources 
and definitions. In table 3.2 we present estimation results48. In models (1), (2), (3), 
and (4) we sequentially regress on slavery the intensity of export slavery, location 
(longitude and latitude), societal variables (prevalence of Islam and degree of state 
development) and colonial origin (with 5 colonial origin binary variables). Finally in 
model (5) we estimate a reduced model using Hendry’s general-to-specific model 
selection method, starting with all variables included in models (1) through to (4) and 
stepwise excluding variables with coefficient p-values of 5 % and above49. We find 
that both the prevalence of Islam and the degree of state development are positively 
associated with the prevalence of indigenous slavery, as hypothesized, and that 
indigenous slavery is more likely to be encountered in countries closer to the 
Equator. Interestingly, there is no robust correlation with export slavery or with 
colonial origin. 
                                                                                                                          
did vary over societies; but, according to our analysis, not the generic institution of 
indigenous slavery itself. This study is not about defining an the nature of African indigenous 
slavery, which would probably be in vain: ‘efforts to find an essence of slavery in Africa as a 
whole leads away from identifying more valid distinctions between slave systems’ (Cooper, 
1981:274; also Cooper, 1979). Another consideration we pursued is that colonizers tended to 
discourage indigenous slavery, and plausibly more so in the coastal areas where they had most 
influence. We experimented with including a variable capturing the share of the population 
living within a hundred kilometers from the coast but left it out for similar reasons: it reduced 
the number of observations and did not improve the explained variation in indigenous 
slavery. 
48 In order to account for the censored nature of our variable for indigenous slavery (which 
takes on values between 0 and 100) we also estimated a ‘Tobit’ specification instead of OLS. 
This  yields qualitatively identical results. 
49 Since ‘Hendry’-type general-to-specific model selection is based on standard errors, it is 
valid only in the absence of serious multicollinearity, which inflates standard errors. We 
checked this by studying Variance Inflation Factor values for all independents. We found 
values above 4 -  i.e. explaining more than 75 % of the variation in the other independents – 
for the colony1 and colony2 variables. These were excluded from the most general model 
with which the model selection procedure started. 
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Table 3.2: Correlates of Indigenous Slavery: OLS Regressions 
 Dependent variable: Indigenous Slavery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Export slavery 0.032**     
 (0.015)     
Longitude  -0.004    
  (0.003)    
Latitude  -0.013*   -0.022*** 
  (0.007)   (0.007) 
Islam   0.005***  0.005*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Early state dev.   0.176  0.489** 
   (0.169)  (0.182) 
British colony    -0.106  
    (0.157)  
French colony    0.008  
    (0.141)  
Portuguese 
colony 
   -0.323**  
    (0.130)  
Belgian colony    0.263**  
    (0.118)  
Spanish colony    -0.610***  
    (0.115)  
(constant) 0.496*** 0.834*** 0.419*** 0.690*** 0.481*** 
 (0.089) (0.103) (0.109) (0.115) (0.110) 
      
R2 0.108 0.138 0.197 0.197 0.353 
N 43 43 41 43 41 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
    See Appendix 3.E. for data definitions and sources. 
 
 
In conclusion of this section, we identified indigenous slavery as conceptually 
separate from the export slave trade in that it is slavery and the slave trade within 
Africa. While indigenous slavery in Africa did not involve the vast numbers of 
people traded in the Atlantic slave trades, it was more pervasive across Africa’s 
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traditional states and societies than export slavery. It is also more recent and 
plausibly more deeply engrained in the fabric of society. It was mostly - but by no 
means always - more benign towards slaves. But it dislocated and disenfranchised 
large numbers of Africans, was often initiated through violence, and intertwined 
commerce with warfare. While often less cruel than the Atlantic slave trades, it was 
arguably a strong and pervasive impediment to the development of political stability 
and human capital in traditional African states and societies before and during the 
colonial era, and well after export slavery had been ended. Its pervasiveness and 
longevity suggest that its impact on Africa’s development may have been strong, 
possible enduring to the present day. We now turn to investigate this issue. 
 
3.3. Indigenous Slavery and Long-Term Income Development 
 
Nunn (2008) showed statistically that export slavery had a negative impact on 
Africa’s long-term development, as measured by the GDP per capita (income) levels 
in the year 2000. In this section we investigate whether this long-run effect is also 
observable for indigenous slavery. 
To begin with, we plot the percentage of the population within today’s 
borders of an African country that historically had the institution of indigenous 
slavery, against the logarithm of its per capita income in 2000, for 41 countries 
(Figure 3.2). The negative relation (with bivariate correlation coefficient of –55%) is 
already clear from visual inspection. This is confirmed by computation of an OLS 
trend line with a highly significant (t-value of -4.15) and negative coefficient of -1.12 
(t-value -4.15), and an R-squared of 0.30. Thus, nearly a third of the variation in Sub-
Saharan Africa’s current income levels is statistically associated with the variation in 
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Figure 3.2: Indigenous Slavery Correlates Negatively to 2000 Income levels in 


























Sources: Atlas Narodov Mira (1964), Murdock (1967), Maddison (2003) 
 
 
A baseline OLS equations to test this relation more rigorously, follows the 
specifications in Nunn (2008): 
 
ln(income2000)i  = C + ßijXij  + eij  with i = 1,2,…,43 and j = 
1,2,…,11 
 
Where ln(income2000)i is the natural logarithm of average per capita GDP in the 
year 200050 in country i, C is a constant, ßij is the coefficient reflecting the impact of 
condition Xj in country i on year-2000 per capita income levels and eij is a white-
noise error term. We refer to the appendix for full details on data sources and 
definitions. The set of Xj variables always includes the indigenous slavery variable, 
and in one model also Nunn’s (2008) export slavery variable51. This specification 
                                                 
50 We also conducted the same analysis with an average GDP pc between 1990 and 2000 and 
GDP pc in 2000 from the WDI as an robustness check. Results can be found in appendix 
3.B. 
51 Compared to the Nunn (2008) specification, this model does not include a dummy for 
North Africa, as we have no North African countries in the sample. 
Indigenous Slavery 91 
  
allows us to examine if indigenous slavery has a long-term growth effect apart from 
the effect of export slavery already identified by Nunn (2008). 
 For our model exploration we follow the procedure also applied in table 3.2 
above. To the simple univariate model just discussed we add sequentially groups of 
covariates in models (1) through to (5). These are variables commonly encountered 
in the literature on the long-term determinants of growth: location, access to sea, 
climate, legal origin, colonial origin, state development, religion, intensity of export 
slavery and presence of point resources (oil, gold, and diamonds). Finally in model 
(6) we start with the most general non-multicollinear model and stepwise exclude 


















                                                 
52 Variance Inflation Factors with values above 4 were found  for four colony dummies and 
for the temperature and latitude variables. These were excluded from the most general model 
that the Hendry selection procedure started with, so as not to undermine the validity of the 
standard errors that are the basis for model selection. 
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Table 3.3: Indigenous Slavery and 2000 Income levels: OLS Regressions 
  Dependent variable: log GDP pc 2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ind. Slavery -1.037*** -1.056*** -0.811** -0.969*** -0.900** -0.712*** 
 (0.366) (0.375) (0.318) (0.318) (0.331) (0.247) 
Latitude 0.014      
 (0.015)      
Longitude -0.004     -0.011** 
 (0.005)     (0.004) 
Coastline 0.030      
 (0.032)      
Rainfall  0.000     
  (0.007)     
Humidity  0.006     
  (0.013)     
Temperature  -0.011     
  (0.015)     
Islam   0.000    
   (0.003)    
Early state dev   -0.064    
   (0.302)    
Export slavery   -0.071**   -0.109*** 
   (0.029)   (0.026) 
Gold    -0.002   
    (0.016)   
Oil    0.049  0.068*** 
    (0.029)  (0.023) 
Diamonds    0.032   
    (0.061)   
British colony     -0.197  
     (0.520)  
French colony     -0.254  
     (0.526)  
Port. Colony     -0.444  
     (0.553)  
Belgian colony     -0.749  
     (0.639)  
Spa. Colony     1.293**  
     (0.543)  
(constant) 7.543*** 7.323*** 7.788*** 8.079*** 7.761*** 8.512*** 
 (0.429) (0.833) (0.359) (0.357) (0.553) (0.240) 
R2 0.34 0.30 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.56 
N 43 43 41 43 43 41 
     Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
      We use Maddison’s income data, as in Nunn (2008). Using other sources such as WDI (2007), or an average   between 1990 and      
      2000 gives qualitatively identical  results, see appendix 3.B. See Appendix 3.E for data definitions and sources. 
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Indigenous slavery is significantly and negatively correlated with current income in all 
models. As in Nunn’s (2008) study, export slavery enters robustly and significantly. 
The indigenous slavery effect is appreciably smaller when export slavery is also 
included. But the preferred model suggest that indigenous slavery does has a long-
term growth effect apart from the effect of export slavery already identified by Nunn 
(2008). Oil and location in degrees of longitude are also robustly part of the 
preferred model, with expected coefficient signs. 
While this is prima facie evidence that indigenous slavery depressed economic 
development in the long run, it is important to note that there may be a selection 
problem, where countries destined by climate or location to remain relatively poor 
also selected into the practice of indigenous slavery. One plausible selection 
mechanism would run via technology. Hopkins (1973:25) attributed indigenous 
slavery institutions to scarcity of labour especially in West Africa, where under 
conditions of simple agricultural technologies (which restrain income growth), ‘the 
costs of acquiring and maintaining slaves were less than the cost of hiring labour’. 
Similarly, Fielding and Torres (2008) explain that particular combinations of 
endowments and climates - prevalent especially in West and Central Africa - 
stimulated the development of plantation and mining economies with their attendant 
‘extractive institutions’ (Acemoglu et al, 2001) inhibiting long-term development. 
This is another possible selection mechanism. In such and similar scenarios, we 
observe a negative correlation of indigenous slavery with today’s income levels, but 
this is no conclusive evidence of causation. Conducting a simple OLS regression 
would then lead to biased estimates. 
In order to assess how serious this selection problem is, we want to know if 
countries with endogenous slavery were already poor at the time of observation of 
indigenous slavery in our data set. Historically, as shown by (among others) 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Africa’s population density is a good indicator for prosperity. 
We explored this relation for the 27 countries for which we have data on both 
historical population density (in the 15th century) and indigenous slavery. With a 
correlation coefficient of +35%, it appears that if anything, there is a positive 
association between the two. This is also reported by Nunn (2008) on export slavery 
who finds it were the richer, not the poorer countries that selected into the slave 
trades. 
But we cannot be certain, of course, that our OLS estimates do not suffer 
from endogeneity problems in some other way. In order to address this possible 
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problem, we apply an instrumental-variable approach to estimating the slavery-
income relation. The instrumental-variable approach also controls for the fact that 
our indigenous slavery variable is a constructed variable, which may render OLS 
estimates biased. On the other hand, we note that 2SLS regressions have bad small 
sample properties. We therefore present them as just an additional robustness check 
of the OLS regression. Estimations results are relegated to Appendix 3.C. The 
reported model coefficients for instrumented indigenous slavery are positive across a 
range of model specifications and actually larger than OLS estimates. We conclude 
that the instrumental-variable approach - to the extent that it adds insight, given the 
data limitations – is in line with the above empirical findings. 
Statistical issues of instrumentation aside, we may also ask what the 
substantial impact of indigenous slavery on long-term development of African income 
levels was. How much income development did it cost the continent? To put this 
into context, we express the decline in 2000 GDP per capita levels that the 
coefficients imply in terms of years of income growth, at the average 1960-2000 
growth rate. A back-of-the-envelope calculation (detailed in appendix 3.D) suggests 
that a one standard deviation increase in the measure for indigenous slavery is 
equivalent to between 20 (preferred OLS estimate) and 24 (2SLS estimate) years of 
income growth, at the average 1960-2000 growth rate. Thus the estimated impact of 
indigenous slavery is truly substantial and not overly sensitive to choosing an OLS or 
2 SLS estimation strategy. 
It is interesting to note that we find substantially larger growth losses due to 
a one standard deviation increase in the measure for export slavery, of 58 and 38 
years of contemporary growth, respectively. Note however that the magnitude of the 
coefficients for the two types of slavery cannot simply be compared, as one is a 
population fraction and the other is (the log of) enslaved and traded persons per land 
area. Also the number of people enslaved and exported during 1400-1800 per 
country population, given in Nunn (2008), would not be comparable in value terms 
to the fraction of the population living in societies that historically had the institution 
of indigenous slavery. All people included in the first measure were slaves, but not all 
people included in the last measure were. And the first is snapshot view in the mid-
19th century, while the second is a cumulative measure over four centuries. With 
these caveats, our approximation suggests that export slavery was roughly a factor 2 
or 3 times more harmful to long-term growth than indigenous slavery – a finding in 
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line with the literature on the uniquely pernicious effects of the slave trades to 
African development. 
We should also note that all the above figures are merely approximations, as 
we use point estimates with a margin of uncertainty, and also as we extrapolate the 
coefficient originally estimated around the sample mean. While the numbers are 
indicative rather than precise, this exercise demonstrates that the estimated 
coefficients represent substantial development effects of indigenous slavery indeed. 
 
3.4. Indigenous Slavery and Capable States 
 
In view of these findings, the natural question to ask is how indigenous slavery 
influenced long-term development. For export slavery, Nunn (2008: 23-25) has 
suggested an ethnic fractionalisation channel and an early state development channel. 
Export slavery may have “impeded the formation of larger communities and broader 
ethnic identities” and therefore is “an important factor in explaining Africa’s high 
level of ethnic fractionalisation today” (Nunn,  2008:4), which in turn is negatively 
related to economic development. On the other hand,  Kusimba (2004:67) suggests 
that “[i]n some cases, smaller ethnically related communities were compelled to 
aggregate into large groups strong enough to construct large fortified settlements”. 
The slave trades might have increased ethnic tensions, but it is less clear how it 
influenced fractionalisation itself. Likewise, indigenous slavery may - as we elaborate 
below - have perpetuated social exclusion along ethnic lines, but probably did not 
cause ethnic fractionalization itself. Indeed, we find no significant correlation 
between measures for ethnic fractionalisation and our measure for indigenous 
slavery53. 
 Alternatively, the political development argument is that export slavery was a 
major motivation in inter-African wars, intertwined commerce with warfare and 
decimated populations unevenly, so hindering the development of political stability 
and economic confederations in traditional African states and societies. In turn, early 
and continuing state development matters to economic development (Bockstette et 
al. 2002; Chanda and Putterman 2005). In comparison to this well-established 
                                                 
53 The correlation coefficient between our indigenous slavery measure and the Alesina et al. 
(2003) ethnic fractionalisation measure is insignificant 0.22 (p = 0.16).  This fractionalisation 
measure reflects “the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population 
belonged to different groups” (Alesina et al. (2003: 5). 
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argument on export slavery, it is not obvious that indigenous slavery in the same way 
impeded early state development. In contrast to export slavery, it was not an external 
threat to the development of indigenous political systems, but an ingrained feature of 
many traditional societies and often (as in the Ashanti empire) one of the 
foundations of state structures through the tribute system and slaves’ economic and 
administrative contributions to statehood (Perbi 2001; 2004, Fenske 2009). Indeed, 
correlations for measures of early state development and indigenous slavery are low 
and insignificant54. 
 Instead, we tentatively suggest that indigenous slavery may have impeded 
the development not so much of statehood itself, as of capable and accountable states. 
A large literature argues that such states are vital to processes of sustainable 
economic development (Kohli 2004; Evans 1995; Granovetter 1985). As noted, 
Africa’s pervasive slavery practices implied discrimination and social exclusion of 
large population groups, which continued into the post-colonial era and to this day. 
Even in the most benign view, indigenous slaves were still marginalized members of 
society with few social linkages to free men and women (Perbi 2001). This was often 
perpetuated as after the abolition of slavery, ex-slaves often remained in relations of 
dependence and exploitation. They typically kept their inferior status, even over 
several generations (Miescher 2007; Manning 1990). 
 Where slavery was widespread, this might have triggered the development of 
restrictive political institutions, limiting the ability of people to take part in the 
political process or to access better educational and employment opportunities 
(Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). This continuing social exclusion (often along ethnic 
lines) is a problem especially with regard to the building of an effective state with 
broad-based legitimacy.  As the ‘capable states’ literature emphasizes, economic 
development in poor countries requires that nation states are supported by large 
sections of society and have the administrative and bureaucratic capacity to uphold 
key market institutions55 and to effectively implement policies (Sindzingre 2004; 
                                                 
54 The correlation coefficient between our measure for indigenous slavery and pre-colonial 
state development, taken from Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) is low and insignificant: r =  0.03 
(p =  0.84). 
55 This is not to argue for a large state apparatus or for ‘state intervention’ in the market, e.g. 
via import-substitution policies, which have often turned out disastrously in the African 
context . The point here is more basic and uncontroversial: market economies function only 
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Kohli 2004) 56. The indigenous slavery heritage of large-scale social exclusion may 
undermine both states’ broad-based legitimacy and its capability. Below we sketch 
out this argument, making linkages to the relevant literatures, before turning to some 
empirical indication of its validity. 
 The importance of broad-based legitimacy is argued in the ‘developmental 
state’ literature. (Sindzingre 2004; Kohli 2004; Evans 1995; Granovetter 1985; Ndulu 
and van de Walle 1996). Democratic (or otherwise participatory) political processes 
signal that state are to some degree responsive and committed to their populations. 
They force rulers to improve the lives of large sections of the population to be able 
to stay in power, and thereby are an incentive for states to prioritize economic 
development for society at large, a necessary condition for sustainable economic 
development. The contrast to this ‘developmental state’ scenario is the capture of 
African states by elites identified by Bates (2008). Englebert (2000a) explicitly 
connects the weak capability of African states to their limited legitimacy. 
 As to the link of indigenous slavery with state capability, in societies where 
large population groups continue to be excluded from opportunities for higher 
education and state employment, bureaucracies cannot tap into much of the 
population’s human capital. Also, social exclusion undermines broad-based state 
legitimacy, and thereby the state’s capacity to formulate and implement effective 
development policies. A large body of literature places the weak state capacity at the 
core of Africa’s dismal growth performance in the post-colonial era (Englebert 
2000a; Ndulu and van de Walle 1996). 
 In sum, the suggestion developed here is that long-standing and pervasive 
indigenous slavery, and the social exclusion it implied, may have undermined the 
development of capable states with broad-based legitimacy and effective 
bureaucracies. Some empirical support for the validity of this explanation for the 
African context is presented in three scatter plots below, which plot our measure for 
the prevalence of indigenous slavery against measures for democratic accountability, 
                                                                                                                          
if market institutions are in place, many of which must be created and maintained by the state 
and its bureaucracy.  
56 This is not to argue for a large state apparatus or for ‘state intervention’ in the market, e.g. 
via import-substitution policies, which have often turned out disastrously in the African 
context . The point here is more basic and uncontroversial: market economies function only 
if market institutions are in place, many of which must be created and maintained by the state 
and its bureaucracy.  
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bureaucratic quality (taken from the ICRG database 57) and state capacity58 (taken 
from Englebert 2000a). 
 
 















        r = -0.31, p= 0.08, n = 32. 
                                                 
57 ICRG data were available for 32 Sub-Saharan African countries. The ‘Democratic 
Accountability’ measure is and index scaled from one (low) to six (high). Index points are 
awarded on the basis of the type of governance enjoyed by a country, ranging from 
alternating democracy to dominated democracy to de facto one-party state to de jure one-party 
state to autarchy. ‘Bureaucratic quality’ is an index scaled from one (low) to four (high). High 
values reflect a low risk of drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services 
after a change in government. Both variables are annually measured. We take the per-country 
averages of observations through the 1990s for each variable so as to avoid domination of 
the analytical results by single values. 
58 State capacity measures the development capacity of states, by averaging six policy variables 
(public investments in education, public investments in agriculture, current government 
expenditure, distortions in the foreign exchange market, restrictions on free trade, and 
distortions in the foreign exchange market) and seven dimensions of governance 
(enforceability of contracts, risk of expropriation of investments, the prevalence of 
corruption, the quality of government institutions, the quality of bureaucracy, the extent of 
civil liberties, the degree of linguistic alienation of citizens from their government) in first 
principal components analysis. For exact sources we refer to Englebert (2000a). 
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        r = -0.47, p = 0.006, n = 33 




All three correlations are substantially negative and statistically significant. Also, in 
line with research findings that indicate that political development, or state capacity, 
is an important determinant of economic development (Englebert 2000a; Kohli 
2004; Evans 1995), the correlation between our measures of political development 
and economic development are positive and significant (democracy: r = 0.55, p < 
0.01; bureaucratic quality: r = 0.67, p < 0.01; state capacity: r =  0.70, p < 0.01). 
While this supports our tentative explanation of the channel from indigenous slavery 
to long-term economic development, clearly this issue warrants further research, 
beyond the space and scope of the present chapter. 
 
3.5.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we conducted the first systematic quantitative assessment of the long-
term impact of Africa’s indigenous slavery on its economic development. We 
document that indigenous slavery was a pervasive institution across traditional 
African societies, and construct a measure that indicates its prevalence especially in 
West-Central Africa and in societies with more developed states, and where Islam 
was more prevalent. Indigenous slavery lasted well into the 20th century, much longer 
than export slavery. Our review of the literature suggests that indigenous slaves 
mostly lived in better health and social conditions than did slaves exported to New 
World and other destinations. But it also highlights the violence and 
disenfranchisement that large parts of the populations in traditional African states 
experienced. All this suggests that it was arguably a strong and pervasive impediment 
on economic development - possibly via negative effects on political development -  
to the present day. 
In order to research this hypothesis, we use historical data in a sample of 43 
countries to estimate the conditions under which indigenous slavery existed, and its 
consequences for today’s levels of economic development. We conclude that 
indigenous slavery was clearly harmful to long-term economic development. The 
effect is statistically significant and substantial in economic terms. We estimate that 
the continuing impact of Africa’s indigenous slavery is about equal to 20-25 years of 
contemporary income growth, and is one half to a third of the negative long-term 
growth impact of export slavery. Our third analysis concerns the transmission 
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channel from indigenous slavery to current income levels. The literature suggest that 
slavery and the discrimination it entails may have inhibited the development of 
politically accountable states with capable bureacracies, in turn leading to lower 
income levels of economic development. We find confirmation of this also in our 
sample, where the measure for historical indigenous slavery is negatively correlated 
with democratic accountability, bureaucratic capacity and state capacity in the 1990s. 












Understanding Long-Run African Growth: Colonial 





This chapter is an empirical examination of the colonial origins of Africa’s economic 
growth. Developments in growth theory suggest that explanations should be located 
in the broad areas of geography, institutions and human capital. Whereas the 
geography school examines factors where one-way causality with growth is beyond 
reasonable doubt – including location, precipitation, sunshine and natural 
endowments – empirical studies on institutions need to address an endogeneity 
problem. Recent studies have done so by employing variables that precede modern 
economic growth in the developing world, including the legal systems used by 
colonising powers (La Porta et al., 2004) and settler mortality (Acemoglu et al., 
2001). This chapter extends this approach to the study of human capital’s impact on 
long-run growth in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter ‘Africa’). We focus on Africa 
                                                 
59 Chapter based on the paper “Understanding Long-Run African Growth: Colonial 
Institutions or Colonial Education?”, written with D.J. Bezemer. His contribution is 
gratefully acknowledged. The paper is published in the Journal of Development Studies 45 
(1):24 – 54. 
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because of the availability of colonial data relating to our research topic. Also, 
Africa’s experience occupies a sufficiently distinct place in the development literature 
to merit separate study of the continent (as testified by the notorious ‘Africa dummy’ 
appearing in much cross-country econometric work). We utilise freshly collected data 
on African colonial human capital and instrument it with settler mortality. Our main 
positive finding is that instrumented colonial era education is a causal factor for long-
term growth. This finding is robust to inclusion of additional effects of legal origin 
and geography. Our education measure explains growth better and shows greater 
stability over time than do measures for extractive institutions used by Acemoglu et 
al. (2001). We also find some evidence that institutions are endogenous to education, 
as suggested by Glaeser et al. (2004) and Glaeser et al. (2006). The next section 
reviews the four main schools of thought in the current debate on the roots of long-
term growth, followed by a historical background on colonial education in section 3. 
Section 4 introduces our data and presents the analysis and results. Section 5 
concludes with a summary and discussion of our findings. 
 
4.2. Explanations of Long-Term Growth 
 
Extractive Institutions 
Institutions are broadly defined as the written and informal rules, beliefs, norms and 
habits that ‘constrain and liberate human action’ (North, 1990). Any empirical study 
on institutions and growth must come to terms with the pervasive and often elusive 
nature of institutions – particularly, their manifold manifestations and the 
endogeneity of institutions to growth. A milestone study is by Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
who address both problems by studying a large number of former European 
colonies and defining their colonial era institutions generically as ‘extractive’ or 
‘constructive’. The authors suggest that where the disease environment was 
favourable to European settlers, they settled in larger numbers and built societies 
with economic institutions akin to those in Europe. These would typically include 
many checks and balances on state power, fostering private entrepreneurship, trade 
and innovation. In contrast, where the disease environment was not favourable – as 
indicated by high settler mortality – Europeans created ‘extractive institutions’: legal 
constructs endowing the state with large powers and few constraints, designed to 
effectively transfer natural resources to the colonisers while stifling private initiative 
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and commercial development (Acemoglu et al., 2001: 1375). The authors presume 
these institutional frameworks (if not concrete institutions) to be persistent, so that 
settler mortality would be a robust proxy for the quality of both early and current 
institutions. 
One gap in the Acemoglu et al. (2001) analysis is that the two steps in the argument 
(high European population mortality led to low European population densities, 
which led to extractive institutions) are not separately tested. Also, they do not 
examine whether their result was driven mainly by the gap in economic performance 
between settler economies such as the US, Australia and New Zealand and colonies 
in Africa and Asia. This begs the question if extractive institutions explain 
performance also within a solely African context. The authors return to both these 
issues in section III. 
 
Legal Origins 
Djankov et al. (2002), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and La Porta et al. (1998) address 
the endogeneity problem besetting institutions by creating a measure of early, 
colonial era institutions, which preceded developing country current growth 
performance. Their measurement distinguishes between colonial institutions 
originating from different national legal systems. Again, the presumption is that once 
introduced, these systems do not change fundamentally and hence, legal origin 
determines the qualities of current institutions (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). In our 
context the differences between Africa’s most active colonisers would be relevant. 
Under French civil law, ‘professional judges, legal codes, and written records’ are 
typical while British common law is characterised by ‘lay judges, broader legal 
principle and oral argument’ (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002: 1193). Joireman (2006) 
questions this assumption and argues that there is significant heterogeneity within 
common law countries. This also applies to colonies: she shows how Kenya and 
India – which both had common law systems imposed by the British colonisers – 
have very different colonial and post-colonial legal experiences. Yet in Djankov et al. 
(2002), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and La Porta et al. (1998), legal-origin differences 
are successfully linked to measures for present-day institutions including market 
regulation, property rights, quality of government, political freedom and financial 
development. These concrete institutions, in turn, are shown to systematically relate 
to growth. 
 




Yet another group of scholars links differences in economic development patterns to 
geographical factors. An important analytical advantage is the absence of serious 
endogeneity problems: geographical factors plausibly have some impact on economic 
growth, while growth has no or very little direct effect on geography. The four broad 
areas often cited relate to natural endowments, productivity, diseases, and transport 
costs (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup et al., 1998; 
Diamond, 1999; Sachs, 2001). 
Endowments of ‘point resources’ (principally oil, gas, diamonds, and 
precious metals) provide a growth potential which may be successfully exploited to 
raise income sustainably; but they are also notorious for leading to a ‘resource curse’ 
of political and economic instability related to rents (Isham et al., 2005). In contrast, 
endowments with non-point, widespread natural resources such as sunshine, rainfall 
and soil fertility have historically constituted the most common geographical basis 
for broadbased and sustainable growth. This may account partly for Africa’s growth 
problems, as its location in the tropics implies that production conditions, 
particularly in agriculture, are less favourable and more variable than in temperate 
zones, due to fragile soils and little or infrequent rainfall. A third geographical factor 
is the incidence of plagues and pests which affect plants and animals (and thereby 
agricultural productivity), as well as the productivity of human labour. Such diseases 
(particularly malaria) are unusually widespread in Africa and their impact is therefore 
more harmful than in most other parts of the world. Fourth, lack of access to 
seaports or navigable rivers increases local transport costs. A third of all African 
countries are landlocked, comprising a quarter of its population (Sachs and Warner, 
1997; Gallup et al., 1998). Also, large distances to world markets increase the 
transport costs of trade. 
Over time, powerful feedback mechanisms may reinforce these barriers to 
economic development. Low agricultural productivity inhibits an ‘agricultural 
transformation’, which historically has been the basis for industrialisation, economic 
diversification and rising income levels in all currently developed countries (Timmer, 
2002). Harsh living conditions lead to thinly settled countries and low incomes, 
which then constitute an endogenous drag on further growth, for example through 
demand limitations and larger costs (and lower returns) in infrastructure 
construction. Small domestic markets also inhibit scale-sensitive technological 
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innovation, widening the ‘ecological divide’ with developed countries that hinders 
the adoption of innovations through technology diffusion (Sachs, 2001: 22). 
Human Capital 
The human capital angle on growth in former colonies has recently been argued by 
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Djankov et al. (2003), based on early work by Dewey 
(1916), Lipset (1959, 1960), Schultz (1961), and others. As it is the focus of this 
chapter, we discuss it in some detail. 
The term human capital was defined by its originator Theodore Schultz 
(1961: 1) as ‘skills and knowledge’ which are ‘a form of capital’ and are ‘in substantial 
part a product of deliberate investment’. He also posited the link with economic 
growth, observing that ‘increases in economic output have been large in comparison 
with increases in land, man-hours and physical reproducible capital. Investment in 
human capital is probably the major explanation for this difference’ (Schultz, 1961: 
1).Education can be viewed as one such investment in human capital, another one 
being, for example, healthcare (Schultz, 1999: 67). Our focus is on the education 
component of human capital.  
The key observation in the human capital angle on the colonial roots of 
Africa’s growth, then, is not that settlers took ‘institutional fundaments’ with them. 
They took themselves, their human capital, and the means to proliferate the 
education component of that human capital through their educational systems. As in 
the Acemoglu et al. (2001) account, there is a link with the density of settlement by 
colonisers, but it does not run via extractive institutions. Instead, the relevant 
reasoning here is that where fewer settlers went to stay, less of their human capital 
was brought and developed via educational systems (Lloyd et al., 1999: 17). Amin 
(1972) and Oliver and Atmore (1967) note that in areas where there was large scale 
white settlement, colonial investment in social sectors was significantly larger than in 
areas where there was less settlement. Thus the idea is that the colonisers’ initial 
human capital endowment and its proliferation affected long-term economic 
development. This links in with Krueger and Lindahl (2001: 1105) who, reviewing 
the literature on education and growth, conclude that ‘the initial level of education 
[is] positively correlated with economic growth’. For Africa, the corollary would be 
that ‘[l]ow levels of health and education are two salient factors contributing to 
[Africa’s] slow growth’, as Schultz (1999: 67–68) notes.  
Some observers question the relevance of education to growth, since the 
returns to education are typically low in agrarian societies (as most colonies were), 
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relative to its return in more diversified economies (Bennel 1996; Pritchett, 2000; 
Galor et al., 2005). For Africa, at least, this is contradicted by the Appleton and 
Balihuta (1996) overview of studies on the link between education and agricultural 
productivity in Africa. They conclude that the estimated effects are positive and 
often very large economically (though not always statistically significant) (Appleton 
and Balihuta, 1996: 420). However, apart from this, the human capital school has 
emphasised that the key benefits of human capital are ‘not technological but political’ 
(Glaeser et al., 2004: 282). Early writers argued that education ‘broadens man’s 
outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him 
from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational 
electoral choices’ (Lipset, 1960: 39). Educated people are purportedly more aware of 
government actions, more actively participating in society, and better able to organise 
themselves politically and to resolve their conflicts ‘through negotiation and voting 
rather than through violent disputes’ (Glaeser et al., 2004: 272; also, Lipset, 1960; 
Tilly, 1998; Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000). Education, in this view, is also a 
precondition for a well-functioning judicial and administrative system (Coleman, 
1965). 
Yet, other critics question this benign role of education in fostering 
economic growth and development, it may also give rise to political instability, ethnic 
tensions and chronic violence. Huntington (1968: 41) already observed that 
‘modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability’: he found that at 
low levels of literacy (roughly below 50%), education breeds political instability while 
for countries with higher literacy rates it fosters stability. He went on to outline a 
mechanism where better educated people in developing countries with weak political 
systems are better able to organise protests, stage coups or foster other forms of 
political instability, which may impede economic growth. Bayly (2004: 222) likewise 
writes of Britain’s preference for indirect rule in Africa in an attempt to ‘stifle the 
growth of English educated elites like those who were causing such troubles in India 
and Egypt’.  
In another type of criticism, Bush and Saltarelli (2000) document how 
education has been used by states for the purposes of cultural repression and 
segregation of ethnic minority groups. This includes colonial governments, who have 
used education for cultural assimilation aims and for divide-and-rule politics. For 
instance, in Belgian Africa, the schooling system from the late nineteenth century 
‘openly favoured the Tutsi minority and actively discriminated against the Hutu’ and, 
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during the 1920s ‘set up special schools to educate Tutsis as the future leaders of the 
country and . . . as support staff for the colonial government’ (Bush and Saltarelli, 
2000: 10). They link this to the enduring ethnic tensions in the successor states 
Rwanda and Burundi, which erupted into violence and genocide in the early 1990s. 
Bush and Saltarelli provide similar examples from Sudan, South Africa, Uganda, 
Zaire and for many other, non-African countries. Likewise, Davidson (1992) 
describes how the fact that African elites were typically Western-style educated 
alienated them from their compatriots – one reason for the legitimacy crisis of 
African governments, which in turn has hampered sustainable growth processes. 
Also other quantitative research confirms that the relation of education with growth 
is not simple and typically nonlinear, often mediated by other variables such as 
inequality, as in Rehme’s (2007) study. 
This literature illustrates that education can indeed have long-term influence, 
for good as well as for harm. On balance, however, these adverse effects appear 
insufficiently strong to make education’s effect on economic growth negative on 
average. A large body of empirical research on that relation in the last half century 
finds that more and better education is robustly associated with higher levels of 
economic growth (Gemmel, 1996; Topel, 1999; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001), often 
conditional on other factors such as capital investment and the trade regime (Judson, 
1998; Vinod and Kaushik, 2007)60. Schultz (1999) presents an overview of findings 
relevant to Africa. Beyond this specialist literature, the role of education in creating 
the ‘wealth of nations’ is also a mainstay in the general study of factors fostering 
economic growth, from Adam Smith to David Landes’ (1997) celebrated Wealth and 
Poverty of Nations. 
We build on these results by looking back to colonial times. Taking our cues 
from the human capital literature, we hypothesise that colonial education may have 
fostered long-term growth through two channels: both by affecting present 
education levels, and through its effect on political institutions, fostering stability, 
‘voice’, and good governance (especially, secure property rights and law and order). 
In support of this link, Lipset (1960) found that the least educated societies are never 
stable democracies, whereas highly educated societies generally are. This was updated 
                                                 
60 Obviously, this is not to say that education is therefore an unmixed blessing; the formation 
of human capital enabling economic growth may still co-exist with, for example, cultural 
repression perpetuated through educational systems. 
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and confirmed by Glaeser et al. (2004), who also find a strong effect of initial 
education on institutional changes (see also Glaeser et al., 2006). 
It is important to note that we restrict our analysis to colonial education, and 
this is a limitation of the present research. Obviously, pre-colonial, indigenous 
education systems – such as education by village elders, the extended family or in an 
indigenous religious setting (Adeyemi and Adeyinka, 2003) – also invest people with 
social and cognitive skills and knowledge, and thus may build their human capital 
and so contribute to, among other things, economic growth. Or alternatively, they 
may have interacted with (hindered or fostered) the development of colonial 
education systems. Such indigenous education systems predated and often co-existed 
with colonial education efforts, and may have been important because the reach of 
colonial administration and education systems was often limited. As Bayly notes of 
colonial administration in general, ‘[w]hole areas of the European colonial world . . . 
remained in the grip of resistance to central authority, and the power of local 
chieftains until the very beginnings of decolonization itself in the 1940s’ (Bayly, 2004: 
254). In this environment, state-colonial education systems must have been only one 
of many influences on human capital, and indigenous education systems may have 
been equally (or more?) determining to human capital formation as was colonial 
education.  
However, as indigenous education systems varied greatly over communities 
and were often not formalised, it is difficult to systematically take them into account 
in a quantitative cross-country analysis – even if there were reliable cross-country 
data. In addition, even apart from data issues, conceptually the impact of pre-colonial 
education on colonial education is a vast topic in itself, mediated and shaped as that 
relation is by environmental factors such as population density, the spread of Islam 
with its rival schooling system, and the different policies of colonisers (see also 
Lange et al., 2006). For reasons of scope and delineation we therefore consider it 
beyond this chapter to treat it in any detail; but we return to this issue in our 
concluding section V as an avenue for future research. 
We limit this study to a test of the effect of colonial human capital on 
subsequent growth in former African colonies. We do, however, include control 
variables (relating to legal origins, extractive institutions and geography). We will 
explicitly test in section 4.3, the two ‘human capital’ channels suggested in the 
literature. However, first we turn to a consideration of the context. 
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4.3. Colonial and Post-Colonial Education and Development in Africa: 
Historical Background 
 
We organise our discussion of colonial education systems around the main 
distinction in our sample, which is the difference between educational policies by the 
British and the French colonising powers. The spread of European-style education in 
the territories they colonised was part of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century process of empire building, in which the British and French vied for control 
over large parts of the African continent: formal education rates increased rapidly 
once the ‘scramble for Africa’ truly began in the 1880s, and indeed spread most 
quickly in contested areas (White, 1996). For instance Tanzania, handed to the 
British empire by the League of Nations after the First World War, and not 
threatened by the ambitions of rival colonisers, continued to have the lowest primary 
enrolment rates in all British Africa. 
The two major European powers operated with distinct styles and 
educational outcomes. Benavot and Riddle (1988) calculate enrolment rates per 
school age population for different years before 1940, and find on average 
considerably higher figures in British Africa compared to French West Africa and 
Equatorial French Africa (see also Bowman and Anderson, 1963). This difference in 
outcomes can be plausibly linked to the complex interaction, in both the French and 
British colonies, of their two most powerful institutions: the state, represented by the 
colonial administration system; and the church, represented by missionary educators. 
 
Colonial Administration 
The British exercised ‘indirect rule’ in Africa (Lugard, 1929), where traditional 
structures and institutions were left intact and colonial rulers attempted to work with 
traditional chiefs. Within the colonial superstructure, chiefs maintained direct power 
over their peoples and lands (Lugard, 1919). Indirect rule was motivated by 
pragmatism and the aim of reducing the costs of colonial administration (Bayly, 
2004: 222), and was characterised by a relative tolerance towards local customs 
compared to other colonial powers (Lugard, 1929; Wesseling, 1991; Lloyd et al., 
1999). The British did not introduce one centralised educational policy in their 
colonies but instead largely left it to missionaries to provide the population with 
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education and to decide whether to educate also in the vernacular (Crowder, 1964). 
Missionaries had already laid the foundation of the schooling system before 
colonisation properly started, and the British government realised that they were the 
only party who had the organisation (and the motivation) to ‘bear the brunt of the 
work in the early period’ (Cowan et al., 1965: 3). This attitude only changed after the 
First World War, when the colonial administration faced increasing needs for an 
educated administrative workforce. In a policy memorandum published shortly after 
the First World War, the British government announced that it ‘reserved to itself the 
general direction and supervision of educational policy’ and that ‘voluntary agencies 
should be used in education’ to which grants in aid were to be made if they 
‘conformed to the established standards’ (Cowan et al., 1965: 6). The colonial 
government increasingly involved itself in the content of educational programmes as 
it used inspection and supervision to monitor the spending of its funds. This larger 
involvement was partly also a response to growing concerns in the international 
community – expressed particularly in the League of Nations – about the quality and 
accessibility of colonial education (Cowan et al., 1965; Cameron, 1970). 
The major aim of British colonial schooling, then, was to provide Africans 
with some minimal level of education and additionally build administrative 
capabilities of traditional chiefs (Sutton, 1965; Lloyd et al., 1999). Yet education was 
not a ticket to upward mobility. Non ruling-class Africans who achieved higher 
education could not participate in the ruling of the colony (Collins, 1970). Since the 
British wished to avoid an indigenous educated elite, colonial officials discouraged 
general education beyond the primary level. Cost considerations also played a role in 
the British administration preferring vocational training over general literacy and 
general education (Wesseling, 1991; Bayly, 2004: 222). 
In contrast, the French implemented an assimilation policy with the ultimate 
goal of providing non-Western peoples with ‘cultural characteristics that would make 
them acceptable as citizens on the same basis as their European fellow at home’ 
(Sutton, 1965: 63), while ‘degrading or ignoring [traditional] institutions in favour of 
French customs, culture and civilization’ (Collins, 1970: 162). Assimilation policies 
implied the imposition of direct, centralised French control, including a centralised 
educational policy. By the beginning of the twentieth century all schools were 
obliged to teach in French and to adopt the French school curriculum (Cowan et al., 
1965; Lloyd et al., 1999). 
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Also in contrast to the British, the French colonial government divested 
indigenous chiefs of their power by creating new administrative units (cantons) 
which typically cut through traditional boundaries. Chiefs kept their nominal 
positions but were assigned to cantons on the basis of their education or 
demonstration of loyalty to the French (Crowder, 1964). The reward to obtaining 
education was thus admittance to the lower echelons of the administration system 
(Collins, 1970). Since most positions in the colonial administration were to be filled 
by French nationals, trained in France, the colonial government selected those who 
received advanced schooling with care, fearful of unemployed higher educated 
Africans. A small elite excepted, pupils in the French colonial schools received 
training in basic skills only (Lloyd et al., 1999). 
Like the British colonial government, and largely for the same reasons, the 
French colonial government gradually increased its investments in education after 
the First World War. However, until the end of the Second World War, the basic 
pattern already established in the French colonies by the turn of the century did not 
change (Cowan et al., 1965: 9). 
 
Missionary Education 
Beginning in the sixteenth century, missionaries had brought European-style 
education to Africa. During the first decades of colonisation, the British colonial 
government was mainly occupied with maintaining law and order, and missionaries 
remained the only party active in providing formal education to African people in the 
British colonies (Cameron, 1970). An additional factor for leaving education to the 
missionaries was the British desire, noted above, to contain the cost of colonial 
administration (Lugard, 1929; Bayly, 2004). In contrast, the French Third Republic 
(1870–1940) enshrined the separation of state and church in its constitution. While 
this was reflected in widespread antipathy towards missionary education in the 
colonies, in practice, this resentment was tempered by the government’s recognition 
of the valuable role of missionary education in the government’s assimilation agenda. 
So a dual church-state educational system was created, where missionary schools 
received state funding and functioned alongside state schools, adhering to the French 
state’s centralised educational policy. 
The presence of missionary (rather than only state) schools arguably helped the 
spread of Western-style education in the colonies (White, 1996). Both the Catholics 
in French Africa and the predominantly Protestant (Anglican, but also other) 
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missionaries in British Africa realised, in the words of Bishop Joseph Shanahan, ‘that 
those who hold the school hold the country, hold its religion, hold its future’ (as 
cited by Berman, 1975: 22). Between various churches, rivalry existed to reach as 
many people as possible. Helped by improved means of communication, this 
stimulated the rapid spread of missionary educational work in the first half of the 
twentieth century, with enduring results (Cameron, 1970). In those former French 
colonies where state activity was minimal due to historical and geographical reasons 
(Amin 1972), the missionary school system was more developed (Madagascar, 
Central African Republic, Cameroon, the Congo and Gabon) and the overall 
postcolonial enrolment rates were highest (Debeauvais, 1964; Benavot and Riddle, 
1988). Missionary activity was even more determining of long-term educational 
achievements in British Africa, where education was largely the domain of the 
churches. 
If the role of the churches within colonial education was markedly different 
between French and British Africa, so were the missionaries. Unlike Catholic 
educators, Protestants missionaries generally considered their presence temporary 
since they envisioned independent, self-reliant indigenous churches (Berman, 1975). 
This vision required a relatively high standard of fairly broadbased education, from 
which a future African church leadership could emerge. Also, due to the larger 
emphasis on individual bible study in Protestant theology, Protestant missionaries 
placed more value on spreading the key skill of reading among the whole population.  
Both the colonial administration and the missionaries responded to most 
Africans’ initially hostile reaction to Western education differently, depending on the 
nature of the local indigenous religion. In Muslim areas, animosity to Western 
education was usually respected and educational efforts restricted or abandoned. 
Large parts of Western Africa were Islamicised already before the French arrival, and 
the French did not replace Islamic education with their own system. In contrast, 
areas with traditionally animistic religions were nearly all Christianised eventually, and 
schooling was an important instrument in the process. 
This policy had long-term consequences. As an illustration, the animistic southern 
part of Nigeria was Christianised, while Christian missionary activity in the Muslim 
areas of Northern Nigeria was forbidden (Sutton, 1965). In consequence, by 1958 
over 90 per cent of the southern children were enrolled in primary schools, in 
contrast to only 9 per cent in the northern part (Ogunsheye, 1965; Morgan and 
Armer, 1988). As Benavot and Riddle (1988), Daun (2000), Hanson II (1989) and 
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Harrison (1988) show, colonial education in French Africa, more of which covers 
traditionally Muslim areas than was the case in British Africa, was clearly more 
restricted by this policy. Similarly, within the French areas, predominantly Muslim 
West Africa shows lower formal educational achievements compared to formerly 
animistic Equatorial Africa. 
These differences in educational development have shown great stability 
over time (Brown, 2000). African educational standards in colonial times61 correlate 
with Africa’s educational achievements in 199562, with an R2 of nearly 0.7. The 
postcolonial African distributions of educational achievements have been so 
persistent in part because many kept strong linkages to their colonial foundation 
(Lloyd et al., 2000). Newly post-colonial independent government typically had 
limited resources and many challenges and, therefore, did not take on extensive 
educational reforms: they ‘hesitated to take over in toto a system it had not the 
resources to run’ (Cameron, 1970: 25); and this reason for continuity has remained 
relevant since – see Brown (2000) and Ntiri (1993). This continuity lends partial 
support to our hypothesis that colonial education distributions had an enduring 
impact on growth patterns. In the next section we illustrate this claim by exploring 
the post-colonial development of educational systems in two countries: francophone 
Senegal and anglophone Uganda. 
 
Educational Continuity and Economic Development Illustrated: Senegal and Uganda 
Senegal’s newly independent government inherited in 1960 the centralised 
educational system characteristic of French colonies, with a relatively large role for 
state-run schools. It developed a new education policy aiming at free, universal and 
compulsory education (Cain et al., 1994). Successive governments planned further 
reforms in 1969, 1979 and 1984 in order to develop a specifically African curriculum, 
to address issues of gender inequality and urban/rural inequalities, to promote 
instruction in a national language, and to provide more market-relevant skills. 
However, as Evans (1994), Bakary (1995), and Cain et al. (1994) all document, few of 
these plans were actually implemented and much of the schooling system remained 
                                                 
61 Total number of pupils divided by total population. See Appendix 4.B for sources. 
62 Average years of primary schooling in the total population over age 15, taken from the 
Barro and Lee data set (Barro and Lee, 2001). 
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unchanged from the colonial period: most teaching is still in French and the 
curriculum is still French-style. Financial restraints and the entrenchment of elites 
benefiting from the status quo are among the reasons.  
The allocation of educational resources in Senegal is heavily biased against 
rural people: 93 per cent of urban children but only 10–34 per cent of rural children 
were enrolled in schools during the 1990s (Cain et al., 1994). Senegal also has lower 
primary enrolment rates and higher secondary and tertiary enrolment rates than most 
francophone African countries (Evans, 1994). Starting from very low literacy rates in 
1960 when only 5 per cent of the population could read, in 1990 only 29 per cent of 
adult population was literate, increasing to 39 per cent in 2006 (World Bank, 2006). 
Thus education has retained its colonial features of exclusivism and strong elitism, 
mainly benefiting the better-off urban minority.  
Yet despite these limitations and the relative inertia of the educational 
system since colonial times, there is evidence that Senegalese education is positively 
linked to economic development, for instance as measured by productivity in the 
manufacturing sector (accounting for around 18 per cent of GDP) as Mbay (2002: 
17) finds. Furthermore, E´ chevin and Murtin (2008: 7) find that education is a 
productive input in all formal sectors as well as in the services and trade segments of 
the informal sector (which provides most employment in Senegal). Another 
education effect they find is that in informal firms, the employer’s level of education 
is positively associated with employee wage levels. 
In sum, the ex-French colony which is now Senegal has both retained many of the 
colonial features in its educational system and has seen a positive contribution of 
education to output, productivity and wage levels. The reach of its educational 
system has remained limited, and so has the rate of its economic growth. 
In contrast to Senegal, the British colony, which is now Uganda, had a 
colonial primary school system predominantly run by churches (Cameron, 1970). 
Although the colonial government increasingly funded these schools to support 
educational expansion, only 46 children per 1,000 population went to school around 
1950. Soon after Uganda became independent, the new government attempted to 
implement a more centralised educational system compared to the decentralised 
system it inherited from the British (Cameron, 1970). It also laid heavier emphasis on 
primary education – a policy which pushed up primary enrolment rates even in the 
1970s and 1980s when Uganda went through serious economic and political turmoil. 
This trend was reinforced and accelerated when Museveni came to power in 1985, 
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increasing the share of the government budget spent on education from the 10 per 
cent it had been under the Amin government to 23 per cent (Byrnes, 1990). Literacy 
rates consequently rose from 25 per cent in 1974 to 56 per cent in 1990, and up to 
67 per cent in 2006 (World Bank, 2006). 
However, many aspects of the Ugandan schooling system remain similar to 
the colonial system despite these reforms – as in Senegal, though not quite to the 
same extent. National exams determine the advancement from one level to the next, 
as is customary in the British system. The British curriculum remained in place until 
1974, when it was replaced by a national curriculum. Instruction in local languages is 
common in the first few years of primary school in some regions (as it was during 
colonial times), but English is still the official language (Byrnes, 1990; Stateuniversity, 
2008). 
As in Senegal, there is clear evidence that Uganda’s economic performance 
is linked to its educational achievements. Empirical studies find that the increase in 
educational coverage from the mid-1980s is reflected in rising agricultural 
productivity and in higher wages. Appleton and Balihuta (1996) argue that both 
general skills (for example numeracy and literacy) and specific knowledge enabled 
farmers to better implement productivity-enhancing polices such as fertiliser and 
pesticide applications. Using Uganda’s first nationally representative household 
survey, they find that the sum of the total years of primary schooling of farm 
workers increases farm output significantly. If farm workers had four years of 
schooling, output was 7 per cent higher than if they had no schooling. Doubling the 
number of schooling years from 7 to 14 years (equivalent to an increase from one 
primary graduate to two graduates) led to an estimated increase in output of 13–19 
per cent compared to the no schooling alternative (Appleton and Balihuta, 1996: 
426). Schooling was also found to have spillover effects, where farmers with better 
educated neighbours tended to be more productive themselves. The results also 
show that secondary schooling does not lead to growth in farm productivity, and 
that there is very large variation in the education effects across Uganda’s regions 
(Appleton and Balihuta, 1996: 424). Thus, this study finds that education can raise 
the productivity of farm workers in several ways. 
Appleton (2001) in another study finds that more education is associated 
with higher levels of household welfare, the effect depending on the level of 
education and the household’s portfolio of economic activities. Primary education is 
found to modestly raise the earnings in households engaged in agriculture, and more 
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substantially raise earnings of households engaged in wage employment. It also 
opens up opportunities to move into non-agricultural self-employment. In contrast 
to Appleton and Balihuta (1996), secondary schooling is found to raise agricultural 
productivity as well as wage incomes. University education only has an effect on the 
earnings from wage employment. Beyond primary education levels, further education 
induces a trade-off between losses in agricultural and non-agricultural self-
employment income and increases in wages (Appleton, 2001: 20). Thus education is 
also instrumental in the structural transformation from an agrarian livelihood 
towards participation in an industrial or service oriented economy. 
Summing up these two country narratives, in both Senegal and Uganda the 
legacy of colonial educational policies can still be discerned, especially in the value 
placed on universal (primary) education. While both countries officially adhere to the 
goal of providing universal education, only Uganda actually implemented policies to 
reach that goal while the Senegalese educational system remains more exclusivist and 
elitist. This parallels the more active British colonial polices towards a basic level of 
education for all (Lloyd et al., 2000) compared to the more passive French attitude to 
mass education. Uganda’s educational expansion can be consistently linked to its 
impressive economic development over the last two decades, as Appleton (2001: 23) 
points out. In contrast in Senegal, Appleton and Teal (1999) argue, institutional 
restrictions and lack of investment in complementary factors of production (such as 
capital) have restricted the opportunities for many people to work in the formal 
sector. But given the positive educational returns to productivity observed in the 
informal sector by E´ chevin and Murtin (2008), Senegal’s limited post-colonial 
increase in education did have a modest positive influence on its economic 
development. 
 
4.4. Data and Analysis 
 
We use data collected from the colonial yearbooks63 on the last years of African 
colonialism between 1945–1950 (Sudan was the first sub-Saharan country to gain 
independence in 1956) but before the European influence on the economic system 
started to decline (Hazlewood, 1953–1954; Hopkins, 1973; Giblin, 1980). Three 
variables from this data set are relevant to the present analysis:  
                                                 
63 See Appendix 4.B for sources 
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(i) and (ii) The percentage of Europeans in the total population and the number of 
Europeans per square kilometre. A salient feature of this newly compiled data is that 
in the 1940s, British colonies were on average about five times more densely 
populated than French colonies (27 compared to 5 persons per square kilometre), 
but with 1 per cent of the total population, the British presence was still about twice 
as large as the French who formed 0.5 per cent of the population. 
 
(iii) The number of primary and secondary pupils per population, which proxies 
investment in educational institutions following for example Easterlin (1981). As 
already noted in section II, the ratio of total pupils to the population was clearly 
higher in British colonies64. 
 
The number of pupils per population will be our measure for educational human 
capital in colonial times. This measure is obviously not a perfect one – for instance, 
with its emphasis on coverage rather than quality it leaves important dimensions of 
colonial education unaccounted for. Therefore we explored three alternatives in 
some detail. These are: the share of public investment from colonial budgets into the 
education system; literacy rates; and the pupils-to-teacher ratio as a proxy for 
educational quality. 
In each case we ran into very serious data difficulties. One conceptual 
problem with the measure of budget shares for education is that it is an input 
measure which is only indirectly linked to the output of colonial educational 
achievements, which we are interested in. Additionally it varies with variations in 
total budgets, which need not reflect variations of actual resources allocated to 
education. For instance, where more expenditure went to increases in teacher 
salaries, this does not necessarily reflect an increase in the coverage or quality of 
education (Lloyd et al., 1999). Likewise, in the years after the Second World War, 
colonial governments changed their policies towards Africa and focused more on 
development. This shift in policy involved substantial changes in the level of public 
expenditure, also directed at the social sector (Hazlewood, 1953/1954; Hopkins, 
1973). Measuring it consistently over countries is not really possible, as French and 
British (let alone other) definitions for budget components differed substantially. For 
                                                 
64 We present an overview of key statistics in the data Appendix 4.B 
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instance, the French colonial government ran a general budget and a budget for each 
separate country it occupied; but the British did not. In brief, we judged it not 
possible to construct reliable data for educational budget shares in colonial times. 
It was found that the measure of pupil-to-teacher ratios, which would 
capture quality of education, was available for 15 countries only – ranging from 134 
in Burkina Faso to 15 in Mauritania. While this limited number of observations 
disqualifies the variable from our statistical analysis below, it does seem that pupil-to-
teacher ratios are clearly and negatively correlated to long-term growth, as would be 
expected in the ‘human-capital’ view on Africa’s long-term growth. The correlation 
coefficient of pupil-to-teacher ratios with 1995 GDP per capita levels is -0.33. 
Similarly, the measure of literacy rates would arguably be a better variable 
than pupils per population, as it is a more direct measure of educational 
achievement. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, literacy rates during colonial times 
are not available. The earliest literacy rates for only 19 sub-Saharan countries are 
available for 1960. This is ‘too little, too late’: only 19 observations from a time well 
after decolonialisation had started. Still, there is considerable correlation between our 
measure of pupils per population and literacy rates in 1960 (correlation coefficient 
0.49). Moreover, correlation between literacy rates in 1960 and in 1990 and 2006 are 
0.71 and 0.62 respectively; whereas correlation between pupils per population and 
literacy rates in 1990 and 2006 are 0.72 and 0.69 respectively. In summary, pupils per 
population is the only variable for educational achievement that we could credibly 
construct from the colonial data; but the above explorations suggest that it also 
captures literacy levels. 
We apply these data to the question of Africa’s long-term growth in two 
ways. First, we explicitly check the two intervening steps in the Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) argument that higher settler mortality led to colonies being more thinly settled 
by Europeans and that a lower density of Europeans in the population led to 
different institutions, worse for long-term growth. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue this 
was based on the literature but without primary empirical evidence. In table 4.1 we 
show that both these relations cannot be detected for sub-Saharan Africa. This then 
leads us to the second application, to explore an alternative explanation for Africa’s 
long-term growth in an instrumental-variable estimation, using our measure of pupils 
per population. 
In Panel A of table 4.1, we report results from regressions of the density of 
Europeans in the population and density of Europeans per surface measure on 
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settler mortality. Neither regression gives statistically significant results, and the 
negative R2 indicate that models A1 and A2 perform worse than a constant-only 
model. In Panel B, we regress the two index measures for colonial institutions used 
by Acemoglu et al. (2001)65 on the density of Europeans in the population, and again 















                                                 
65 As proxies for colonial-era institutions Acemoglu et al. (2001: 1384) used a democracy 
index at the first year of independence, varying between the 1950s and 1975, an index 
measure for constraint on the executive at first year of independence, where more constraints 
reflect better institutions. For both indices we used the Polity IV database, where Acemoglu 
et al. (2001) used the Polity III database. 
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Table 4.1: The links from settler mortality to European densities to 
institutions in Africa 
 Panel A 






 Settler mortality -0.000 0.000   
 (0.001) (0.007)   
(constant) 0.005 0.021   
 (0.007) (0.040)   
     
R2 -0.06 -0.06   
N 18 18   
     
 Panel B 
Dependent variables: institutional quality 





Europeans/pop 88.665  49.778  
 (53.862)  (36.587)  
Europeans/km2  15.641  7.691 
  (9.902)  (6.778) 
(constant) 2.078*** 2.078*** 3.104*** 3.149*** 
 (0.709) (0.720) (0.482) (0.493) 
     
R2 0.069 0.061 0.036 0.012 
N 24 24 24 24 
     Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%..  
     Source: See appendix 4.A..     
       
 
These results in an African sample differ from those reported by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) in a global sample of former colonies. This leads us to question the link 
between settler mortality and early institutions. While Acemoglu et al. (2001, 
footnote 21) report that there is a ‘weaker relationship between settler mortality and 
institutions in a sole Africa sample’, we actually find no relationship in an African 
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sample. Naturally, our sample size is necessarily small, especially for panel A results, 
and this may (partly) cause the lack of statistical significance. Yet at the least we 
conclude that there is no evidence that African colonial-era institutions are well 
proxied by settler mortality66. 
This is not to say that there cannot be a link between settler mortality and 
African growth, or that institutions are irrelevant in this relation; only that the 
account of this link presented by Acemoglu et al. (2001) finds no support in the 
African data. Alternatively, settler mortality may have influenced other aspects of 
colonial institutions than its extractiveness. We noted in section II above that one 
candidate for an alternative channel is colonial human capital. Lipset (1959, 1960), 
Djankov et al. (2003) and Glaeser et al. (2004) suggested that colonial human capital 
may have influenced both colonial institutions and current human capital, and – 
through either or both of these channels – it may affect present GDP per capita 
levels. It is this explanation of Africa’s long-term growth that we will now explore 
empirically.  
We start with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification where we 
regress our human capital variable Pupils (per population) on PPP per capita GDP 
levels in 199567. We test robustness to other explanations by adding a legal-origin 
variable (Coloniser, which takes value 1 for British and 0 for French colonies) and up 
to four geographical variables from the following set: Malaria (index of 1994 malaria 
prevalence), Coastal population (the share of the population living within 100 km 
from the coast), Landlocked68 (absence of overland access to sea), Tropics (the share 
                                                 
66 An important reason underlying this result may also be that the stability over time of 
institutions assumed in Acemoglu et al. (2001) should be questioned in the African context. 
African colonial-era institutions do not correlate well with current institutions (which cause 
current GDP). Twenty-four of the 44 African countries included in the Polity IV data 
experienced shortly after independence a (often sharp) decline in the democracy index used 
here and in Acemoglu et al. (2001). Of the 14 countries with a low initial measure for 
‘constraint on the executive’, six countries showed an appreciable improvement subsequently. 
This volatility links in with a cross-country analyses of institutional indices by Glaeser et al. 
(2004) who note that these index measures tend to reflect short-term changes (for example 
election results) rather than the stabler, underlying institutions. 
67 We chose 1995 to allow comparison to Acemoglu et al. (2001). If we use 1995 GDPpc 
from Maddison (2003) our results improve, see appendix 4.C. Pupils are always significant, 
regardless of the specification of the model. 
68 Note that including Coastal population and Landlocked does not amount to the same thing 
since they are quite different variables. There are countries with coastlines (Landlocked=0) 
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of territory located in the tropics)69 and Hydrocarbons (proven reserves of natural 
gas and crude oil in 1993, BTUs per person). In selecting  these variables, we follow 
Gallup et al. (1998) and La Porta et al. (2004). We take out one of these variables in 
turn and table 4.2 reports OLS estimation results. We find that in four of the seven 
specifications, Pupils significantly correlates with 1995 per capita GDP. Apparently, 
OLS results are not robust to adding control variables70; in addition, as noted they 
are plausibly biased because of endogeneity. Only Malaria is consistently correlated 








                                                                                                                          
such as Kenya, but with coastal populations of only 6 per cent. Compare also Mozambique 
(40%), Sudan (2%) and Tanzania (16%) (Gallup et al., 1998: 31) 
69 TROPICS has little variation within Africa, with many values equal or close to 100 per 
cent. Excluding it improves the significance of findings, without qualitatively changing them. 
70 OLS results are robust to control variables when Maddison’s income data are used see 
appendix 4.C. See also footnote 9. 
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Since the above analysis faces the same endogeneity challenges as the Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) account, the question is whether the findings are robust to an alternative 
approach, addressing the endogeneity problem. We instrumented the colonial era 
education measure Pupils (the percentage of pupils in the population) with Settler 
mortality around 1800, as in Acemoglu et al. (2001)71. We then regress this 
instrumented human capital variable on PPP per capita GDP levels in 199572. Panel 
A in table 4.3 presents the second stage of the 2sls regression73. Panel B reports the 
corresponding first stage results. We test robustness to other explanations by adding 
controls, as above. We include not more than five variables in total because of the 
limited number of observations (23) in this instrumented-variable regression74.
                                                 
71 As we have one endogenous variable and one instrument, the model is exactly identified. 
72 We chose 1995 to allow comparison to Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
73 We combine an instrumental variable approach with generalised least squares (GLS), which 
accounts for the correlation structure in the disturbances across equations. This procedure, 
also known as ‘three stage least squares’ (sls), results in consistent estimates that are more 
efficient than 2sls without using the information contained in cross-equation correlations of 
disturbances. We estimated our equations also without GLS (that is, ‘simple’ 2sls), which 
produces qualitatively identical, but less significant estimates, as expected. See Kmenta (1977) 
and Greene (2003) for more detail. 
74 An instrumented model without control variables, regressing Log GDP pc in 1995 only on 
Pupils (instrumented with Settler mortality) plus a constant, yields a similar coefficient 
estimate (24.941) and significance levels (s.e. is 7.404) for Pupils as model (1). 
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In model (1) we include only a colonial origin variable. In model (2) we add Malaria 
and Hydrocarbons, in model (3) also we replace Hydrocarbons by Coastal 
population. In model (4) we replace Coastal population with Tropics (the share of 
territory located in the tropics) and in model (5) we then add Landlocked instead of 
Tropics. Finally in model (6) we run the model including Hydrocarbons, Coastal 
population and Tropics. We find that variation does not affect the key results. Panel 
B shows a significant negative effect of settler mortality on colonial education levels 
in all models75. And panel A shows that the instrumented Pupils variable is positive 
associated with 1995 GDP pc76 levels in all specifications.  
We conclude that the link between settler mortality and GDP pc in 1995, 
which Acemoglu et al. (2001) conjectured to run through ‘extractive institutions’ in 
Africa, is most likely to run through human capital investments made in the colonial 
era through education77. This conclusion is robust to including controls for 
geography and legal origin. It connects to the description given by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001: 1374–1375) of extractive institutions as inter alia involving low educational 
and healthcare investments; but in view of the lack of support for the intervening 
steps in the Acemoglu et al. (2001) argument, presented in table 4.1, this 
interpretation is tenuous for the African setting. A more plausible understanding of 
the findings is to see them as support for the hypothesis that human capital, as 
distinct from the broader framework of production-and-commerce oriented 
institutions, was the more important factor for long-term growth (Glaeser et al., 
2004). This view finds additional support in the lack of significant findings for 
                                                 
75 Instrumenting colonial human capital with other (legal-origin or geographical) exogenous 
variables did not yield statistically significant explanations of 1995 GDP pc. Although 
colonial education does correlate with several of the exogenous variables considered here, 
only settler mortality is a suitable instrument for human capital variables in an equation 
explaining 1995 GDP. Results from these additional analyses are available on request from 
the author. 
76
 Also for the 2sls estimates the results improve when we use Maddison’s income data, see 
appendix 4.C. 
77 Our newly compiled data set allowed us to also consider health, another dimension of 
human capital. In 2sls and OLS regressions of HOSPITALS, a measure for colonial 
healthcare (the number of hospitals per 1000 population health), again using settler mortality 
as the instrument, on 1995 GDP pc, HOSPITAL yields a valid instrumental-variable 
explanation of present GDP levels. But model performance is very weak, with a negative R2 
indicating that a constant-only model would predict better. Also, the relation between 
colonial health and present pc GDP relation was not robust to introducing controls. 
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institutional measures, such as ‘democracy’ and ‘constraints on the executive’ 
variables, reported in table 4.1. In addition, our estimates offer support for the legal-
origin explanation of growth: the coefficient is negative and significant in all models 
except model (2), implying that British colonisation is correlated with lower 1995 
income levels than is French colonisation78. However, the significance of this 
exogenous variable is not robust to an OLS specification in table 4.2, perhaps 
because Coloniser captures some other systemic difference between British and 
French colonies other than legal origin; for instance, the qualitative differences in 
education systems noted in section 4.3. Another explanation is offered by Joireman 
(2006) who observes significant heterogeneity with respect to colonial and post-
colonial legal experiences within the group of British (ex-) colonies. This reality may 
undermine a single ‘Coloniser’ effect. Of the geographical variables, Malaria is a 
robustly negative influence on growth, in the OLS specification, but not robustly 
significant in the 2sls specifications. 
Having established a robust relation of colonial education with current per 
capita income levels, we now pursue the ‘educational’ line of reasoning further by 
examining the additional hypotheses that: (i) colonial education achievements 
persisted (that is that colonial education achievements statistically ‘cause’ present 
educational levels); and (ii) colonial human capital caused colonial institutions. On (i), 
table 4.4 shows that instrumented education levels in the 1940s correlate to present 
enrolment rates, both primary and secondary79. Thus, a first channel through which 
exogenous, colonial-era investments in human capital have affected present growth 
is through the ‘persistence effect’ mentioned above, by durable increases in levels of 
human capital till the present. It is important to note that human capital persisted 
over time, while institutional measures did not, as discussed above. This is in 
contradiction to the argument put forward by Acemoglu et al. (2001) on the 
durability of institutional quality, but it is in line with the Glaeser et al. (2004: 274) 
argument that human capital is ‘the more basic cause of growth’. 
                                                 
78 Interestingly, Lange et al. (2006: 1412) find that ‘British colonisation had comparatively 
positive effects’ on economic development, that is compared to Spanish colonisation. 
79 Average years of primary schooling in the total population over age 15, taken from the 
Barro and Lee data set (Barro and Lee, 2001). Using World Development Indicators as the 
source yields similar results. 
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Table 4.4: Colonial human capital persisted 
Panel A   
Second stage of 2SLS: dependent variables: primary and 
secondary enrolment rates in 1990 
 PRIM90 SEC90 
      
Pupils 34.953*** 10.6090** 
  -(3.730) (3.851) 
(Constant) 0.290* -0.076 
  (0.144) (0.148) 
      
  
Panel B  
First stage of 2SLS: dependent variable: Pupils 
      
Settler mortality -0.015** -0.015** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
(Constant) 0.122*** 0.122*** 
  (0.038) (0.038) 
      
N 18 18 
        Robust standard errors are in parentheses.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***   
         significant at 1%.. Sources: see appendix 4.A.   
 
 
Finally in table 4.5, we explore another channel by examining the influence of human 
capital investments on contemporaneous institutional indicators, as suggested by 
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Glaeser et al. (2006). We consider institutional indices both 
on democracy and on constraints on the executive as used by Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
and find positive and significant correlations of Pupils with both in an OLS 
framework. These findings are however not robust to using instrumented education, 
so that the results may be partly driven by endogeneity of education to 
institutions80.18 We conclude that the major channel through which colonial 
                                                 
80 Results from the 2SLS analysis are available on request from the author 
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education affects current growth is through the persistence effect of educational 
quality, more than through institutional quality. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Colonial education and current institutions 
  
Dependent variable: Democracy and Constraints on the executive 
 
Democracy Constraints 
      
Pupils 37.990*** 19.086** 
  (12.488) (9.163) 
(Constant) 1.154 2.641*** 
  (0.714) (0.467) 
    
adj. R2 0.16 0.09 
N 37 37 
     Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%..  
     Sources: see appendix 4.A. 
 
 
4.5. Summary, Future Research and Conclusions 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) conjecture that high settler mortality led colonising powers to 
introduce ‘extractive’ institutions, which set the economy on a long-term path of low 
and volatile growth. Low settler mortality, in contrast, supposedly caused colonisers 
to build institutions more conducive to growth. When we implement this analysis for 
a sample of only African countries, both these correlations disappear. Higher settler 
mortality did not lead to African colonies being more thinly settled by Europeans, 
and a lower density of Europeans in the population did not lead to different 
institutions, worse for long-term growth. While it is noteworthy that these findings 
might well be due to small sample size, they leave sufficient room to pursue an 
alternative explanation of long-term growth differences between African countries, 
based on colonial education rather than colonial extractive institutions. We collect 
archival material from colonial yearbooks to construct a novel data set on European 
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and total population densities and investments that the colonial powers made in 
schooling.  
In our analyses we find that African colonial education does possess both 
properties ascribed to institutions in the global Acemoglu et al. (2001) study: it 
correlates well both with settler mortality and with current measures for human 
capital. Instrumenting education with settler mortality, we obtain again a robust 
explanation of long-term development which does not suffer from endogeneity and 
which is specific to Africa. We establish the robustness of this explanation by 
introducing controls for the legal origin of institutional systems and for a number of 
geographical variables, both of which have additional explanatory power. Further 
investigation of the channels through which education fostered growth suggests its 
positive impact on both current education and on colonial institutions, though the 
causality between colonial institutions and colonial education seems two-way. 
There are several loose ends to this study, which provide opportunities for 
future research. A big one relates to a relatively neglected issue in this strand of 
literature: what was there before colonialism?81 Obviously pre-colonial Africa was 
not tabula rasa with respect to education. A next step is this literature would be 
therefore to enlarge the scope of analysis one step further compared to the 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) and similar frameworks (including this one) by noting that 
long-term growth may have depended not only on colonial education, but also on 
pre-colonial African education levels. In line with the human capital definition, this 
would include organised efforts by Africans to create or pass on skills and knowledge 
that contributed to long-term growth of their economies – either directly or by 
providing a basis for colonial education systems to be more rapid or slow. One 
might conjecture, for instance, that people used to education of some sort were more 
willing to have their children attend colonial schools; or conversely, that indigenous 
and colonial education were rivals and so the presence of pre-colonial education 
hampered the spread of colonial education. However, as in the present study, a 
simple causal approach would be amiss in that it ignores an endogeneity problem 
similar to the one addressed in this chapter. Namely, pre-colonial education cannot 
be assumed to simply determine (positively or negatively) colonial education; instead, 
both are plausibly jointly caused by underlying factors. 
                                                 
81 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this. 
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In light of the literature reviewed in this chapter, one might speculate about two 
strong candidates for this underlying factor: Islam and population density. Societies 
where Islam – a ‘religion of the book’ – had spread before Western colonisation 
arrived, were more likely to have more extensive pre-colonial formal schooling 
systems and higher literacy levels. Bayly (2004: 261), writing on pre-colonial states, 
observes that ‘in Muslim West Africa, the state crept forward in alliance with elite 
literacy and the spread of purist Islam’. At the same time, as we noted in section 4.3, 
colonisers restricted colonial education in Islamic areas. So ‘Islam’ may well be a 
factor jointly fostering pre-colonial and hindering colonial education systems. A 
second candidate for the underlying factor is population density, which is one sign of 
a society’s potential for economic and social development, including the 
development of schooling systems. Population density may also be systematically 
related to the origin of the coloniser. We learn this, for instance, from Lange et al. 
(2006) who explain that ‘Britain tended to colonize most extensively pre-colonial 
regions that were sparsely populated and underdeveloped’ (Lange et al., 2006: 1412). 
This is in comparison to the Spanish; in our data we detect that British colonies 
(mostly in east Africa) were far more densely populated than other, predominantly 
French colonies, many in arid West Africa. The densities are 27 and 5 persons per 
square kilometre, respectively, and the correlation coefficient between population 
density and British origin is + 0.26. In section 4.3, it is described how Britain also 
achieved higher enrolment rates in its colonial schools than did the French, partly by 
making more use of missionary education. Combining these facts, it is found that 
population density is an influence both on colonial education and on pre-colonial 
education – in this case, both influences are positive. 
In light of these supposed two underlying factors, ‘Islam’ and ‘population 
density’, with opposite effects on pre-colonial education, a further observation is that 
pre-colonial education itself is far from homogeneous. The most important 
distinction may well be between types of pre-colonial education linked to the spread 
of Islam and with more emphasis on formal schooling and literacy; and informal, 
indigenous pre-colonial education which had developed in Africa itself, plausibly in 
settled communities with high population densities. Valuable follow-up research 
would be to investigate how different kinds of pre-colonial education affected 
colonial education, and thus indirectly shaped the long-term economic fortunes of 
Africa. 
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This is an avenue for future research. The contribution of this study was to suggest 
and substantiate that African colonial education levels are among the long-term 
determinants of African economic growth. A more general implication is that the 










The Familiarity Dimension of Psychic Distance; or, 





International business studies often apply the concept of psychic distance to explain 
foreign market selection (Dow, 2000; Ellis, 2007; Stöttinger and Schlegelmilch, 1998) 
or international organizational performance (Evans and Mavondo, 2002; Evans, 
Treadgold, and Mavondo, 2000; O’Grady and Lane, 1996). Although actual measures 
of psychic distance have proved problematic (Dow, 2000; Dow and Karunaratna, 
2006), a common assumption implies that the psychic distance experienced toward a 
foreign market depends on the extent to which that market differs from the home 
market. Country differences, such as in culture, religion, and political systems, should 
disturb the flow of information from the foreign market to the firm, which limits a 
firm’s ability to learn about such markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990; Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). All else being equal then, firms can be expected to favour 
foreign markets that are more similar to their home market. 
Despite significant progress in operationalizing various psychic distance 
stimuli (Brewer, 2007; Dow and Karunaratna, 2006), the predominant focus on 
country differences and actual knowledge may overlook an important dimension of 
psychic distance. In particular, we argue that what determines the perception of 
psychic distance, and subsequently foreign market selection, is not merely the degree 
                                                 
82 Chapter based on the paper “The Familiarity dimension of Psychic Distance; or, why 
Historical Ties Affect the Location of FDI”, written with J.J. Hotho. His contribution is 
gratefully acknowledged. The paper is resubmitted at the International Business Review. 
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of similarity between the home and the foreign country but also the extent to which 
a foreign market environment is perceived as familiar. The familiarity argument 
developed herein builds on the idea that the perceived understanding of foreign 
markets depends not only on actual knowledge and market information (cf. Brewer, 
2007; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) but also on the unsubstantiated beliefs, 
assumptions, and generalizations that are held to be true regarding the nature of a 
foreign market environment. As a result, foreign markets may be perceived as 
psychologically close despite a lack of actual knowledge, or despite actual differences 
between countries. 
We explore the validity of this argument by examining the extent to which 
both country differences and historical (colonial) ties—a variable we associate with 
the perception of familiarity—affect the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
originating from the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Germany 
between 1984 and 2003 in a world sample.  
This chapter takes a different approach to investigate the effect of a colonial 
past on subsequent developments. First of all we analyse the influence of a shared 
history between countries from the coloniser perspective, and secondly we use a 
world sample of countries where all the other chapters explicitly focused on an all 
African sample. But given the extend of colonial activity on the African continent 
(only two countries remained independent during the whole period), and since the 
United Kingdom and France were Africa’s major colonisers83, we believe that the 
current set up is nevertheless very relevant for the African continent.  
We find that historical ties, common language, and the level of industrial 
development all significantly affect the location of foreign investment, but we find 
no consistent support for the idea that firms favour investments in countries that are 
more similar in terms of culture, institutional environment, religion, political system, 
or education level.  
Our results thus caution against the indiscriminate use of country 
differences in conceptualizations and operationalizations of psychic distance. As 
others have argued and illustrated (e.g., Dow and Karunaratna, 2006; Evans and 
Mavondo, 2002), not all country similarities have equal weight as psychic distance 
stimuli. In addition, the results provide partial support for the argument that in 
addition to its relation to the similarities between the home and the host country, 
                                                 
83 Before WW I Germany also played a substantial role in the colonising of Africa. 
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psychic distance relates inversely to perceptions of familiarity with a foreign country 
or market.  
Our results also require three caveats. First, data for country differences are 
only to a limited extend available for developing countries generally and for Africa 
more specifically. This is why we in addition to the basic results we provide 
additional estimates for an extended sample of countries that shed some light on the 
relationship between historic ties and internationalisation patterns in developing 
countries. Second, the use of aggregate data prevents us from examining the effects 
of historical ties on the actual internationalization sequence of firms or the 
commitment of resources over time. And third, the historical tie variable is but one 
of many potential indicators of foreign market familiarity, and it correlates with 
another explanatory variable, common language. We nonetheless focus on historical 
ties, which appear in previous literature as a potential psychic distance stimulus (e.g., 
Brewer, 2007; Dow and Karunaratna, 2006). Despite these concerns, the results 
open new lines of inquiry into the psychological dynamics of decision makers 
involved in internationalization decisions. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: We first critically review 
existing literature on psychic distance. Motivated by mixed empirical support and 
conceptual issues, we develop the notion of familiarity as an additional dimension of 
psychic distance. Then, following a discussion on the use of historical ties as a 
country-level indicator of perceived familiarity, we discuss the research methods and 
analysis results. We end with a discussion of the potential implications of the 
familiarity construct for the psychic distance concept, as well as for 
internationalization process theory at large. 
 
5.2. Psychic distance and the location of foreign investment 
 
The term “psychic distance,” initially coined in a study on Western European trade 
patterns by Beckerman (1956), entered the field of international business studies in 
the 1970s with the development of internationalization process theory, which 
predicts two distinct patterns: the development of a firm’s engagement within 
foreign markets and the selection of foreign markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). 
Within foreign markets, internationalization process theory argues that a lack 
of local market knowledge initially defers resource commitments, but over time, 
greater market-specific knowledge should result in a gradual increase in foreign 
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market involvement through more committed modes of operation and larger 
resource commitments—a phenomenon termed the “establishment chain” 
(Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). According to O’Grady and Lane (1996), 
the establishment chain therefore reflects a gradual ‘learning through experience’ 
process within countries. 
Regarding the selection of foreign markets, internationalization process 
theory predicts that “firms enter new markets with successively greater psychic 
distance,” which results from the degree of dissimilarity between markets, such as 
“differences in language, culture, political systems, etc.” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990: 
13). As O’Grady and Lane (1996: 310) explain, “There is an implicit assumption that 
psychically close countries are more similar, and that similarity is easier for firms to 
manage than dissimilarity, thereby making it more likely that they will succeed in 
similar markets.” As a result, international business literature largely assumes that 
country differences represent the source of psychic distance. 
This emphasis on country differences, and cultural differences in particular, 
increased in response to the growing conception that cultural and psychic distance 
relate closely, as well as due to the availability of relatively straightforward measures 
of cultural distance. Kogut and Singh (1988: 430), in their study of the influence of 
cultural distance on entry mode selection, claim that “[c]ultural distance is, in most 
respects, similar to the ‘psychic distance’ used by the Uppsala school”.  Their study 
popularized the use of a convenient measure of cultural distance based on 
Hofstede’s (1980) work, which in turn facilitated the interchangeable use of cultural 
and psychic distance. Furthermore, in their discussion of the Uppsala model, 
Johanson and Vahlne (1990: 17) explain that “[t]he internationalization model 
predicts, taking only psychic distance into account, that firms will start by invading 
‘neighbouring’ (in the cultural sense) markets and later, as experience grows, more 
distant markets will be entered.” Here, Johanson and Vahlne explicitly link psychic 
distance to cultural closeness, unintentionally further obscuring the difference 
between the two concepts.  
In response to the growing convergence between psychic and cultural 
distance, from the mid-1990s onward, several pleas demanded a more elaborate 
operationalization of psychic distance (e.g., Evans, Treadgold, and Mavondo, 2000; 
Harzing, 2003; O’Grady and Lane, 1996; Stöttinger and Schlegelmilch, 1998). On the 
one hand, some authors suggest expanding the measure of psychic distance by 
including additional measures of country differences, such as differences in language 
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(Harzing, 2003), industry structure (O’Grady and Lane, 1996), or legal and 
administrative approaches (Harzing, 2003). On the other hand, researchers also 
suggest psychic distance measures based on perceived rather than objective country 
differences (e.g. Dow, 2000; Evans, Treadgold, and Mavondo, 2000; Harzing, 2003; 
O’Grady and Lane, 1996), which tend to rely on measures developed by expert 
panels (Dow, 2000; Ellis, 2007; Nordström, 1991), psychographic instruments 
(O’Grady and Lane, 1996), and large-scale questionnaires (Stöttinger and 
Schlegelmilch, 1998). 
More recently, the presumed effects of country differences have become 
subjects of debate. In a critical review, Shenkar (2001) extensively discusses several 
conceptual illusions and methodological assumptions regarding cultural distance, and 
Harzing (2003) questions the explanatory power of cultural distance in FDI 
decisions, particularly regarding entry mode selection and performance evaluation. 
The presumed influence of cultural distance on FDI decisions may have been 
overestimated, and country-specific characteristics may hold much more power in 
explaining foreign investment decisions. In a similar vein, Brewer (2007) proposes 
extending measures of psychic distance with indicators other than country 
differences, such as the availability of secondary information about foreign markets 
or the value of foreign aid programmes. 
Empirical studies considering the effects of both cultural and psychic 
distance on market selection and expansion patterns have produced mixed results. 
Regarding cultural distance, Erramilli (1991) suggests that increases in firm 
experience abroad, measured as geographic scope, result in the selection of culturally 
more distant markets. Along similar lines, Grosse and Goldberg (1991) and Grosse 
and Trevino (1996) find that cultural distance negatively affects the direct 
involvement of firms in the United States, in terms of both assets and offices 
(Grosse and Goldberg, 1991) and FDI (Grosse and Trevino, 1996). Yet studies by 
Engwall and Wallenstål (1990), Benito and Gripsrud (1992), Mitra and Golder 
(2002), and Ellis (2007) find no support for the idea that firms gradually expand into 
culturally more distant countries; rather, Mitra and Golder (2002) and Ellis (2007) 
suggest that firms tend to enter markets that are similar to previously entered 
markets rather than to the home market. 
Studies on the effect of psychic distance also produce mixed results. For 
example, Dow (2000) finds that psychic distance, measured using a panel of experts, 
significantly affects the pattern of export market selection by Australian exporters. In 
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contrast, Ellis (2007), using a similar method, finds no direct effect of psychic 
distance on foreign market entry. In their exploration of potential country-level 
psychic distance stimuli, Dow and Karunaratna (2006) find that differences in 
education levels and religion in particular affect the intensity of bilateral trade in their 
sample. Yet Stöttinger and Schlegelmilch (1998: 367) reveal no effect of psychic 
distance on export development and therefore suggest that “the concept of psychic 
distance has ‘past [sic] its due-date’.”  
 
Familiarity  
The lack of consistent empirical support for the psychic distance construct may 
result from a misconception about what causes decision makers to perceive some 
countries as psychologically more distant than others. Recent studies focus on 
refining the concept by expanding the measurement of psychic distance in 
operational terms (Brewer, 2007; Dow and Karunaratna, 2006), but we contend that 
the psychic distance construct requires reconsideration at the conceptual level, 
especially with regard to the role of country differences as the sole driver of psychic 
distance. 
Internationalization process theory employs the psychic distance construct 
as the cognitive link between the foreign market and the uncertainty that decision 
makers experience toward that market (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). This 
uncertainty relates to characteristics of the foreign market environment, because 
country differences “disturb the flow of information between the firm and the 
market” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990: 13), which hampers the development of local 
knowledge. Psychologically more distant countries thus should be less easy to 
understand, and following the logic of uncertainty reduction, firms prefer the 
commitment of resources to markets that are more similar to the home country. 
What remains underemphasized, however, is that psychic distance is a 
cognitive phenomenon, based on both knowledge and beliefs. Internationalization 
process theory fails to acknowledge that implicit beliefs and assumptions about the 
nature of a foreign market may drastically reduce the uncertainty associated with 
resource commitments, even when the decision maker lacks knowledge and actual 
differences exists between countries. In other words, the more we know or think we 
know about a country, the less uncertainty we experience as a result of our 
(presumed) lack of local knowledge.  
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Accordingly, the psychological distance that decision makers experience 
toward a foreign country may stem not only from actual knowledge or information 
flows but also from the perception of familiarity with a foreign market, which results 
from beliefs and assumptions that a decision maker holds to be true. Subjective 
beliefs and assumptions differ from actual knowledge; whereas “[k]nowledge is 
generally defined as a subset of beliefs […] beliefs do not have to be justified or true 
to affect decisions” (Markóczy, 1997: 1230). Thus, the perception of psychic distance 
should stem from the lack of both actual knowledge and subjective beliefs about a 
foreign market.  
We find a somewhat similar argument in Beckerman (1956), who, in coining 
the term psychic distance, in our reading refers to the perception of familiarity with a 
country rather than an inhibitor of information flows. Beckerman (1956: 38) suggests 
that psychic distance stems from both “the extent to which foreign sources have 
been personally contacted and cultivated” and the nearness of a foreign market, 
resulting from a “psychic evaluation” by an individual. Although Beckerman briefly 
refers to linguistic similarities, country differences are not central in his notion of 
psychic distance. Rather, he alludes to the extent to which a foreign country is 
perceived as familiar, as a result of both personal experience and mental 
representations. 
The familiarity argument in turn suggests that the degree of psychic distance 
depends not on country differences alone but on other factors that affect the 
knowledge decision makers have and the beliefs they hold. The question of which 
factors affect the representation of a particular information environment in the 
knowledge structure of decision makers typically appears in research on managerial 
and organizational cognition. For example, an extensive review of cognitive work in 
organizational decision making (Walsh, 1995) illustrates the complexity of 
understanding the origins of knowledge structures, in that factors at the individual, 
group, organizational, and national level all likely play a role. Direct personal 
experience and formal education, as well as socialization processes among the family 
(Gibson and Papa, 2000) and at the organizational level (Van Maanen and Schein, 
1979), represent just some of the factors that shape decision makers’ knowledge 
structures. Furthermore, research into the determinants of national stereotypes 
suggests that beliefs about foreign nationals form in response to media coverage and 
cultural exports (Eagly and Kite, 1987). Overall, these studies indicate that 
perception links invariably to the cognitive structure of the observer, which in turn 
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depends on many potential information sources. Regardless of whether decision 
makers perceive countries as more or less similar, their knowledge and strong beliefs 
about the nature of those foreign countries and markets affect their perception of 
familiarity, which should lower the psychological distance they experience .  
The term “familiarity” is not new to the international business literature. For 
instance, Child, Ng, and Wong (2002: 50) expect less psychic distance between the 
United Kingdom and Hong Kong due to “a degree of mutual familiarity arising from 
the fact that Hong Kong was a British colony until 1997.” Yet little consensus 
indicates what familiarity actually implies, and the term often gets applied without 
further elaboration. It has been equated with geographical proximity (Weinstein, 
1977) and cultural distance (Erramilli, 1991) and associated with the liability of 
foreignness (Pedersen and Petersen, 2004; Zaheer, 1995), foreign market knowledge 
(Pedersen and Petersen, 2004), and information flows (Brewer, 2007). Both Pedersen 
and Petersen (2004) and Brewer (2007) associate familiarity with psychic distance, 
but equating familiarity—and psychic distance—with foreign market knowledge 
alone, as Pedersen and Petersen (2004) do, may ignore the crucial point that 
perceptions of familiarity stem from subjective beliefs as well. And although we 
agree with Brewer’s (2007) assertion that measuring perceived differences alone 
cannot suffice for operationalizing psychic distance, we propose widening the very 
notion of what constitutes psychic distance, not just the range of indicators used to 
measure it. 
Furthermore, our argument demands differentiation between familiarity and 
experience. The perceived familiarity that we associate with psychic distance differs 
from firm experience, in that experience relates to post-entry learning about foreign 
markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990). Perceptions of familiarity instead relate 
to the psychic distance experienced both before and after entry. Therefore, though 
country-specific corporate experience may explain subsequent increases in resource 
commitments in a particular market (Davidson, 1980), it holds no explanatory power 
ex ante.  
 
Familiarity and Historical Ties 
Historical ties do not directly refer to country differences but nonetheless often 
appear associated with reduced psychic distance. Both Brewer (2007) and Dow and 
Karunaratna (2006) include colonial ties in their efforts to expand and improve the 
measures used to operationalize psychic distance, and Child, Ng, and Wong (2002) 
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suggest the short psychic distance between Hong Kong and the United Kingdom 
results from their historical ties, a claim supported by Ellis (2007), whose psychic 
distance scores for Hong Kong places the United Kingdom between Thailand and 
Korea. There are subtle differences in the way historical ties are argued to affect the 
perception of psychic distance. Whereas Child, Ng, and Wong (2002) and Dow and 
Karunaratna (2006) expect historical ties to affect perceptions of psychic distance 
indirectly, by engendering institutional or political and linguistic similarities, Brewer 
(2007) argues that they result in more detailed knowledge of these countries, which 
affects the perception of psychic distance directly.  
Instead, we consider a historical tie a country-level psychic distance stimulus 
that positively affects perceptions of familiarity with a particular country by fostering 
more or less collectively shared beliefs about that country. The exact ways historical 
ties affect the knowledge structure of a population are complex. For example, 
postcolonial critics such as Edward Said (1978) note that colonial ties are often 
reflected in the national education systems and literary histories of the colonizers, 
which sustains particular representations of these countries in knowledge structures. 
Similarly, historical ties may foster stereotypical beliefs about foreign nationals (e.g., 
the Irish as excessive drinkers; Greenslade, Pearson, and Madden, 1995), which are 
not necessarily shared by the inhabitants of countries without such a historical tie. 
More direct effects of historical ties are conceivable, such as the presence of certain 
ethnic minorities or the incorporation of foreign dishes into the national cuisine of a 
country, which likely shape the mental representation of foreign nationals and 
foreign contexts further. In short, we argue that both directly and indirectly, 
historical ties evoke particular shared beliefs about the nature of a foreign country 
and its nationals, which increases the extent to which a country may be perceived as 
familiar. Following our familiarity argument, we expect historical ties to reduce the 
psychological distance experienced by key decision makers and positively affect 
location decisions. 
Will all historical ties, both positive and negative, positively affect location 
decisions? It can be argued that historical ties with a negative connotation deter 
investments due to negative sentiments, but we separate the perception of familiarity 
that results from a historical tie from the emotional connotation of that historical tie. 
That is, we assume that irrespective of the connotation, historical ties positively 
affect the perception of familiarity, and psychological distance therefore decreases. 
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We explore the validity of our argument by examining the effect of historical 
ties on the location of FDI.84 In line with our familiarity argument, we expect the 
following effect of historical ties on the location of foreign investment: 
 
Hypothesis: A historical tie between the home and the host country has a 
positive effect on the amount of foreign direct investment from the home 
country dedicated to the host country. 
 
Our familiarity argument and the country differences identified in existing literature 
offer alternative, and potentially complementary, explanations of what drives psychic 
distance. We therefore also include several measures of country differences in our 
empirical analysis as control variables, relying primarily on work by Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul (1975), Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990), and Dow and 
Karunaratna (2006) to select among the many country differences available in the 
literature. 
Specifically, we include differences in culture (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 
1990; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), institutionalized business practices 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), and language (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 1990; 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). In addition, we include differences in 
education level and industrial development, as suggested by Johanson and Vahlne 
(1977) and Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975). Both Johanson and Vahlne 
(1990) and Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) also note the potential relevance 
of religious and political system differences, distinguishing between ideological 
differences and differences in political freedom (Dow and Karunaratna, 2006). We 
therefore also control for differences in political ideology, democracy, and religion.85 
                                                 
 
84 Although colonial ties may represent a determinant of foreign trade (Frankel and Rose, 
2002; Linnemann, 1966; Rauch, 1999; Tinbergen, 1962), the potential effect of historical ties 
on the location of foreign investment remains largely overlooked. Studies of foreign 
investment that consider historical ties generally interpret them as indicators of either cultural 
or institutional distance, rather than as an explanatory variable. Rauch (1999) and Wei (2000), 
for example, combine colonial ties and common language in a composite variable to proxy 
for cultural distance, and Head and Ries (2005) combine historical ties and geographical 
distance. 
85 Because Dow and Karunaratna (2006) find that the effect of time zones is neither strongly 
nor consistently significant, we exclude this factor. 
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5.3. Data and Methods 
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the influence of historical ties and country 
similarities on the location of FDI, for which we use an adjusted gravity model. We 
do not seek to explain the location of foreign investment in full, nor measure or 
operationalize psychic distance directly. Rather, we seek to challenge the assumption 
that psychic distance stems solely from country differences by contrasting the effects 
of country similarities with that of a country-level antecedent of perceived familiarity 
(historical ties) on the location of foreign investment. As Dow and Karunaratna 
(2006) explain, the use of data pertaining to aggregate firm behaviour is appropriate 
when the explanatory variables are country-level measures, which involves matching 
the level of analysis of the dependent and independent variables.  
We address the location of FDI from four source countries: the United 
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. All four source countries are 
major international investors. Three of the four have been major colonial powers at 
some point in time, and Germany occupied substantial areas in Africa and maintains 
historical ties with a substantial number of countries within Europe. By focusing on 
four source countries from the EU, we control for the effects of preferential trade 
agreements between host countries and former colonizers. That is, the EU’s 
common border policy applies preferential trade agreements to both the former 
colonizer and the EU as a whole, which nullifies any advantages of former colonizers 
over other EU members.  
 
The Gravity Model 
The empirically most successful framework for predicting foreign trade flows is the 
gravity model (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Bloningen and Wang, 2004; 
Rauch, 1999). Gravity equations are increasingly applied to explain cross-border 
investments, such as FDI flows (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003) and FDI stock 
(Head and Ries, 2008; Wei, 2000). The basic prediction of the gravity model is that 
“the volume of trade between two countries will be directly proportional to the 
product of their economic masses (as measured using GDP or GNP) and inversely 
proportional to the distance between them” (Rauch, 1999: 10). The basic gravity 
model can be expressed as: 
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Trade ij = β 0 * GDPi β 1 * GDP jβ 2 * Dijβ 3  
 
where Tradeij is the bilateral trade between source country i and host country j; GDPi 
and GDPj are the gross domestic products of country i and j, respectively; and Dij is 
the weighted geographical distance between source country i and host country j. 
Linearizing equation (1) and substituting FDI for trade, we derive the 
following gravity equation:  
 
ln(1+ FDI ij ) = β0 + (β1 + β2) * ln(GDPiGDPj ) + β3 * ln Dij + β4 * Xij + εij  
 
where FDIij is the bilateral stock of outward FDI of source country i in host country 
j, ln(GDPiGDPj) is the product of the size of the economies of the host and source 
country, and lnDij is the log of the weighted distance between the source and the 
host country. In addition, Xij is a vector that includes bilateral familiarity and 
similarity variables, and εij is the error term. Because our four source countries report 
zero stock of outward FDI for various countries, using the double log form of the 
gravity equation would cause the loss of potentially valuable information. We 
therefore use ln(1 + FDIij) as the dependent variable, following Eichengreen and 
Irwin (1995) and others. The sample is (again) truncated at zero, so we estimate the 




As our dependent variable, we use the bilateral stock of outward FDI of the four 
source countries by geographical destination between 1984 and 2003. Although using 
FDI flows may appear more appropriate when analyzing location decisions, FDI 
flow statistics do not account for multinational enterprise (MNE) activities financed 
through local capital markets (Devereux and Griffith, 2002), such as setting up a 
foreign subsidiary with local capital. In addition, outward FDI flow data often 
contain disinvestments from the host country, which explains their frequent negative 
values (OECD, 2008). Therefore, we use FDI stock as a closer approximation of the 
actual location of MNE activity. 
We use Source OECD and UNCTAD data about outward FDI stock, 
complemented with data provided by the Office for National Statistics (U.K.) and 
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the central banks of Germany, France, and the Netherlands. To convert national 
currencies into U.S. dollars, we multiply data reported in national currencies by the 
currency ratios provided by the OECD.  
Data pertaining to FDI stock in non-OECD countries is not always 
consistently reported annually, so we average the reported values for four five-year 
periods: from 1983–1988, 1989–1993, 1994–1998, and 1999–2003. This approach 
has two additional advantages. First, it enables us to include a more extensive set of 
independent variables, based on data from the 1990s, in our analysis of the last time 
period. Inversely, it prevents an explanation of the location of FDI in the first three 
time periods that uses variables based on future data. Second, testing our models for 
four separate time periods enables us to assess the robustness of our estimations 
against temporal trends in foreign investment, such as the rise of China as a major 




Along with the average bilateral stock of outward FDI in the four five-year periods 
as our dependent variable, we include the following independent variables.  
National incomes. The most commonly identified determinant of foreign 
investment is the market size (measured as national income, or GDP) of both the 
host and the home country. Our equation includes the market sizes at the beginning 
of each five-year period in constant 2000 U.S. dollars, as reported by the World Bank 
World Development Indicators. 
Geographic distance. The geographic distance between the source and the 
host countries, taken from the CEPII data set86, equals the weighted bilateral 
distance between the largest cities of the source and target country in kilometres, 
weighted by the share of the city in the overall population of the country. We expect 
an ambiguous effect, because greater distance is associated both with more FDI, to 
circumvent the transportation costs of exports (Egger and Pfaffermayer, 2004), and 
less FDI, because the costs of monitoring increase with distance (Head and Ries, 
2005).  
                                                 
86 The CEPII data set was obtained from 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
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Several variables included in the vector Xij represent various potential 
psychic distance stimuli. In addition to historical ties, our familiarity-based psychic 
distance stimulus, we include common language and seven measures of country 
differences. 
Historical ties. We presume a historical tie exists between a host and a 
source country when substantial parts of both have existed under common rule for a 
substantial period of time. We define a substantial part of a host country as one-third 
of the geographical area or one-third of the population. With regard to a substantial 
period of time, we use one generation, which corresponds to 30 years of common 
rule. Key to our definition of a historical tie is that a certain degree of historical 
familiarization must be assumed to have taken place. We include historical ties 
starting with the coronation of Otto I in 962, which marks the formation of the Holy 
Roman Empire and the unification of several Central European fiefdoms. Data on 
colonial ties come from Henige (1970), and data on historical ties within Europe 
derive from Davies (1996) and Bideleux and Jeffries (2002). 
Common language. A host and a source country share a common 
language when the official language of the source country is an official language in 
the host country. The CEPII data set provide data about common languages. 
Cultural distance. Due to the pervasiveness of the concept in the 
international business literature and the common notion that cultural similarities 
between the host and the source country affect the location of foreign investment, 
we include a measure of bilateral cultural distance. Specifically, we adopt the most 
common measure of cultural distance, based on Hofstede’s (1980) indices, as 
suggested by Kogut and Singh (1988): 




where CDst is the cultural distance between source country s and target country t, (Iis-
Iit) is the difference in scores of countries s and t on characteristic i, and Vi is the 
variance on characteristic i.87 Because we estimate a double log form of the gravity 
model, we use the log of cultural distance in our equation. 
                                                 
87 The original measure of cultural distance, provided by Kogut and Singh (1988), 
distinguishes between Hofstede’s scores for the United States (u) and the included foreign 
countries (j). 
Historical Ties and FDI                                                                      151 
 
Institutional distance. Measures of institutional distance, as developed by 
Kostova and others (Busenitz, Gómez, and Spencer, 2000; Kostova, 1997, 1999; 
Kostova and Roth, 2002), rely on the decomposition of the institutional 
environment into regulative, normative, and cognitive components. Such 
institutional profiles can be compiled only with respect to very specific domains, 
such as the legitimacy of a particular organizational practice, which resides at a much 
lower level of analysis than that of our study. To capture relevant country-level 
institutional differences and similarities, we therefore apply a measure of institutional 
distance based on the key country-level institutional features identified by Whitley 
(1999).  
We use data pertaining to 59 countries from the Global Competitiveness 
Report (2000) and match Whitley’s (1999) institutional features with the indicators 
from the Global Competitiveness Report that best capture the intended institutional 
characteristics (see Appendix 5.A). To explore the validity of our indicators, we 
performed a cluster analysis of the OECD countries in our sample to determine the 
extent to which our indicators reproduce the business system typologies expected by 
Whitley (1999), as discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Hotho, 2008). Overall, we 
find sufficient support for the validity of our institutional indicators. We calculate 
institutional distance in a manner similar to the cultural distance index proposed by 
Kogut and Singh (1988) but without correcting for differences in variance,88 which 
takes the form: 




where IDst is the institutional distance between source country s and target country t, 
and (Iis-Iit) is the difference in the scores of countries s and t on institutional feature 
i.89 To compare the estimated coefficients with those of the other variables, we use 
the log of institutional distance in our equation. 
                                                 
88 As Kogut and Singh (1988) concur, correcting for variance imposes certain weights on the 
indicators included in a composite index. When the original scores are scaled similarly, as is 
the case in the Global Competitiveness Report, correcting for variance would inflate relatively 
small differences on some indicators and marginalize more considerable differences in 
country scores on other indicators. This procedure would unnecessarily distort the resulting 
institutional distances. 
89 The calculated institutional distances are available upon request. 
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Furthermore, we adopt five composite variables pertaining to country 
differences from Dow and Karunaratna (2006). 
Education. Dow and Karunaratna (2006) calculate the difference in 
education levels by first calculating the differences in adult literacy and enrolment 
rates in both secondary and tertiary education for the population over 15 years. 
Subsequently, they apply factor analysis to combine the three scores into a single 
difference variable, then take the absolute value. 
Democracy. Country-level differences in the degree of democracy reflect 
the mean scores of four different democracy variables, taken from the POLCON V, 
the (modified) POLITY IV, the Freedom House Political Rights, and the Freedom 
House Civil Liberties database between 1993 and 1998. Dow and Karunaratna 
(2006) first calculate country differences for each score, then combine the scores 
using factor analysis to derive the absolute values. 
Industrial development. Industrial development depends on income 
levels, energy consumption, the percentage of the labour force not working in 
agriculture, urbanisation, and the number of passenger cars, newspaper circulation, 
radios, telephones, and televisions per 1000 inhabitants. All data refer to 1994, 
except for the literacy rate, which has values for 1995. Dow and Karunaratna (2006) 
calculate the country differences for each variable, combine them into a single 
variable using factor analysis, and use the absolute differences. 
Political ideology. Scores of different political ideologies come from Beck 
and colleagues (2001), measured between 1993 and 1998, and indicate absolute 
differences. 
Religion. To measure differences in major religions between countries, we 
first assign scores to the distance between the two closest major religions between 
countries, ranging from those of the same denomination or sect to those that belong 
to different religious families. Subsequently, we assign scores to the prevalence of a 
country’s major religion in the other country, and vice versa. Factor analysis enables 
us to combine the differences between these scores. Data come from Dow and 




In table 5.1 we start by presenting the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix 
for the most recent time period (1999–2003) for both the extended sample including 
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as many countries as we have data for (including on average 26 African countries per 
source country90) and for the limited sample for which all the data was available. 
Subsequently, we estimated the basic model for our extended sample, see table 5.2. 
In table 5.3 the estimations for the limited sample of countries for which all 
(similarity) variables were available are shown, to enable a comparison of familiarity 
and similarity measures. Finally, in Appendix 5.B contains the correlation tables and 
results for the earlier periods. Correlations remain stable across the four time 
periods. As Table 5.1 shows, the dummies for historical ties and common language 
are moderately correlated (r = 0.62 for the extended sample, r = 0.60 for the limited 
sample); therefore, we do not include historical ties and common language in the 
same equation in either sample.  
    In the limited sample, neither the historic tie dummy nor the language 
dummy correlates strongly with any of the other similarity-based variables. As 
expected (Dow and Karunaratna, 2006), the democracy, education, and industrial 
development variables show signs of multicollinearity, especially between education 
and industrial development (r = 0.77). The rest of the correlation matrix does not 
suggest any clear incidences of multicollinearity, but we test for it by estimating 
auxiliary regressions involving only independent variables. Cultural and institutional 
distance and, to a lesser extent, cultural distance and the dummy for language 
correlate mildly. Including these variables together may result in biased estimates. 
                                                 
90 This sample includes 17 African countries the UK invests in, 37 African countries the 
Netherlands invests in, 13 African countries Germany invests in and 39 African countries in 
which France invests. 
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Table 5.2: Results of the gravity model for FDI location between 1999 and 
2003 for the extended sample 
  Dependent Variable: Ln FDI 1999-2003 
  (1) (2) (3) 
National incomes 1.07*** 1.07*** 1.08*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Distance -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.60*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Historical ties  1.14***  
   (0.20)  
 Common language   1.62*** 
   (0.23) 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.73 0.74 
N 589 589 589 
          The model is estimated using a tobit specification, Robust standard errors in parentheses. *  
              significant at 10%,  ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
Our estimations for the extended sample provide evidence for our main hypothesis 
that a historical tie between the home and the host country has a positive effect on 
the amount of foreign direct investment from the home country dedicated to the 
host country. We start with the basic gravity model including market size and 
geographical distance in model (1) and add the historical tie dummy in model (2). 
The historical tie variable is significant and shows the expected positive sign, and the 
explanatory power of the model increases. The only other variable that has sufficient 
data for developing countries is official language. Although this variable is often used 
as an indicator of country similarity, table 5.1 shows that it does not correlate with 
any of the other similarity measures included in this study. Our interpretation of 
common language is that it is, like historical ties, an indicator of familiarity rather 
than similarity. First of all, because historical ties and common language are mutually 
correlated but are both not correlated with any of the similarity measures. If these 
similarity measures are to capture the same phenomenon, the least one would expect 
is that they correlate with each other. Furthermore, the argument that a common 
language makes a country more similar would mean that for example the UK would 
be more similar to at the same time the US and Zambia, where often the argument in 
literature is (see for example the discussion on colonial institutions in chapter one) 
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that the reason the US is rich and Zambia is poor is that they have such different 
institutions. See for an extended discussion of this point page 160. So in model (3) 
we consider the effect of common language. The effect of language is strongly 
significant and comparable to the effect of historical ties. Given the unavailability of 
similarity measures for developing countries, we now proceed with the estimations 
with a limited sample of countries. 
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Model (1) (table 5.3) provides the results from the basic gravity model for the limited 
sample. In model (2), we add the historical tie dummy. The coefficient of historical 
ties is significant (p < 0.001), with the expected positive sign, and increases the 
explanatory power of the model. This result is consistent with our findings for the 
earlier time periods (Appendix 5.B). In the subsequent models (models (3)–(10)), we 
estimate the isolated effects of the control variables and find that the coefficients of 
both cultural distance (model (3)) and institutional distance (model (4)) are significant 
(p < 0.05), with the expected negative signs. In model (5), we estimate the effect of 
common language in isolation. Similar to historical ties, the coefficient is strongly 
significant (p < 0.001) and displays the expected positive sign. The results for cultural 
distance and common language also are consistent with our results for earlier time 
periods (Appendix 5.B). In models (6)–(10), we estimate the effects of the similarity 
variables adopted from Dow and Karunaratna (2006); differences in democracy (p < 
0.10), education level (p < 0.10), and the level of industrial development (p<0.001) all 
appear to have a negative effect on the location of foreign investment in isolation. 
However, we find no significant effects of differences in political ideology (model 
(9)) or religion (model (10)). 
In models (11)–(16), we estimate the combined effects of cultural and 
institutional distance with historical ties and common language, respectively. When 
we consider the effect of cultural distance in combination with historical ties (model 
(11)) and common language (model (14)), the coefficient of cultural distance shows 
the expected sign, but the effect is not significant. Both the effects of historical ties 
and common language remain strongly significant, and the coefficients show the 
expected sign. We find similar results for the earlier time periods (Appendix 5.B); the 
effect of cultural distance weakens or disappears when combined with either 
historical ties or common language, which both remain strongly significant. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of institutional distance remains significant when 
considered with both historical ties (model (12), p < 0.05) and common language 
(model (15), p < 0.10). When we contrast the effects of historical ties and common 
language with both cultural and institutional distance (models (13) and (16)), the 
coefficients for both cultural and institutional distance exhibit the expected sign but 
are not significant. The coefficient of both historical ties and common language 
remains strongly significant (p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, respectively). 
In the final estimations (models (17)–(24)), we work toward a full model. 
Because of the potential issues of multicollinearity among democracy, education, and 
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industrial development (Dow and Karunaratna, 2006), we first estimate their effects 
separately (models (17)–(22)). Somewhat surprisingly, the only coefficient that 
remains significant is that for differences in industrial development (models (19) and 
(22)). The coefficients of historical ties (models (17)–(19)) and common language 
(models (20)–(22)) both remain strong and significant (p < 0.01 and p < 0.001, 
respectively). In the final set of models ((23) and (24)), we retain all variables, 
alternating only the collinear historical ties and common language variables. 
Consistent with our previous estimations, only the coefficients of historical ties, 
common language, and industrial development remain significant. The explanatory 
power of the models with historical ties (model (23)) and common language (model 
(24)) are comparable, with adjusted R2 of 0.663 and 0.668, respectively. 
 
5.5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
This study attempts to reflect critically on the commonly held assumption that 
underlies the psychic distance construct, namely, that firms favour foreign markets 
that are similar to the home market and eschew the commitment of resources to 
markets that are dissimilar. We argue that decision makers may perceive some 
countries and markets as psychologically more close than others because of not only 
the degree of similarity between the home and the foreign country but also the 
extent to which that decision maker perceives the foreign market as familiar. 
We explore the validity of our argument by contrasting the effect of a set of 
similarity-based psychic distance stimuli with that of historical ties, a country-level 
psychic distance stimulus that we associate with foreign market familiarity. The 
results suggest that historical ties, common language, and differences in industrial 
development provide a stronger and more robust explanation of the location of 
foreign direct investment than do cultural or institutional similarities or similarities in 
terms of the political system, education level, or religion.  
 
Effect of Historical Ties and Common Language 
Our estimates generally indicate that both historical ties and common language have 
significant effects on the location of FDI. The consistent effect of historical ties in 
both the extended and the limited sample supports our hypothesis, yet these results 
require further comment because of the correlation between historical ties and 
common language (r = 0.62 in the extended sample and r = 0.60 in the limited 
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sample). This finding is not surprising: In intensely colonized countries, native 
languages often got replaced with or complemented by the language of the 
colonizers. Two questions thus remain: Can the observed effect be attributed to 
either historical ties or common language, and does the significant effect of historical 
ties indicate a similarity effect or a familiarity effect? 
To disentangle the effects of historical ties and common language, we 
removed countries with both a historical tie and a common language from our 
sample and re-estimate the effects of ties and language. Although the variation 
explained by historical ties remains consistently higher for all four periods, both ties 
and language become insignificant because of the reduced sample size. Strictly 
speaking, we therefore must conclude that the effects of historical ties and common 
language are inseparable on the basis of the current data set, and that both their 
effects are significant. 
Thus, we turn to the question of whether the significant effect of historical 
ties should be interpreted as a similarity or a familiarity effect. A look at the 
correlation matrix indicates that though historical ties and common language are 
moderately correlated, neither correlates with any of the other similarity measures. 
This is not to claim that, for example, historical ties with the U.K. did not at least 
partially inform the parliamentary system of New Zealand or the legal system of 
South Africa. Rather, the correlation matrix illustrates that historically tied countries 
are not necessarily more similar in terms of the country characteristics most 
frequently associated with reduced psychic distance, see page 154 In addition, though 
the effects of both historical ties and language are significant and robust, the effects 
of many similarity-based variables remain insignificant. These observations provide 
at least partial support for the argument that the effect of historical ties captures a 
construct distinctive from that of country similarities. 
 
Cultural and Institutional Distance  
By and large, we cannot confirm that differences in culture, as measured with Kogut 
and Singh’s (1988) measures, affect the location of FDI from the four source 
countries in our sample. Although our results suggest that cultural distance has merit 
as an explanatory variable when considered in isolation, this power mostly disappears 
when combined with other—better—explanatory variables, such as historical ties 
and common language. These results add to the work of those sceptical of the 
cultural distance concept or its supposed effects, such as Benito and Gripsrud 
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(1992), Shenkar (2001), Harzing (2003), and Tihanyi, Griffith, and Russell (2005). We 
also confirm the insignificant effect of cultural distance on internationalization 
decisions, even though Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index remains one of the most 
indiscriminately applied psychic distance surrogates.91  
A similar conclusion emerges regarding the effect of institutional distance: It 
has some explanatory power when considered in isolation or in combination with 
historical ties and common language, yet the effect disappears when we combine 
institutional distance with additional variables, such as cultural distance and industrial 
development, with which it is moderately correlated. This finding is not to say that 
institutions do not matter in location decisions; as evidenced in other empirical 
studies (e.g., Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer, 2004; Jakobsen and De Soysa, 2006), 
institutional quality serves to increase the attractiveness of countries as destinations 
for foreign investment, even if the combination of institutional conditions that 
determine location attractiveness differs by region (Pajunen, 2008). However, our 
results do not support the notion that substantive institutional country differences 
have a negative effect on locational attractiveness, which casts doubt on institutional 
differences as a significant psychic distance stimulus. 
 
Effects of Democracy, Education, Religion, Industrial Development, and Political Ideology 
We estimate the effects of several additional country similarities using measures 
developed by Dow and Karunaratna (2006). Although the effect of differences in 
industrial development is significant, we find no consistent effects of differences in 
democracy, education, political ideology, or religion on the location of foreign 
investment. However, multicollinearity among industrial development, education, 
and democracy means these results are not necessarily unbiased.  
For three reasons, we nonetheless recommend differences in industrial 
development as a key predictor variable. First, when we alternate the industrial 
development, education, and democracy variables in the extended models (models 
(17)–(22)), only the coefficient for industrial development remains significant. 
Second, in our sample, differences in industrial development correlate most strongly 
with the location of foreign investment. In contrast with Dow and Karunaratna 
                                                 
91 Kogut and Singh proposed the measure in a study on entry-mode selection rather than on 
geographic location decisions. However, their measure thereafter has been applied in all sorts 
of studies related to foreign investment. 
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(2006), we therefore identify differences in industrial development, rather than 
differences in education, as the most significant psychic distance stimulus. 
Alternatively, the negative effect of differences in the degree of industrial 
development on the location of FDI may reflect the common notion that most 
MNE activity takes place within the “triad” of developed countries in the European 
Union, North America, and Asia (Rugman, 2000; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004). At 
the least, the results demonstrate that when it comes to the location of foreign 
investment, not all country differences equally affect location attractiveness. Third, 
the large differences in the effects of religion, education, and language support Dow 
and Karunaratna’s (2006) suggestion that the relative contribution of various psychic 
distance stimuli likely varies with the type of managerial decision or the type of entry 
mode.  
 
The Familiarity Dimension of Psychic Distance 
The dominant argument in the field of international business regarding psychic 
distance and the location of foreign investment asserts that the higher the degree of 
(perceived) similarity between the home and the foreign market, the lower the 
psychic distance experienced (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), whereas the 
lower the psychic distance, the less uncertain firms are toward a foreign market 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988), and the higher the propensity or likelihood that the firm 
will invest or expand in that country (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). In this study, we 
develop the notion of familiarity and suggest that what determines psychological 
distance is not merely the perception of country differences but also the degree to 
which a decision maker perceives a foreign market as familiar. Our empirical finding 
that historical ties, common language, and industrial development have a strong 
effect on the location of foreign investment, whereas the effect of other measures of 
country similarities is not significant, adds support to our argument that current 
conceptualizations of psychic distance overlook an important dimension. 
The familiarity construct offers interesting implications for the psychic 
distance concept and internationalization process theory. Country differences may 
inhibit the flow of information between foreign markets and the firm (Brewer, 2007; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1975), yet cognition research demonstrates that both 
knowledge and beliefs depend on a much wider range of information sources at the 
individual, organizational, and national levels (Walsh, 1995). As a result, a person 
may claim familiarity with countries that he or she perceives as very different from 
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the home country. Future research should examine the implications of such off-
diagonal relations on the perception of psychic distance. In addition, holding or 
forming beliefs about foreign markets requires no actual experience, which implies 
that prior to entry, foreign markets may be perceived already as familiar (e.g. 
Pedersen and Petersen, 2004), with high confidence levels about the foreign context, 
even in the absence of actual local knowledge. Therefore, further research should 
also examine whether the perception of familiarity permits firms to demonstrate high 
levels of local engagement, even at entry. 
Our study also comes with three important caveats. First, data on measures 
capturing similarity between countries are only available for a limited number of 
almost exclusively developed countries. This means that this study stands out from 
the other chapter in this thesis where we focus exclusively on the developing region in 
the world: Africa. It also means that we can not comment the relation between 
similarities and internationalisation patterns for developing countries, based on 
empirical results. But despite this serious shortcomings, we try to shed some light on 
the relationship between historic ties and investment patterns by providing additional 
estimates for an extended sample of countries that include many developing 
countries including the majority of Africa.  
Second, though the use of country-level data enabled us to study the effect 
of several alleged country-level antecedents of psychic distance on aggregate firm 
behaviour, it does not allow for the measurement of psychic distance itself, which 
requires detailed firm- or individual-level data. Our level of analysis also implies that 
we cannot comment on the effect of historical ties on the actual internationalization 
sequence of firms or the commitment of resources to foreign markets over time. 
Despite these significant shortcomings, our results suggest that for the location of 
foreign investment, not all country similarities have equal weight as psychic distance 
stimuli. A comparison with Dow and Karunaratna (2006), who use trade intensity as 
their dependent variable, reveals that our results support their notion that the relative 
contribution of psychic distance stimuli may also differ, depending on the entry 
mode decision. For example, whereas a common language is not conductive for 
trade, language may positively affect location decisions when such decisions involve 
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local investments.92 Our results therefore caution against the indiscriminate use of 
country differences as a surrogate for psychic distance. 
Third, the historical ties variable we develop arguably provides a rather 
crude indicator of the perception of familiarity, and it may be compromised by its 
correlation with common language. In addition, as we have emphasized, many other 
factors likely influence the extent of perceptions of familiarity with a foreign market. 
We focus on historical ties mainly because they frequently have been recognized as 
potential psychic distance stimuli (e.g. Brewer, 2007; Dow and Karunaratna, 2006), 
though usually with the assumption that they engender country similarities—an 
assumption that, with the exception of common language, our data do not support. 
                                                 
92 In contrast with our findings, in Dow and Karunaratna (2006) the coefficient of the 
language variable—which correlates strongly with our common language dummy (r = 0.84)—









Table 1.A.: Colonial period per country 










Benin  French West Africa France 
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Botswana  Bechuanaland Britain 
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1966 
Burkina Faso  Upper Volta France 
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Burundi  Ruanda-Urundi Belgium 
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1962 
Cameroon  Cameroun France, Britain 
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Cape Verde  Portugal  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1975 
Central African Rep. French Equatorial Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Chad  French Equatorial Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Comoros   France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1975 
Congo  French Equatorial Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Côte d'Ivoire  Côte d'Ivoire  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Djibouti  French Somaliland  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1977 
DR Congo  Belgian Congo  Belgium  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Equatorial Guinea  Spanish Guinea  Spain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1968 
Eritrea  Eritrea  Ethiopia  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1993 
Ethiopia  Kingdom of Aksum  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885  
Gabon  French Equatorial Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
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Table 1.A.1continued: Colonial period per country 





Guinea  French West Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1958 
Guinea-Bissau  Portuguese Guinea  Portugal  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1973 
Kenya  British East Africa  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1963 
Lesotho  Basutoland  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1966 
Liberia  Commonwealth of Liberia  
American 
Colonization Society  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1847 
Madagascar  Malagasy Protectorate  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Malawi  Nyasaland  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1964 
Mali  French West Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Mauritania  French West Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Mauritius   Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1968 
Mozambique  Portuguese East Africa  Portugal  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1975 
Namibia  South West Africa  South Africa  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1990 
Niger  French West Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Nigeria  Nigeria  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Rwanda  Ruanda-Urundi  Belgium  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1962 
São Tomé and Príncipe  Portugal  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1975 
Senegal  French West Africa  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Seychelles   Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1976 




Italian Somaliland, British 
Somaliland  Italy, Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
South Africa  South Africa  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1961 









                                                                      
 
Table 1.A.1continued: Colonial period per country 





Swaziland  Swaziland  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1968 
Tanzania  Tanganyika  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1964 
The Gambia  Gambia  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1965 
Togo  French Togoland  France  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1960 
Uganda  British East Africa  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1962 
Zambia  Northern Rhodesia  Britain  
Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 1964 






































Rule of Law and Order 
1996-2002 
    
Angola -1.18 1.00 -1.54 
Benin 0.97 6.00 -0.27 
Botswana 2.35 9.00 0.58 
Burkina Faso -0.30 0.67 -0.54 
Burundi -0.96 0.83 -1.28 
Cameroon -0.91 1.00 -1.26 
Cape Verde   
Central African Republic 0.01 5.00 -1.09 
Chad -0.58 1.00 -0.90 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -1.99 
Congo, Rep. -1.21 0.00 -1.37 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.26 3.00 -0.97 
Djibouti -0.13 2.00 -0.63 
Equatorial Guinea -1.09 0.00 -1.25 
Eritrea    
Ethiopia -0.12 3.00 -0.82 
Gabon -0.40 0.00 -0.50 
Gambia, The 0.08 0.00 0.01 
Ghana 0.65 4.33 -0.27 
Guinea -0.89 1.00 -1.23 
Guinea-Bissau -0.39 5.00 -1.52 
Kenya -0.33 3.00 -1.04 
Lesotho 1.54 8.00 -0.07 
Liberia -1.26 3.00 -2.04 
Madagascar 0.93 7.17 -0.55 
Malawi 0.85 6.67 -0.54 
Mali 0.78 6.00 -0.48 




                                                                      
 
Table 2.A.1 continued: factor analysis scores + underlying variables 
  Governance Democracy 1997-2002 
Rule of Law and Order 
1996-2002 
Mauritius 2.73 10.00 0.79 
  Mozambique 0.47 6.00 -0.80 
Namibia 1.49 6.00 0.29 
Niger -0.19 2.67 -0.83 
Nigeria -0.57 3.20 -1.34 
Rwanda -1.14 0.00 -1.30 
Sao Tome and Principe  -0.32 
Senegal 0.85 5.00 -0.19 
Sierra Leone -0.19 5.00 -1.30 
Somalia   -2.15 
South Africa 1.96 9.00 0.18 
Sudan -1.30 0.00 -1.47 
Swaziland -0.20 0.00 -0.29 
Tanzania 0.13 2.50 -0.45 
Togo -0.53 1.00 -0.85 
Uganda -0.59 0.00 -0.71 
Zambia 0.12 3.00 -0.57 
Zimbabwe -0.83 0.00 -0.96 
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Appendix 2.B: Included control variables 
 
-GDP pc 1990. Per capita income in 1990 is included to control for income differences 
across countries. Data are taken from Maddison (2003). 
 
-Colonial dummy. To see whether different colonising powers had a distinct influence on 
governance quality we include a dummy for British colonies. 
 
-Ethnic Linguistic Fractionalisation. Given that the heterogeneity of most African 
societies is often argued to negatively influence governance quality (Easterly and Levine 1997, 
Alesina et al. (1999), we include an ethnic fractionalisation measure of 1985 taken from P. G. 
Roeder (2001). 
 
-Ethnic Tensions. Since ethnic diversity is often argued to create tensions and conflicts 
which negatively influence governance quality (Horowitz 1985, Gurr 1993, Sambanis 2001)93, 
we include the average measure for ethnic tension between 1984-2000 (taken from the 
ICRG). 
 
-Total Military Intervention Score. Military intervention, or military coups have been a 
pervasive phenomenon in SSA (McGowan 2003). These interventions create political 
instability and military rule is almost by definition authoritarian. This leads to a worsening in 
governance quality. (Taken from McGowan 2003). 
 
-Internal Conflict. The final measure of violence measures the extend to which countries 
experienced internal conflict. Countries that experience more internal conflict have on 
average lower governance quality (Elbawadi, I. and N. Sambanis 2002, 2000) 
 
-Mineral resource dependence. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) argue that capital intensive 
production systems in general, and mineral resource dependent systems in particular, are 
likely to lead to sub-optimal institutional development paths. Therefore include the following  
mineral resource dependency variable: the log of hydrocarbons deposits per captia (BTU’s 
per person of proven crude oil and natural gas reserves in 1993, taken from Gallup et al. 
1998).   
 
                                                 
93 There are also many studies either arguing the opposite (namely that fractionalisation 
makes countries saver) Collier and Hoeffler 2002, Collier (2001), or that there is no effect of 
ethnic heterogeneity on instability and conflict (Elbawadi and Sambanis 2000 and 2002). 
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-Population density 1900. Africa stands out for its low population density. Domar (1970) 
indicates that low population density in combination with land-abundance can result in sub-
optimal paths of institutional development. Therefore population density in 1900 is included. 
Population data are derived from McEvedy and Jones (1978). Information on the area of the 
various African countries in squared km. is taken from the World Development Indicators. 
 
 
-Permanent Settlement. We calculated the percentage op people that historically lived in 
permanent settlements. The settlement pattern variable in Murdock (1967) is divided in 
societies that live in  “fully migratory or nomadic bands (a)”; in  “separated hamlets where 
several such form a more or less permanent single community (b)”; in “neighborhoods of 
dispersed family homesteads (c); in “seminomadic communities whose members wander in 
bands for at least half of the year (d)”; in “semisedentary communities whose members shift 
from one to another fixed settlement at different seasons or who occupy more or les 
permanently a single settlement from which a substantial proportion of the population 
departs seasonally to occupy shifting camps (e)”; in “compact and relatively permanent 
settlements (f)”; in compact but impermanent settlements(g); and societies that live in 
“complex settlements consisting of a nucleated village or town with outlying homesteads or 
satellite hamlets (h)”. We follow Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) who define permanent 
settlement to include societies living in (b), (c), (f) or (h).  
 
-Written records. We calculated the percentage op people that belongs to a society that had 
an indigenous system of writing based on the ‘writing and record’ variable of Murdock and 
Provost (1973). Societies are divided in societies that have “an indigenous  system of true 
writing and possesses written records of at least modest significance (a)”; in societies  that 
have “an indigenous system of writing but lack any significant accumulation of written 
records (b)”; in societies that “lack true writing but possesses a significant nonwritten records 
in the form of picture writing, quipus, pictorial inscription, or the like”(c); in societies  where 
“writing and significant records are lacking but the people employ mnemonic devices, e.g. 
simple tallies” (d); and in societies where “writing, records and mnemonic devices in any 
form are lacking or unreported” (e). Murdock and Provost (1973) provide this data for only 
the 41Sub-Saharan African societies which are included in the Standard Cross Cultural 
Sample (see Murdock and White 1969). As these societies represent clusters of culturally 
related societies, we assign the same value for all so societies in the corresponding cluster, 
following Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). Subsequently we follow Gennaioli and Rainer (2207), 
who define societies possessing an indigenous writing system to include those that are 
included in (a) and (b). 
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-Dependence on Agriculture. The Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967) gives the estimated 
relative dependence of each society on five major types of subsistence activity (gathering, 
hunting, fishing, animal husbandry and agriculture). The scale is from 0-9 (Murdock 1967:47). 
We calculate for each country the weighted average for the dependence on agriculture for all 
its societies following Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). 
 
-Forest-Woodland.  The percentage of land covered by Forest and Woodland, taken from 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                      
 
Table 2.C.3: Robustness check: state development and community development separately linked to 
respectively rule of law and democracy 
  Rule of Law Democracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
State-Community 0,49   1,63   
  (0,29)   (1,41)   
State˚  0,74**    0,43  
   (0,29)    (1,46)  
Communityª   0,50    5,04*** 
    (0,34)    (1,52) 
         
Adj. R2 0,05 0,13 0,003 0,01 -0,02 0,13 
N 42 41 43 40 39 40 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
˚ Centralisation measure taken from Gennaioli and Rainer (2007).  









Table 3.A.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
Indigenous slavery 43 0.6277 0.3498 0 0.99 
Ln(income2000) 52 7.1335 0.8253 5.3845 9.2735 
Export slavery 52 3.2596 3.8948 -2.3026 8.8183 
British colony 52 0.3462 0.4804 0 1 
French colony 52 0.4038 0.4955 0 1 
Portuguese colony 52 0.0962 0.2977 0 1 
Belgian colony 52 0.0577 0.2354 0 1 
Spanish colony 52 0.0192 0.1387 0 1 
Latitude 52 13.5500 9.8586 0 36 
Longitude 52 16.6988 20.2144 -24.0443 57.7939 
Rainfall 52 8.8654 16.0551 0 69 
Humidity 52 71.6731 11.9471 35 95 
Temperature 52 8.7500 7.4882 -9 19 
Coastline 52 -0.2378 3.2352 -4.6052 6.9839 
Islam 52 35.3192 39.0848 0 100 
Gold 52 -7.4840 5.6642 -13.8155 3.0843 
Oil 52 -6.7148 4.0309 -9.2103 3.2359 
Diamonds 52 -5.4901 2.3963 -6.9078 2.1868 
Atlantic distance 52 7.3808 3.2803 3.6468 16.3927 
Indian distance 52 6.9342 4.2387 0.0319 16.7754 
Saharan distance 52 3.5112 1.5678 0.3097 6.6373 
Red Sea distance 52 3.4455 1.4666 0.0644 6.4654 
Early state development 47 0.5804 0.3291 0 1 
Written records 43 10.2884 24.3562 0 97.5 
Democratic accountability 32 
1.4699 0.9334 0 3.3750 
Bureaucratic quality 32 
2.6393 0.9751 0.4917 4.4333 
State capacity 34 
-0.7784 0.4682 -1.6000 0.2600 
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Appendix 3.B: Robustness checks 
Table 3.B.1: Indigenous Slavery and Average 1990-2000 Income levels: OLS Regressions 
  Dependent variable: log GDP pc, average 1990-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Ind. slavery -0.861*** -0.902*** -0.603** -0.770*** -0.855** -0.613*** 
  (0.317) (0.318) (0.278) (0.257) (0.325) (0.223) 
Latitude 0.013      
  (0.014)      
Longitude -0.004     -0.007** 
  (0.004)     (0.004) 
Coastline 0.028      
  (0.03)      
Rainfall  0     
   (0.006)     
Humidity  0.004     
   (0.012)     
Temperature  -0.007     
   (0.016)     
Islam   -0.001    
    (0.003)    
Early state dev   -0.238    
    (0.262)    
Export slavery   -0.062**   -0.086*** 
    (0.024)   (0.023) 
Gold    -0.001   
     (0.014)   
Oil    0.044*  0.064*** 
     (0.026)  (0.021) 
Diamonds    0.057   
     (0.049)   
British colony     -0.244  
      (0.479)  
French colony     -0.292  
      (0.492)  
Port. colony     -0.572  
      (0.487)  
Belgian colony     -0.652  
      (0.541)  
Spa. colony     0.438  
      (0.497)  
(constant) 7.411*** 7.274*** 7.727*** 8.028*** 7.763*** 8.246*** 
  (0.369) (0.795) (0.284) (0.321) (0.507) (0.219_ 
              
R2 0,33 0,28 0,35 0,4 0,37 0,56 
N 43 43 41 43 43 43 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.B.2: Indigenous Slavery and 2000 Income levels WDI: OLS Regressions 
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Ind. slavery -1.66*** -1.539*** -1.004** -1.277*** -1.324** -0.941** 
  (0.52) (0.496) (0.423) (0.388) (0.503) (0.361) 
Latitude 0.008                     
  (0.021)                     
Longitude -0.011     -0.015**  
  (0.008)     (0.006) 
Coastline 0.003                     
  (0.052)                     
Rainfall  -0,006                    
   (0.010)                    
Humidity  0.005                    
   (0.017)                    
Temperature  -0.004                    
   (0.027)                    
Islam   0                   
    (0.004)                   
Early state dev   -0.413                   
    (0.490)                   
Export slavery   -0.104**   -0.113*** 
    (0.045)   (0.036) 
Gold    0.006                  
     (0.023)                  
Oil    0.085***  0.113*** 
     (0.030)  (0.025) 
Diamonds    0.093                  
     (0.070)                  
British colony     0.113                 
      (0.783)                 
French colony     0.117                 
      (0.792)                 
Port. colony     -0.269                 
      (0.928)                 
Belgian colony     -0.632                 
      (0.826)                 
Spa. colony     1.358                 
      (0.824)                 
(constant) 7.062*** 6.640*** 7.227*** 7.877 6.750*** 8.166*** 
  (0.597) (1.114) (0.491) (0.414) (0.839) (0.33) 
              
R2 0,3544 0,314 0,366 0,487 0,398 0,632
N 41 41 39 41 41 39




                                                                      
 
Appendix 3.C: 2sls estimates 
We need an instrument that is correlated with indigenous slavery, but not with the error term in 
the equation explaining present-day income. We base our instrumentation choice on model 
(3.6) above, where we now instrument indigenous slavery with latitude, state development and 
prevalence of Islam94. Also, since we are interested in unbiased estimates of the effects of both 
indigenous and export slavery, we take account of the fact that export slavery may be an 
endogenous variable. As in Nunn (2008), we instrument export slavery with a country’s 
distance to African coasts where important export slave trade ports were located: the Red Sea 
coast, the Atlantic Ocean coast, the Mediterranean coast and the Indian Ocean coast. 
Estimations results are reported in tables 3.B.1 and 3.B.2, where we report second and 
first stages, respectively, of 2SLS regressions of two models. In both models, the coefficient for 
instrumented indigenous slavery takes a negative value which is significant statistically. We 
conclude from this that indigenous slavery was a robust long-term influence on African 
development, even taking account of any endogeneity problems and controlling for the 
presence of export slavery. 
To justify our use of the instrument variables (IV), we conduct several tests. A test of 
the exogeneity of the regressor (endogeneity test) indicates whether the IV method is required. 
It tests the null hypothesis that the variable is exogenous (hence, high p-values indicate 
exogeneity). Second, we use a weak identification test, with the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic, to 
examine the relevance of our instruments. This confirms they correlate with our independent 
variables. A weak identification indicates the weak explanatory power that causes an increased 
bias in the estimated IV coefficients (Hahn and Hausman, 2002). We provide Stock-Yogo 
critical values. Test statistics below the critical value indicates weak instruments (which is the 
case for our second estimate). Third, we use a test of over-identifying restrictions using the 
Hansen J statistic to test the validity of our instruments (i.e., if the instruments are orthogonal 
to the error distribution of the dependent). For this test statistic, the null tests validity of 
instruments, which is indicated by high P-values.  
  
 
                                                 
94 Instrurmenting only with latitude produces qualitatively identical results. This might be 
viewed as more valid since indigenous state development and prevalence of Islam are plausibly 
endogenous themselves and therefore, it could be argued, not suited as an instrument. Either 
choice does not affect the outcome. 
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Table 3.C.1: 2SLS estimations second stages 
  (1) (2) 
 pc income 2000 pc income 2000 
Export slavery   -0.160*** 
  (0.0559) 
   
Slavery -1.297** -0.581* 
 (0.574) (0.290) 
   
Longitude -0.00535 -0.0137** 
 (0.00559) (0.0057) 
   
Oil 0.0418 0.0767*** 
 (0.0320) (0.023) 
   
Constant 8.144*** 8.760*** 
  (0.389) (0.427) 
adj. R2 0.249 0.453 
N 41 41 
   
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic / 
partial F statistic 
7.439 2.278 
Stock-Yogo critical values 6.46 6.16 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.14 0.61 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.73 0.5 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 2sls is estimated 
using small sample properties. The Hansen J statistic tests for joint instrument validity, where null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the second stage equation. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for weak instruments is an adaption of Gragg 
Donald F statistic as errors are assumed to be the non i.i.d. and robust to HAC. The degrees-of-freedom for the rk 
statistic is ((N-L)/L1)*((N- 1)/N)*(N_clust-1)/N_clust), where N is the number of observations, L is the number of 
instruments and L1 is the number of excluded instruments. Kleibergen-Paap F closely approximates partial F statistic 
and is reported jointly. Stock -Yogo (2005) critical values are for 20% maximal LIML size. 
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Table 3.C.2: 2SLS estimations, first stages 
  1 2 3 
 Slavery Export Slavery Slavery 
Longitude -0.005** 0.153 -0.059*** 
 (0.002) (0.154) (0.019) 
    
Oil -0.027* 0.235 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.165) (0.016) 
    
Latitude -0.028*** -0.101 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.156) (0.01) 
    
Islam 0.004** 0.005 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.02) (0.002) 
    
Early state dev. 0.538*** 0.62 0.495*** 
 (0.152) (2.495) (0.152) 
    
Atlantic dist.  -0.612 -0.196*** 
  (0.713) (0.06) 
    
Indian dist.  -1.167 -0.212** 
  (0.878) (0.088) 
    
Saharan dist.  -4.299** 0.231 
  (1.624) (0.167) 
    
Red Sea dist.  3.737* -0.670*** 
  (1.905) (0.217) 
    
(constant) 0.443*** 19.17 5.360*** 
  (0.105) (15.458) (1.563) 
adj. R2 0.38 0.21 0.53 
N 41 41 41 
    
F 8.70*** 3.59*** 8.25*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 3.D: How much Income Development did Slavery Cost Africa? 
What was the substantial impact of indigenous slavery on long-term development of African 
income levels was - how much income development did it cost the continent? To explore this 
issue we ask how a one standard deviation change in the slavery variable would affect per capita 
incomes in the year 2000. This then reflects the impact on long-term development of a sample-
specific, typical change in indigenous or export slavery. 
Since the dependent variable is in logarithmic terms but the independent is not, the 
coefficient is a semi-elasticity: it tells us the percentage change in 2000 per capita incomes 
resulting from a one unit change in the slavery variable95. The coefficient in the most 
conservative instrumented estimations in Appendix B is b = -0.058. A change in S from its 
sample average 0.63 by 0.01 unit to 0.64 would with lead to a growth decline of 0.01 * -0.581 = 
0.00581, or -0.581 percentage points. But the typical variation in our sample, the standard 
variation of 0.35, is much larger and results in a change in the 2000 income level equal to 
(0.35*-0.581), which is a -20 percentage points decline. In the same Appendix B model, the 
coefficient for export slavery is -0.160. A standard deviation increase in the measure for export 
slavery (of 3.60) then implies a GDP decline of 58 %, or nearly three times larger than the 
indigenous slavery effect. 
As noted, it is not clear that instrumentation is necessary and valid, given the sample 
properties, so we also consider the coefficients in our preferred Table 3.2 OLS specification. 
These are -0.712 for indigenous slavery and -0.109 for export slavery, implying year 2000 per 
capita GDP declines of 25 % and 39 %, respectively. 
To put this into context, total average growth in per capita income achieved during 
1960-2000 in the same sample was 0.93 % annually. The growth loss due to a one standard 
variation change in the measure for indigenous slavery is thus equivalent to between 20 (2SLS) 
and 24 (OLS) years of contemporary growth; for export slavery this was between 58 and 38 
years, respectively96  - 3 or 2 times larger than the indigenous slavery effect. 
                                                 
95 In the equation  ln(y) = C + b*S + e (where y, S and e are 2000 per capita incomes, slavery and the error 
term, respectively), coefficient b equals the first derivative of ln(y) with respect to S, denoted d(lny)/dS  
(using d for infinitesimal changes). Because d(lny)/d(y) = 1/y, it follows that d(lny) = d(y)/y, which is the 
relative change in y, expressed as a fraction. Hence coefficient b is the ratio of d(y)/y over dS, or the 
relative change in y (expressed as a fraction) over a one unit change in S. 
96 Since ln(1.25) / ln(1.0093) = 24, rounded to whole years. 
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Appendix 3.D 
Table 3.D.1: Definitions and Sources   
Variable Source Definition 
log of GDP pc in 
2000 Maddison (2003) Real per capita GDP in 2000 
British colony Nunn (2008) British Colony 
French colony Nunn (2008) French Colony 
Portuguese colony Nunn (2008) Portuguese Colony 
Belgian colony Nunn (2008) Belgian Colony 
Spanish colony Nunn (2008) Spain (Equatorial Guinea) 
Longitude Nunn (2008) 
The longitude of each countries centroid, 
measured in degrees. The centroid of each 
country is calculated using the Centroid 
Utility in ArcGIS. For the countries where 
the centroid is located outside the land 
borders of the country (Cape Verde, Gambia, 
Mauritius, Seychelles and Somalia), a point 
within the country closest to the centroid is 
used. The location on the coast that is closest 
to each country's centroid is identified using 





The absolute value of latitude of each 
country's centroid measured in degrees 
Early state 
development 
Gennaioli en Rainer 
(2007) 
    
For each country the share of non-European 
population that belongs to indigenously 
'centralised' ethnic groups 
Written records 
  
Bolt en Smits (2008) 
  
For each country the share of non-European 
population that belongs to an indigenous 





The percent Islamic variable is the percent of 
a country’s population that is Islamic. 
Slave export per area Nunn (2008) 
Log of total number of slaves taken from 
each country during various slave trades 
between 1400 and 1900, normalised by 
country size (measured by land area -millions 
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Table 3.E.1continued: Definitions and Sources   
Variable Source Definition 
Rainfall Nunn (2008) 
The average total rainfall, in the driest month 
of the year, measured in millimetres.  
Humidity Nunn (2008) 
The average of the maximum afternoon 
humidity, measured in percent, during the 
hottest month of the year 
Temperature Nunn (2008) 
Lowest average monthly temperature, degrees 
Celsius 
Coastline Nunn (2008) Countries' total coastline per land area 




Natural log of the average annual gold 
production per thousand inhabitants from 
1970 to 2000 measured in kilograms 
Oil Nunn (2008) 
Natural log of the average annual crude 
petroleum production per thousand inhabitants 
from 1970 to 2000 measured in thousands of 
tonnes 
Diamonds Nunn (2008) 
Natural log of the average annual gemstones 
and industrial diamond production per 
thousand inhabitants from 1970 to 2000 
measured in thousands of carats 
 Atlantic distance  Nunn (2008) 
Shortest sailing distance for slave ships to the 
port of destination in the transatlantic slave 
trade 
Indian distance Nunn (2008) 
Shortest sailing distance for slave ships to the 
port of destination in the Indian Ocean slave 
trade 
Red Sea distance Nunn (2008) 
Shortest overland slave route to location of 
demand 
Saharan distance Nunn (2008) Shortest overland slave route to location of 
demand 
Population 
density 15 century 





Type of governance enjoyed by a country, 




Reflects the risk of drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services after a 
change in government 
State Capacity Englebert (2000a) The development capacity of states combining 
policy and governance variables 
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Appendix 4.A: Income, Geographical and Institutional Data 
We thank Acemoglu for kindly providing the data on which the Acemoglu et al. (2001) results 
are based; and Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger for making their data on which the Gallup et al. 
(1998) results are based available on the Internet. 
 
Table 4.A.1. Data description 
Variable Year Source 
Settler Mortality 1800-1850 Acemoglu et al, 2001  
Settler mortality is potential settler mortality measured in terms of deaths per annum per 
1000 'mean strength' (raw mortality numbers are adjusted to what they would be if a 
force of 1000 living people were kept in place for a whole year). 
Democracy at first 
year of independence 
before 1975 Various years Polity IV 
Democracy indicator based on the competitiveness of political participation, openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the executive. Scale 
between 0 and 10, where higher scores indicate more democracy. Year of observation is 
the first year of independence as long as that is before 1975, otherwise the country gets a 
score of 1 (in line with Acemoglu et al 2001). 
Constraint on the 
executive before 1975 Various years Polity IV 
Measure of the extent of institutionalised constraints on the decision making powers of 
chief executives, whether individuals or collectivises. Scale between 0 and 7, where 
higher scores indicate more constraints. Year of observation is the first year of 
independence as long as that is before 1975, otherwise the country gets a score of 1 (in 
line with Acemoglu et al 2001). 
PopCoast 1994 Gallup et al 1998 
Proportion of the population living within 100 km of the coastline. 
Landlocked dummy   Gallup et al 1998 
A binary dummy, with a value one indicating landlockedness 
Malaria index 1966, 1994 Gallup et al 1998 
Index of Malaria prevalence based on a global map of extent of malaria in 1966 (WHO 
1967), and the fraction of falciparum malaria. 'The index is the product of the fraction of 
land area subject to malaria times the fraction of falciparum malaria cases'. (Gallup et al 
1998) 
      
Life expectancy 1965 1965 Gallup et al 1998 
Data Gallup et al took form the United Nations 
 




Table 4.A.1: Data description (continued) 
Variable Year Source 
Tropic 1996 Gallup et al 1998 
The proportion of a country's land area within the geographical tropics 
Legal origin    Authors 
Binary dummy, where value one indicates a former British colony. 
  
Hydrocarbons 1993 Gallup et al 1998 
Hydrocarbon deposits are total BTU's per person of proven crude oil and natural gas 





















                                                                      
 
Appendix 4.B: Collected Colonial Data 
Our newly constructed date set is comprised of data on former British and French colonies in 
Africa. Based on colonial yearbooks of the years 1945–1955 (detailed sources are below), we 
calculated variables that could serve as proxies for the general institutional environment 
between 1945–1950. The data set consists of four modules:  
 
a) Population density and European presence (calculated as density per squared 
kilometre and as the proportion of Europeans to total population) in countries is 
collected.  
b) Human capital: school pupils as a proportion to total population. 




Pupils per 1000 
population 
Pupils per 1000 population  
British colonies 
Pupils per 1000 
population  French 
colonies 
Mean 42 61 23 
Median 36 54 16 
Stdev 35 43 22 
Min 2 11 2 
Max 151 151 69 
Obs 39 15 15 






Europeans per population 
(%) - British colonies 
Europeans per 
population (%) - French 
colonies 
Mean 0,71 1,013 0,46 
Median 0,31 0,277 0,33 
Stdev 1,13 1,599 0,41 
Min 0,08 0,075 0,08 
Max 5,50 5,499 1,30 
Obs 24 11 13 
    
 
 
Europeans per square 
kilometre 
Europeans per square 
kilometre - British colonies 
Europeans per square 
kilometre - French 
colonies 
Mean 0,040 0,062 0,022 
Median 0,024 0,037 0,015 
Stdev 0,062 0,085 0,022 
Min 0,001 0,003 0,001 
Max 0,277 0,277 0,076 
Obs 24 11 13 
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Table 4.B.2. Sources 
French West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal) 
Annuaire Statistique de L’Afrique 
Occidentale Francaise, 1949 Volume 4, 
and 1950 à 1955 Volume 5 
French Equatorial Africa (Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Gabon) 
 Annuaire Statistique de L'Afrique 
Equatoriale Française, 1936-1950 Volume 
1, 1951 à 1955 Volume 2 
Madagascar 
Annuaire Statistique de Madagascar, 1938 




Official Year Book of the Union [of 
South Africa] and of Basutoland 
[Lesotho], Bechunanaland Protectorate 
[Botswana] and Swaziland, 1950 no 26. 
Ghana 
 
Economic and Statistical Bulletin of the 
Gold Coast, April 1952, Vol 1. 
  
Digest of Statistics, November 1953, No. 
4 




Official Year Book of the Union [of 
South Africa] and of Basutoland 
[Lesotho], Bechunanaland Protectorate 
[Botswana] and Swaziland, 1950 no 26. 
Malawi 
 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 
Census of Population 1956 
  
Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1955, 






Final report on the Census Enumeration 
made in the Colony of Mauritius and its 
Dependencies on 11th June, 1944 
 
Blue Book of the Colony of Mauritius 
and its Dependencies, 1946/1947 
 Yearbook of Statistics, 1959 No. 14.  
Nigeria 
Blue Book for the year ending 31st 
December, 1938. 
 
Digest of Statistics, Vol. 2, October 1952, 
No. 1 and 4. 
  Digest of Statistics 1956 
Sudan 
Foreign Trade Report (with some internal 
statistics), 1949 
 
First population census of Sudan 
1955/56, Final Report, vol. 1 
 Swaziland 
 
Official Year Book of the Union [of 
South Africa] and of Basutoland 
[Lesotho], Bechunanaland Protectorate 
[Botswana] and Swaziland, 1950 no 26. 
Tanzania 
Statistical Abstract, 1938-1952 
(Tanganyika) 
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Uganda Statistical Abstract, 1957 
Zambia 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 
Census of Population 1956 
  
  
Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1955, 
Vol. 2, No. 1 
 
Economic and Statistical Bulletin 
(Northern Rhodesia), February 1953, Vol. 
5, No. 11 
Zimbabwe 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: 
Census of Population 1956. 
 
 
Monthly Digest of Statistics, April 1955, 
Vol 2, No. 1 
Official Year Book of Southern Rhodesia, 
1952, No. 4 
   
Additional data on Education Mitchell, B.R. (2003) 4th edition 
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Table 4.B.3: Variable description and availability 








French West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal) 
  1950-55 
   
French Equatorial Africa (Central African  
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Gabon) 
  1946-51 Madagascar 
  1948-53 Ghana 
  1947-51 Kenya 
  1946-51 Malawi 
  1946-47 Mauritius 
  1938-50 Nigeria 
  1936,46,50 Botswana 
  1936,46,50 Lesotho 
  1949-55 Sudan 
  1936,46,50 Swaziland 
  1947-52 Tanzania 
  1947-51 Uganda 
  1946-51 Zambia 
  1946-51 Zimbabwe 








French West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania,  
Niger, Senegal) 
  1950-55 
   
French Equatorial Africa (Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Gabon) 
  1946-51 Madagascar 
  1948-53 Ghana 
  1947-51 Kenya 
  1946-51 Malawi 
  1946-47 Mauritius 
  1938-50 Nigeria 
  1936,46,50 Botswana 
  1936,46,50 Lesotho 
  1949-55 Sudan 
  1936,46,50 Swaziland 
  1947-52 Tanzania 
  1947-51 Uganda 
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Variable Description Year  Source 
  1946-51 Zambia 








French West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal) 
  1950-55 
   
French Equatorial Africa (Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo Republic, Gabon) 
  1946-51 Madagascar 
  1948-53 Ghana 
  1947-51 Kenya 
  1946-51 Malawi 
  1946-47 Mauritius 
  1938-50 Nigeria 
  1936,46,50 Botswana 
  1936,46,50 Lesotho 
  1949-55 Sudan 
  1936,46,50 Swaziland 
  1947-52 Tanzania 
  1947-51 Uganda 
  1946-51 Zambia 
    1946-51 Zimbabwe 
    
Education 
Total students 





French West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo) 
  1950-52 
   
French Equatorial Africa (Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo Republic, Gabon) 
  1947-49 Madagascar 
  1945 Gambia 
  1945-47 Ghana 
  1947-49 Kenya 
  1947-50 Malawi 
  1947-49 Mauritius 
  1949-50 Nigeria 
  1947-49 Botswana 
  1947-49 Lesotho 
  1947-49 Sudan 
  1948-50 Swaziland 
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Variable Description Year  Source 
  1947-49 Tanzania 
  1949-51 Uganda 
  1948-51 Zambia 
  1948-50 Zimbabwe 
  1947-49 Angola 
  1948-50 Cameroon 
  1947-49 Mozambique 
  1947-49 Sierra Leone 
  1947-49 Congo DM 
  1950-52 Liberia 
    1945-51 Burundi 
  1945-51 Rwanda 
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Appendix 5.A. Institutional Indicators 
The institutional distance scores are based on data from the Global Competitiveness Report 
(2000) and matched with the key institutional features of business systems identified by 
Whitley (1999). All scores range between 1 and 7, and we invert the scores on union power 
for interpretation. We also identify suitable indicators for all institutional features except the 
dominant organizing principle of unions, the extent to which bargaining is centralized, and 
the more specific extent to which communal norms govern authority relations.  
 
Key institutional features Indicatorsa 
The state  
Dominance of the state and its 
willingness to share risk 
Independence of government policies from 
elites and special interest groups (3.05) 
The extent to which government subsidies 
promote competition (3.03) 
State antagonism to collective 
intermediaries 
The pervasiveness of industrial clusters and 
specialized institutions  (10.16) 
Extent of formal regulation of markets The burden of regulation (3.01) 
  
Financial systems  
Capital market or credit based Access to external finance (8.04) 
The use of the stock market (8.11) 
  
Skill development and control system  
Strength of public training system The difference in quality of schools 
available to rich and poor children (6.02) 
Strength of independent trade unions The extent of union power and influence 
(6.10) 
  
Trust and authority relations  
Trust in formal institutions Public trust of politicians (4.16) 
Predominance of paternalist authority 
relations 
The willingness to delegate authority to 
subordinates (11.13) 
The extent to which management-worker 
relations are cooperative (6.09) 
a Corresponding items in the Global Competitiveness Report 2000 are in parentheses. 
 
We also provide the correlation matrix of the selected indicators. A two-step clustering 
procedure with a sample of OECD countries from the Global Competitiveness Report 
validates the selection of our institutional indicators, as discussed more extensively in Hotho 
(2008). The clusters formed on the basis of the selected institutional indicators correspond 
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well with Whitley’s business system typology, in terms of both cluster characteristics and 
cluster membership, which lends support to the selected indicators. We calculate subsequent 
distances using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) approach, except that we do not correct for 
differences in variance, because the original scores are scaled similarly. Ultimately, our 




∑ (Iij − Iik )2 /11, 
where IDjk is the institutional distance between countries j and k, and (Iij - Iik) is the difference 
in the scores of countries j and k on institutional feature i. Calculated institutional distances 
are available upon request. 
 








































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                      
 
Appendix 5.B: Descriptive statistics and gravity estimations for 1984-1988 
1989-1993 and 1994-1998 
 
Table 5.B.1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 1984–1988 
Variables N Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. FDI 1984-1988 149 5.64 2.23      
2. National Incomes 
1984 
149 25.30 1.52 0.65**     
3. Distance 149 8.17 1.20 -0.41** -0.27**    
4. Historical Ties 149 0.15 0.36 0.28** 0.09 -0.10   
5. Common Language 149 0.09 0.29 0.26** 0.00 -0.05 0.56**  
6. Cultural Distance 149 0.37 0.92 -0.36** -0.33** 0.28** -0.16 -0.27** 
*  p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 5.B.2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 1989–1993 
Variables N Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. FDI 1989-1993 192 5.91 2.43      
2. National Incomes 1989 192 25.42 1.52 0.62**     
3. Distance 192 8.25 1.14 -0.44** -0.31**    
4. Historical Ties 192 0.15 0.35 0.31** 0.10 -0.10   
5. Common Language 192 0.10 0.30 0.29** 0.02 -0.09 0.60**  
6. Cultural Distance 192 0.43 0.89 -0.36** -0.30** 0.30** -0.17 -0.30** 
*  p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 5.B.3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 1994–1998 
Variables N Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. FDI 1989-1993 199 6.61 2.28      
2. National Incomes 1989 199 25.62 1.49 0.64**     
3. Distance 199 8.21 1.14 -0.42** -0.23**    
4. Historical Ties 199 0.15 0.35 0.26** 0.11 -0.11   
5. Common Language 199 0.10 0.29 0.25** 0.02 -0.08 0.59**  
6. Cultural Distance 199 0.42 0.88 -0.33** -0.28** 0.29** -0.17* -0.30** 
*  p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
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Table 5.B.4: Results of the gravity model for FDI location between 1984 an 1988 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Ln FDI 1984-1988 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
National Incomes 0.88*** 086*** 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Distance -0.47*** -0.43*** -0.40*** -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.44*** 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Historical Ties  1.32*** 1.25***    
   (0.36) (0.36)    
Cultural Distance   -0.21 -0.28** -0.10  
    (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)  
Common Language     1.83*** 1.91*** 
      (0.46) (0.44) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.53 
N 149 149 149 149 149 149 
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients reported; standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 5.B.5: Results of the gravity model for FDI location between 1988 and 1993 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Ln FDI 1989-1993 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
National Incomes 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.85*** 0.88*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Distance -0.58*** -0.54*** -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.53*** 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Historical Ties  1.61*** 1.52***    
   (0.36) (0.36)    
Cultural Distance   -0.30** -0.38*** -0.17  
    (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)  
Common Language     1.94*** 2.08*** 
      (0.44) (0.42) 
        
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.50 
N 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients reported; standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.. 
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Table 5.B.6: Results of the gravity model for FDI location between 1993 an 1998 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Ln FDI 1994-1998 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
National Incomes 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.87*** 0.89*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Distance -0.56*** -0.53*** -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.53*** 
  (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Historical Ties  1.09*** 1.03***    
   (0.33) (0.33)    
Cultural Distance   -0.21 -0.27** -0.10  
    (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)  
Common Language     1.58*** 1.66*** 
      (0.40) (0.38) 
        
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.52 
N 199 199 199 199 199 199 
Notes: Standardized regression coefficients reported; standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Het is algemeen bekend dat Afrika het armste continent ter wereld is, gemeten naar 
niveau en groei van inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking. In veel studies naar 
economische groei in een globale  context neemt Afrika dan ook een bijzondere plek 
in, vaak weerspiegeld door de beruchte Afrika-dummy.  
 Maar gemiddelden hebben een beperkte betekenis in de Afrikaanse context, 
gezien de enorme diversiteit die dit continent herbergt. Er zijn 47 landen in Sub-
Sahara Afrika (hierna Afrika), die samen een gebied bestrijken van 23,8 miljoen 
vierkante kilometer. Dat is een gebied zo groot als Europa, de Verenigde Staten 
(inclusief Alaska) en China samen. Het continent kent een grote verscheidenheid aan 
klimaatzones die varieert van woestijnen en semi-woestijnen tot savannes, tropische 
regenwouden en bosgebieden.  
 In 2000 leefden er meer dan 665 miljoen mensen in Afrika, gemiddeld 28 
mensen per vierkante kilometer. Het dichtstbevolkte land is Mauritius met 584 
inwoners per vierkante kilometer, de minst dichtbevolkte landen zijn Namibië en 
Mauritanië die respectievelijk 2,3 en 2,4 inwoners per vierkante kilometer hebben. 
Daarnaast is Afrika ook etnisch en linguïstiek veruit het meest diverse continent ter 
wereld. 
 Deze grote verschillen in omstandigheden kunnen we terug zien in de 
ontwikkelingspaden die diverse Afrikaanse landen hebben bewandeld gedurende de 
tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw. Er zijn landen die gemiddeld meer dan 2,5 
procent per jaar zijn gegroeid sinds 1950, maar er zijn ook landen die in 2000 armer 
waren dan 25 jaar eerder.  
 Afrika’s bijzondere positie in ontwikkelingsstudies, en de grote diversiteit in 
ontwikkelingspaden van verschillende Afrikaanse landen verdient een analyse van 
haar institutionele en economische ontwikkeling in een volledig Afrikaanse context. 
Dit proefschrift zal dit doen vanuit een historisch perspectief, door te kijken naar de 
invloed van initiële condities op de lange termijn ontwikkelingspaden in Afrika. 
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Gegeven Afrika’s koloniale geschiedenis, die een duidelijke invloed heeft gehad op 
de ontwikkeling van dat continent (al was het alleen al door de creatie van de landen 
die we vandaag de dag kennen) definiëren we twee perioden voor initiële condities: 
de prekoloniale periode en de koloniale periode.  
 
Het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift is zowel een algemene inleiding op 
Afrikaanse lange-termijn ontwikkeling als een inleiding op de hoofdstukken die 
volgen. Het begint met een kort overzicht van de huidige economische 
omstandigheden in Afrikaanse landen en de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen sinds 1950. 
Daaruit wordt duidelijk dat er voldoende variatie in groei is tussen landen om te 
kunnen analyseren. Hierna volgt een overzicht van de literatuur over economische 
ontwikkeling, met een focus op Afrika. 
De literatuur onderscheidt de volgende kernoorzaken van Afrikaanse ontwikkeling:  
Instituties, die hun oorsprong hebben in de koloniale tijd. De algemene 
conclusie is dat Afrikaanse landen slechter presteren dan landen uit andere regio’s 
omdat het institutionele raamwerk dat geïmplementeerd is gedurende de koloniale 
tijd om verschillende redenen niet voldoet.  
Slavenhandel, die voor en tijdens de koloniale periode bestond, en waardoor 
miljoenen jonge Afrikanen zijn weggevoerd. Niet alleen zorgde de slavenhandel voor 
politieke instabiliteit, maar ook voor extreem lage bevolkingsdichtheid. De literatuur 
toont aan dat beide factoren een termijn effect hebben op de lange termijn 
ontwikkeling van Afrika.  
Geografie: de tropische ligging van het grootste deel van het Afrikaanse 
continent wordt gezien als een reden voor de over het algemeen lage productiviteit in 
de landbouw vanwege slechte grondkwaliteit, schaarste van water, en de 
aanwezigheid van ongedierte en parasieten die ziekten veroorzaken bij mens en dier. 
Daarnaast zijn een groot aantal landen in Afrika afgesloten van directe toegang tot de 
zee, of een bevaarbare rivier. Dit maakt het transport van goederen kostbaar en 
moeilijk. 
Een laatste belangrijke conclusie in de literatuur over de ontwikkeling in 
Afrika is dat de grote etnische diversiteit op het continent de economische ontwikkeling 
vaak heeft gehinderd, doordat het moeilijker is een oplossing voor conflicten te 
bereiken als er veel groepen betrokken zijn. Empirische resultaten echter wijzen 
verschillende kanten op, hetgeen bewijst dat de relatie tussen etnische diversiteit en 
economische groei een gecompliceerde is. 
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Eén van de onderwerpen waar in de kwantitatieve literatuur tot nu toe relatief weinig 
aandacht is besteed is de situatie zoals die was voordat de Europese landen het 
continent gingen besturen. Lange termijn institutionele verklaringen bijvoorbeeld 
houden meestal alleen rekening met de koloniale invloed op instituties en niet met de 
omstandigheden in de tijd daarvoor. Bovendien onderzoeken de meeste studies 
economische ontwikkeling op basis van analyses voor alle landen in de wereld. De 
vraag is hoe goed die methoden toepasbaar zijn op de groeiverschillen tussen 
Afrikaanse landen. Op beide terreinen beoogt dit proefschrift een bijdrage te leveren. 
Ten eerste door de institutionele omgeving van prekoloniale samenlevingen mee te 
nemen in een analyse van de lange termijn institutionele en economische 
ontwikkeling. Ten tweede door uitsluitend de verschillen in ontwikkeling tussen 
Afrikaanse landen te bestuderen. 
  
Het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift is gewijd aan de invloed van 
prekoloniale instituties op institutionele ontwikkeling. Op basis van antropologische 
data construeren we verschillende institutionele maatstaven die lange-termijn 
institutionele en economische ontwikkeling zouden kunnen verklaren.  
 Een groot deel van de kwalitatieve en historische literatuur beargumenteert 
het belang van vroege politieke structuren op institutionele en ontwikkeling. Politieke 
stabiliteit (vaak gerelateerd aan staatsstructuren) bijvoorbeeld, leidt tot betere 
instituties en zo tot hogere economische groei. 
 In dit hoofdstuk beargumenteren we dat naast deze staatsstructuren, lokale 
gemeenschapsstructuren even belangrijk zijn voor het verklaren van institutionele 
ontwikkeling in Afrika. Ten eerste was de lokale een cruciaal kenmerk van 
(prekoloniale) Afrikaanse organisatiestructuren; een karakteristiek die tot op heden 
kenmerkend is gebleven voor veel landen inde regio. Lokale samenlevingen 
functioneerden als verzekering in tijden van ziekte of slechte oogst en speelden zo 
een centrale rol in het omgaan met schaarse hulpbronnen. Daarnaast functioneerden 
goed georganiseerde lokale samenlevingen als tegenwicht ten opzichte van de staat.. 
Lokale gemeenschapsstructuren beperkten de macht van de staat en maakten 
collectieve actie gemakkelijker.  
 Naast vroege politieke structuren nemen we nog drie andere prekoloniale 
institutionele karakteristieken mee, waarvan op basis van de literatuur ook kan 
worden verwacht dat ze van invloed zijn op lange termijn institutionele ontwikkeling. 
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De eerste is autochtone slavernij. Hierbij bekijken we welke samenlevingen de 
institutie van slavernij hadden vóór de koloniale machten het continent innamen. 
Slavernij is een institutie die mensen controleert en uitsluit. Er bestaat literatuur die 
beargumenteert dat slavernij vaak leidt tot de ontwikkeling van politieke systemen 
waarbij mensen beperkt worden in hun deelname in politieke processen. De laatste 
twee prekoloniale instituties die we beschouwen zijn culturele heterogeniteit, en 
conflictmanagment instituties. Daartoe brengen we in kaart hoeveel verschillend 
georganiseerde groepen in één land leven, en of deze groepen naar binnen of naar 
buiten toe zijn georganiseerd, dat wil zeggen of ze  wel of niet contact zoeken met 
andere groepen met als doel samenwerking (een heel rudimentaire vorm van 
conflictmanagment) te bevorderen Als groepen heel verschillend zijn georganiseerd 
kan worden verwacht dat voorkeuren verschillen en dat samenwerking moeilijker is 
dan in samenlevingen waar groepen homogeen zijn gestructureerd. Dit zal met name 
het geval zijn in samenlevingen waar geen instituties ten behoeve van 
conflictmanagment waren ontwikkeld.  
 De resultaten bevestigen het belang van de combinatie van staat en 
community structuren voor institutionele ontwikkeling. In landen waar deze 
structuren goed ontwikkeld waren zien we nu meer wet- en regelgeving en sterkere 
democratische structuren. Daarnaast zien we dat in samenlevingen waar slavernij een 
algemene  verbreide institutie was, de wet- en regelgeving en democratische 
structuren zich in veel minder sterke mate hebben ontwikkeld. Ook een grote 
diversiteit in culturele achtergrond blijkt de ontwikkeling van deze instituties te 
bemoeilijken, hoewel deze heterogeniteit een minder negatief effect heeft in die 
samenlevingen waar een zekere vorm instituties ten behoeve van conflictmanagment 
waren ontwikkeld.  
 
De negatieve invloed die slavernij heeft op institutionele ontwikkeling, de 
omvangrijke literatuur over de invloed van Europese exportslavernij op ontwikkeling 
in Afrika, en het in de literatuur vaak genoemde nauwe verband tussen autochtone 
slavernij en exportslavernij, heeft ertoe geleid dat we de invloed van autochtone 
slavernij op economische ontwikkeling in een aparte analyse onderzoeken in 
hoofdstuk 3. 
 Autochtone slavernij kent een lange geschiedenis en bestond al ver voor de 
koloniale slavenhandel (zeker vanaf de eerste eeuw na Christus, bijvoorbeeld in wat 
nu Ghana is). Autochtone slavernij was vaak een volledig geïntegreerd kenmerk van 
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prekoloniale samenlevingen. Toch zijn er veel bronnen die beargumenteren dat de 
institutie van autochtone slavernij sterk beïnvloed en veranderd is door de Europese 
slavenhandel, en dat autochtone slavernij het continent heeft geopend voor de 
export slavernij. 
 Veel samenlevingen steunden qua economische groei en politieke 
machtsvorming voor een groot deel op slaven. Productie hing vaak af van 
slavenarbeid, en politieke macht was afhankelijk van slavenlegers. Verder  maakte 
slavenhandel deel uit van de pan-Afrikaanse handel in goederen zoals zout, koper, en 
dadels vanuit de Sahara, en gierst, sorghum, graan, vee, gom, ivoor en goud vanuit 
West Afrika.  
 De belangrijkste conclusie van dit hoofdstuk is dat autochtone slavernij 
robuust en significant negatief gerelateerd is aan de lange termijn 
inkomensontwikkeling in Afrika. De resultaten van onze kwantitatieve analyse zijn 
grotendeels in lijn met bevindingen in de kwalitatieve literatuur, die stellen dat 
autochtone slavernij geografisch geconcentreerd was (voornamelijk in West en 
Equatoriaal Afrika), en meer voorkwam in samenlevingen waar de Islam 
domineerde. Tenslotte vinden we bewijs dat slavernij, door het sociaal uitsluiten van 
delen van de bevolking, heeft geleid tot de ontwikkeling van restrictieve instituties, 
die de ontwikkeling van ‘developmental states’ zeer bemoeilijkt heeft. 
 
In hoofdstuk vier analyseren we het effect van de koloniale periode op de lange 
termijn ontwikkeling in Afrika. In dit hoofdstuk maken we gebruik van de koloniale 
archieven om de omstandigheden op een aantal gebieden te kunnen kwantificeren. 
Volgens de literatuur waren de grootste sociale en economische veranderingen 
tijdens de koloniale periode een gevolg van de politieke bezetting van gebieden en 
het creëren van landstaten, economische invloed van het Westen, de introductie van 
het Christendom en van de invoering van westerse scholing. Wij concentreren ons in 
dit hoofdstuk op twee invloeden, namelijk de invloed van de bezettingspatronen en 
de invloed van westerse scholing op de ontwikkeling in Afrika.  
 De bezettingspatronen stellen ons in staat om een van de meest invloedrijke 
verklaringen voor onderontwikkeling van Afrika, de ‘extractive institutions’ -
hypothese, te testen. Deze hypothese stelt dat de instituties, geïmplementeerd door 
de koloniale machten hebben geleid tot een lage kwaliteit van hedendaagse instituties 
in Afrika, hetgeen één van de belangrijkste redenen is voor de achterblijvende 
ontwikkeling van Afrika ten opzichte van andere continenten. 
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We beginnen dit hoofdstuk met een kritische analyse van deze hypothese door te 
kijken of de analyse ook onderlinge groeiverschillen tussen Afrikaanse landen kan 
verklaren. Hoewel deze hypothese de groeiverschillen tussen Westerse landen en 
ontwikkelingslanden goed lijkt te verklaren, vinden we dat ze niet bruikbaar is voor 
de verklaring van groeiverschillen tussen Afrikaanse landen onderling. 
 Met de gegevens over westerse scholing analyseren we vervolgens de invloed 
van scholing op lange termijn Afrikaanse ontwikkeling. We constateren dat koloniale 
scholingscijfers een positief effect hebben op hedendaagse scholingscijfers, en dat 
koloniale scholing positief gecorreleerd is met inkomensontwikkeling sinds de 
onafhankelijkheid. Dit scholingseffect is robuust voor de opname van controle 
variabelen voor verschillende koloniale machten, en voor geografische variabelen, 
van welke sommigen een additionele verklarende kracht hebben.. Ook vinden we 
bewijs voor de stelling dat politieke instituties door scholing worden beïnvloed.   
 
In het vijfde en laatste hoofdstuk analyseren we of een koloniale band tussen 
landen, als onderdeel van bredere historische banden, ook op lange termijn interactie 
tussen moederland en kolonie beïnvloedt. Onze belangrijkste hypothese is dat, als 
landen een (koloniaal) verleden delen, dit de bekendheid tussen die landen vergroot 
en dat dat een positief effect heeft op investeringsbeslissingen.  
 Uit de literatuur weten we dat de psychologische afstand tussen landen is  
(de waargenomen afstand tot een ander land) een belangrijke factor voor 
investeringsbeslissingen is. Wij beargumenteren dat bekendheid tussen landen 
negatief gerelateerd is aan psychologische afstand tussen landen. Met andere 
woorden: als mensen bekend zijn met een ander land, voelen ze de afstand tot een 
ander land als minder ver, dan wanneer ze onbekend zijn met een land. Dit is een 
verschil met bestaande literatuur, waar de waargenomen afstand meestal afhangt van 
verschillen tussen landen, en niet van bekendheid met een ander land.  
 De resultaten bevestigen onze hypothese dat landen meer investeren in 
landen waarmee ze een historische (koloniale) band hebben dan in landen waarmee 
ze geen gedeelde geschiedenis hebben. Daarnaast tonen onze resultaten aan dat 
verschillen tussen landen niet zo belangrijk zijn voor de verklaring van 
investeringsstromen als vaak wordt gedacht. We vinden geen bewijs voor de stelling 
dat er meer geïnvesteerd wordt in landen die cultureel, institutioneel, politiek, 
religieus of op scholingsgebied sterke overeenkomsten vertonen. 
 
